Tag: Employment Law

The Right to Be Accompanied: A Legal Protection With a Dangerous Loophole

SOLIDARITY TRADE UNION | EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS & CASE LAW

Wolfe v Taka Mayfair Ltd [2026] EAT 106

A worker is called into a meeting with his employers at the end of a shift. He has not been warned that his job is at risk. He has not been told that the meeting is disciplinary or that dismissal is a possible outcome. There is no trade union representative present, no colleague to offer support and no opportunity to prepare a defence. By the time he discovers what the meeting is really about, he has lost his job.

Most people would regard that as an obvious denial of basic procedural fairness. Yet, according to a recent Employment Appeal Tribunal judgment, the employer has not necessarily breached the statutory right to be accompanied.

The reason is remarkably simple. The worker never asked to be accompanied.

That is the uncomfortable lesson of Wolfe v Taka Mayfair Ltd [2026] EAT 106, decided by His Honour Judge Auerbach on 22 July 2026. The judgment exposes a significant weakness in legislation intended to protect workers during disciplinary and grievance proceedings. It also raises an important question about the relationship between rights that exist on paper and rights that can be exercised in practice.

For trade unions, the case deserves careful attention. It illustrates why workers need to understand their rights before they find themselves in difficulty, why employers should be challenged when they fail to follow fair procedures, and why the law itself may need strengthening.

What happened to Mr Wolfe?

Leonardo Wolfe was employed by Taka Mayfair Limited, a restaurant business, as a Head Sommelier and Manager. His employment began on 21 December 2022 and ended on 21 January 2023, a period of just one month.

According to the account he advanced before the Employment Tribunal, the circumstances of his dismissal were particularly troubling.

At the end of a working shift, he was drawn into a face-to-face meeting with the restaurant’s two owners. He had received no advance warning of the meeting’s purpose. Neither its disciplinary character nor the possibility of dismissal had been explained to him.

The employer disputed the characterisation of the meeting, describing it as a performance review rather than a disciplinary hearing. Wolfe maintained that the meeting was one at which the statutory right to be accompanied should have applied.

That disagreement was never finally resolved in the proceedings under consideration. Instead, the case turned on a narrower legal question.

Wolfe had not asked to bring a trade union representative or work colleague to the meeting. He argued that he had been unable to make an informed request because he had not known what was about to happen.

There is an obvious practical difficulty here. A worker cannot readily exercise a right attached to a particular type of meeting if the employer conceals, or simply fails to disclose, the meeting’s true nature.

Wolfe subsequently brought Employment Tribunal proceedings and sought permission to amend his claim to include a complaint that his statutory right to be accompanied had been breached.

The Tribunal refused the amendment. Even accepting his factual account for the purpose of considering the application, it concluded that the proposed claim could not succeed. Section 10 of the Employment Relations Act 1999 required him to have made a request to be accompanied. He had not done so.

Wolfe appealed that decision.

It is important to understand precisely what the appeal concerned. The Employment Appeal Tribunal was not deciding whether the original dismissal was fair, nor whether the employer had behaved properly in every respect. It was deciding whether the Employment Tribunal had been legally correct to refuse an amendment adding a particular statutory complaint.

That distinction matters because an employer may escape liability under one statutory provision while still having acted unfairly or unreasonably under another.

What does the law actually say?

The right to be accompanied is contained in section 10 of the Employment Relations Act 1999. It applies to workers, not merely those who satisfy the narrower legal definition of employee, and it does not depend on a minimum period of service.

The legislation establishes two conditions for the statutory right to become operative.

First, the worker must be required or invited to attend a qualifying disciplinary or grievance hearing. Secondly, the worker must reasonably request to be accompanied.

Where those conditions are satisfied, the employer must permit the worker to be accompanied by an eligible person, generally an appropriate trade union official or another worker employed by the same employer.

The companion is not there merely to observe proceedings. The legislation allows the companion to put the worker’s case, respond to points raised during the hearing, sum up the worker’s position and confer with the worker privately.

A companion cannot insist on answering every question on the worker’s behalf or preventing the employer from presenting its case. Nevertheless, the role provides significant practical protection.

A representative may identify procedural irregularities, challenge unsupported allegations, seek clarification, ensure relevant mitigating circumstances are considered and help prevent an employer from using its greater experience or authority to overwhelm an individual employee.

There is also a statutory postponement right. Where the chosen companion is unavailable, an eligible worker can propose a reasonable alternative date within the statutory five-working-day period, and the employer must postpone accordingly.

These protections are valuable, particularly when dismissal is a possible consequence.

However, the legislation contains a crucial qualification. The worker must request accompaniment before the employer becomes subject to the relevant duties.

That requirement proved decisive in Wolfe’s case.

The argument against the employer’s approach

Wolfe’s argument before the Employment Appeal Tribunal was both practical and persuasive from the standpoint of workplace fairness.

If an employer can avoid the statutory duty simply by failing to explain that a meeting is disciplinary, the protection becomes vulnerable to circumvention.

Consider the difference between two situations.

In the first, an employee receives a letter explaining that they are required to attend a disciplinary hearing, setting out the allegations and warning that dismissal is a possible outcome. The employee requests a trade union representative, and the employer refuses.

That is a straightforward potential breach of section 10.

In the second, an employee is simply told to attend a meeting with management. No allegations are disclosed. No warning is given. During the meeting, the employer raises concerns about performance or conduct and announces dismissal.

The employee may never have requested a representative because there was no reason to anticipate needing one.

Yet the practical outcome is substantially the same. In both cases, the worker faces a potentially career-ending decision without the support that Parliament intended the legislation to provide.

Wolfe argued that allowing the second situation to escape the statutory protection undermined the legislation’s purpose.

He also challenged the suggestion that employees should simply ask for representation whenever they are summoned to an unexplained meeting.

Workers are not always in a position to challenge management. Some may fear that asking for a union representative will be interpreted as confrontational. Others may be unfamiliar with employment law, inexperienced in disciplinary procedures or anxious about their position.

Those fears are especially acute among workers with limited service, insecure contracts or little practical bargaining power.

Judge Auerbach recognised the force of these concerns. Nevertheless, he concluded that the statutory wording was sufficiently clear to prevent the Tribunal from adopting Wolfe’s proposed interpretation.

The judge’s task was to apply the law Parliament had enacted, rather than to rewrite that law in accordance with what might be regarded as desirable policy.

The judgment makes clear that the express wording requires an actual request. Without one, the accompanying obligations in section 10 do not arise.

The judge concluded that any gap in protection was ultimately a matter for Parliament to address.

The difference between legal rights and workplace fairness

One of the most important aspects of the judgment is its treatment of the Acas Code of Practice on Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures.

The Code sets out standards of fairness that employers are expected to observe when dealing with disciplinary matters.

Under the Code, employees facing disciplinary proceedings should ordinarily receive written notification of the allegations, sufficient information to understand the case against them and reasonable time to prepare a response.

They should also be informed of their right to be accompanied.

Paragraph 10 of the Code expressly addresses notification of that right. Yet, as the Employment Appeal Tribunal explained, the Code does not have precisely the same legal status as an Act of Parliament.

An employer’s failure to comply with the Code does not automatically give rise to an independent claim for compensation.

Instead, tribunals must take relevant provisions into account when deciding applicable claims, such as ordinary unfair dismissal. In appropriate cases, an unreasonable failure to follow the Code may also affect compensation, with a potential adjustment of up to 25 per cent.

This creates an important distinction.

An employer who fails to explain the purpose of a disciplinary hearing may have disregarded recognised standards of fair treatment. If an eligible employee is dismissed, that failure may contribute to a finding of unfair dismissal.

Nevertheless, it does not automatically establish a breach of section 10 unless the worker made the required request to be accompanied.

The distinction might satisfy the technical requirements of the legislation, but it is difficult to defend as a coherent approach to workplace justice.

Why should an employer’s obligation to respect a particular statutory protection depend on whether an employee recognised a danger that the employer had failed to disclose?

Acas guidance clearly recognises the value of giving workers proper notice and an opportunity to prepare. The judgment demonstrates that following good practice and complying with the narrow requirements of a particular statute are not always the same thing.

A request made during the meeting could make a difference

Although Wolfe lost his appeal, the judgment contains an important observation that union representatives should not overlook.

Judge Auerbach considered the possibility of a worker discovering, during an unexpected meeting, that formal disciplinary action might be taken.

What if that worker immediately asks for a trade union representative?

The judgment discussed this possibility with reference to Yoshovska v Goldman Sachs International, an Employment Tribunal decision from January 2022.

The suggestion was that a worker who only becomes aware of the disciplinary nature of a meeting once it is underway may still be able to make a reasonable request for accompaniment at that point.

There is nothing in section 10 requiring every request to be made in writing, nor does the legislation prescribe a particular minimum period before the hearing by which the request must be submitted.

It follows that an oral request made during a meeting may be legally significant.

A worker who suddenly realises that a supposed informal discussion has become a disciplinary hearing should therefore make an immediate and explicit request for representation.

The employer may then need to adjourn proceedings to allow the statutory right to be exercised.

Importantly, however, the judge did not finally determine that particular question. He identified it as a potentially arguable route, but it could not assist Wolfe because Wolfe had made no request at all.

That qualification should not be lost. The judgment supports the practical importance of making a request during a meeting, but it should not be presented as definitively settling every question about a late request or adjournment.

The distinction is particularly important in workplace representation, where an overconfident reading of a judgment can be as damaging as misunderstanding the law altogether.

Could the dismissal still have been unfair?

A natural reaction to the case is to ask whether Wolfe could have pursued ordinary unfair dismissal rather than relying on the right to be accompanied.

His exceptionally short employment was a significant obstacle.

At the time of his dismissal in January 2023, employees ordinarily needed two years’ continuous service to qualify for protection against ordinary unfair dismissal.

Wolfe had approximately one month’s service.

There are exceptions where dismissal relates to particular automatically unfair reasons, and discrimination protections are not generally dependent on completing two years’ service. However, the facts described in the EAT judgment do not, by themselves, establish that such an exception applied.

This is one reason the right to be accompanied is so important.

Unlike ordinary unfair dismissal protection under the law applicable to Wolfe’s dismissal, section 10 does not require two years’ service.

A worker may be entitled to the protection from the very beginning of the working relationship.

Indeed, its application is wider in another respect. It extends to qualifying workers rather than being restricted exclusively to employees.

That makes it particularly valuable for people in insecure employment who may have limited access to other employment protections.

The difficulty exposed by Wolfe’s case is that the benefit of this wider protection may disappear at precisely the moment an inexperienced or vulnerable worker needs it most.

There is, nevertheless, another important legal distinction.

The EAT referred to Talon Engineering Ltd v Smith, an earlier decision demonstrating that the statutory right to accompaniment and the general law of unfair dismissal are separate.

A breach of section 10 does not inevitably render a dismissal unfair. Equally, an employer may comply with section 10 and still carry out an unfair dismissal.

Fairness depends on the wider circumstances, including the employer’s reasons, investigations, procedures, and treatment of the employee.

It would therefore be wrong to conclude from Wolfe that employers have unrestricted freedom to dismiss workers at meetings arranged without warning.

They do not.

The judgment decides a specific statutory issue, not the general acceptability of surprise dismissals.

A right without an effective remedy?

There is another aspect of section 10 worth examining: the compensation available when employers breach it.

Where an Employment Tribunal upholds a complaint under section 11, it may order compensation of up to two weeks’ pay, subject to the relevant statutory calculations.

That is a comparatively modest financial remedy.

For a worker who has lost a job, the practical consequences can be far greater than the amount recoverable under this particular provision.

The legislation also provides separate protections against victimisation for exercising, or seeking to exercise, the right to be accompanied.

Section 12 protects workers against detriment for invoking the statutory rights and includes protection against dismissal for that reason. Certain claims arising from dismissal for exercising these rights do not require the ordinary qualifying period of employment.

There is protection, too, for those who accompany or seek to accompany another worker under the statutory arrangements.

These provisions demonstrate that Parliament recognised the risk of employers retaliating against workers or representatives who assert their rights.

Yet the Wolfe judgment exposes a difficulty that arises before retaliation even becomes relevant.

What happens when the worker never gets a meaningful opportunity to assert the right in the first place?

That is the central problem.

The statutory framework protects workers who invoke accompaniment rights, but the particular duty to permit accompaniment can be avoided where no request is made, even if the absence of a request results from the employer’s failure to explain what is happening.

This is an unsatisfactory imbalance.

The employee must be sufficiently informed, sufficiently confident and sufficiently quick-thinking to recognise the situation and invoke the protection. The employer, meanwhile, is not subject to an equivalent express obligation under section 10 to ensure that the worker knows the nature of the meeting and the right that may arise.

That does not mean every employer will exploit the position. Many employers will follow established procedures and allow representation as a matter of course.

The concern is that the law leaves room for less scrupulous employers to take advantage of a worker’s uncertainty.

A statutory safeguard should not depend so heavily on the employee’s ability to anticipate management’s intentions.

Why the judge could not close the loophole

It would be easy to criticise the EAT for reaching a conclusion that appears harsh. That would miss an important feature of the judgment.

Judge Auerbach did not suggest that Wolfe’s concerns were trivial or irrational.

On the contrary, the judgment engaged carefully with the argument that an employer could undermine the protection by withholding information about a meeting.

The difficulty was the statutory wording.

Section 10 expressly requires a reasonable request. There was no dispute that Wolfe had failed to make one.

The judge considered whether the legislation could be interpreted more broadly by reference to its purpose, the history of its introduction or human rights principles.

He concluded that these approaches could not remove a requirement stated unambiguously by Parliament.

The purpose of statutory interpretation is not to give judges unlimited freedom to repair legislation whenever its operation produces an unattractive result.

That is an important constitutional principle, even when its practical consequences are frustrating.

The judgment therefore puts responsibility for any reform where it properly belongs: with Parliament.

The final conclusion was that if the absence of protection in these circumstances represents a legislative gap, Parliament must decide whether to close it.

For unions, that creates an opportunity to make the case for a straightforward and overdue reform.

What should change?

There is a strong argument for amending section 10 so that employers have an express statutory obligation to notify workers of their right to be accompanied whenever they are required to attend a qualifying disciplinary or grievance hearing.

That notification should explain the nature of the meeting, the possible consequences and the worker’s entitlement to representation.

The duty should not depend on the employee requesting information that the employer ought to have supplied in the first place.

It would also be sensible to provide expressly that where an apparently informal meeting develops into one at which formal disciplinary action may be taken, the employer must stop proceedings, explain the worker’s rights and provide a reasonable opportunity to secure representation.

Such requirements would hardly impose an unreasonable burden on responsible employers. Organisations already following the Acas Code should have little difficulty complying.

The change would principally affect employers who fail to observe the standards of transparency and procedural fairness that should already be normal practice.

A further question concerns remedies.

The existing maximum compensation of two weeks’ pay for a straightforward breach of accompaniment rights may provide an inadequate deterrent, particularly where employers deliberately exclude union representation.

There is an argument for stronger remedies where an employer knowingly disregards a worker’s statutory rights, alongside effective protection against retaliation.

The wider issue is that workers should not have to understand complicated distinctions between statutory obligations, codes of practice and qualifying periods merely to obtain fair treatment.

Employment law is already complex. That complexity should not become an advantage for employers who control the disciplinary process.

What Solidarity members should do

The immediate lesson from Wolfe is that workers must be proactive about representation.

Members should never assume that a meeting described as informal, a performance discussion, a review or a routine management conversation cannot have disciplinary consequences.

Where there is uncertainty about a meeting’s purpose, the sensible course is to ask for clarification before attending.

If there is any possibility of formal disciplinary action, members should expressly request accompaniment by a trade union representative.

Making that request in writing creates a useful record, although the statutory requirement does not insist upon written notification.

The following wording would be appropriate:

I would like clarification of the purpose of this meeting and whether any disciplinary action, including a warning or dismissal, is being considered. If this is a disciplinary hearing, I am exercising my statutory right under section 10 of the Employment Relations Act 1999 to be accompanied by a trade union representative. I request that the hearing be arranged to allow my representative to attend.

If the disciplinary nature of a meeting only becomes apparent once proceedings have started, the worker should make the request immediately and ask for an adjournment.

For example:

It now appears that this meeting may result in disciplinary action. I am requesting trade union representation under section 10 of the Employment Relations Act 1999. I ask that the meeting be adjourned so that I can arrange for my representative to attend.

There is no guarantee that every dispute over such a request will be resolved in the worker’s favour. Nevertheless, making the request removes the particular difficulty that defeated Wolfe’s claim: the complete absence of any attempt to invoke the statutory right.

Members should also record what happened, including who attended, what was said about the meeting’s purpose, when disciplinary consequences were first mentioned and how management responded to any request for representation.

These details may become crucial evidence in subsequent proceedings.

It is important to distinguish between a disciplinary investigation, an informal management discussion and a formal disciplinary hearing. The statutory right does not ordinarily apply to purely investigatory meetings or informal discussions that cannot themselves result in disciplinary action. However, workplace policies may provide wider rights, and disability-related reasonable adjustments may create additional obligations.

Members should therefore seek advice rather than assume that the statutory minimum represents the full extent of their protection.

Lessons for union representatives

For trade union representatives, the case has implications extending beyond advising individual members.

One is the importance of challenging employers who use ambiguous terminology to describe meetings.

A meeting does not necessarily cease to be disciplinary simply because management calls it a performance review, fact-finding conversation or informal discussion.

Its actual purpose and potential consequences matter.

If a meeting can result in a formal warning, dismissal or another qualifying disciplinary outcome, the statutory definition may be satisfied regardless of the label the employer attaches to it.

Representatives should examine the employer’s own disciplinary procedure and any contractual or collectively agreed provisions concerning representation.

These may provide protections exceeding the statutory minimum.

A collective agreement, for example, may require advance notice, disclosure of allegations and union representation in circumstances where the precise statutory duty under section 10 has not yet arisen.

It is also worth examining whether the employer has followed the Acas Code, whether the disciplinary investigation was adequate, whether the worker had a meaningful opportunity to respond and whether any dismissal was reasonable in the circumstances.

Wolfe should not encourage representatives to abandon potentially meritorious cases simply because no request for accompaniment was made.

It does, however, mean that an isolated claim for breach of section 10 is unlikely to succeed where the evidence establishes that the worker never made such a request.

Finally, representatives should remember that tribunal claims are subject to strict time limits, generally starting at three months less one day for the relevant employment event, subject to applicable rules and extensions. Acas early conciliation can affect the calculation. Members should seek advice promptly rather than wait for internal proceedings to conclude.

The importance of trade union membership

Perhaps the most significant lesson concerns the practical value of trade union membership.

Employment rights are not self-enforcing.

Workers may possess considerable protections under legislation yet be completely unaware of their existence until a dispute develops.

Even those who know their rights may lack the confidence to challenge management, particularly when they are new to an organisation or worried about losing their livelihood.

An experienced union representative can change that balance.

Representatives understand the relevant procedures, recognise when a supposedly informal conversation has become a disciplinary matter and know when to insist that proceedings are adjourned.

They can identify whether the employer has disclosed the allegations, provided adequate evidence and allowed the worker sufficient time to prepare.

They can also ensure that disciplinary decisions are challenged through the proper channels where there are grounds to do so.

None of this guarantees that every employee will avoid disciplinary action or dismissal. Nor should it.

Employers have legitimate reasons to address misconduct and poor performance. A fair disciplinary system must accommodate those responsibilities.

But it must also ensure that workers are treated with dignity, allowed to answer allegations and given a genuine opportunity to defend themselves.

These principles are not obstacles to effective management. They are essential conditions of fair management.

Solidarity’s approach is to ensure that members do not have to face workplace disputes alone. Where representation rights arise, we want members to exercise them confidently, with access to advice before decisions are taken rather than having to pursue remedies after the damage has been done.

A victory for the wording of the law, but not necessarily for justice

The decision in Wolfe v Taka Mayfair Ltd is legally understandable. The Employment Appeal Tribunal was asked to interpret a statute, and the relevant words leave little room for manoeuvre.

The judge did not invent the requirement that workers request accompaniment. Parliament put it there.

Yet that does not make the outcome satisfactory.

The case demonstrates how a legal protection can be weakened by the conditions attached to exercising it.

A worker who knows a disciplinary hearing is taking place can request representation. A worker who has no idea that a disciplinary hearing is taking place may fail to do so, even though the need for representation is just as great.

The law recognises the former situation but, as this judgment confirms, does not adequately address the latter through section 10.

There is something deeply unsatisfactory about a system in which an employer’s failure to provide information can leave a worker unable to exercise a statutory right, without that failure itself constituting a breach of the particular provision intended to protect them.

The answer is not to criticise judges for applying the law. It is to improve the law.

Parliament should make it an explicit statutory duty to notify workers of their accompaniment rights and provide a meaningful opportunity to exercise them before formal disciplinary action is taken.

Until that happens, workers and their unions must deal with the law as it stands.

For Solidarity members, the message is clear. When management calls you into a meeting and you suspect that your employment may be at risk, establish what the meeting is about and request your union representative. If the meeting unexpectedly turns disciplinary, make that request immediately.

The most important words in a disciplinary meeting may be spoken before the employer has even explained its allegations.

They are the words that ensure you do not face those allegations alone.

Together we are strong.

By Maria Camara

Legal reference: Wolfe v Taka Mayfair Ltd [2026] EAT 106, judgment of HHJ Auerbach, 22 July 2026. The article reflects the law and published guidance reviewed on 14 October 2026. The 2026 Acas consultation draft is not treated as an operative replacement for the existing Code.

Primary judgment: Employment Appeal Tribunal judgment. Relevant guidance: Acas Code of Practice.

Understanding Pay Gaps: Lessons from Next v Thandi

Equal pay cases rarely arrive with fireworks. They tend to come wrapped in spreadsheets, job descriptions and long arguments about “material factors”. But every so often, a judgment cuts through the technicalities and shows us something important about how employers justify pay gaps — and how the law responds.

The Next Retail Ltd & Next Distribution Ltd v Thandi & Others appeal is one of those cases. It centres on a familiar divide: retail staff on one side, warehouse staff on the other, and a pay gap running straight down the middle. The workers argued the gap was discriminatory. The employer said it was simply the labour market at work.

The Employment Tribunal initially sided with the workers on key points. The Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) then stepped in and corrected parts of that reasoning. The result is a judgment that matters not just for the claimants, but for anyone fighting pay inequality in sectors where employers lean heavily on “market forces” to explain why some jobs are valued more than others.

Retail vs warehouse: the pay gap at the heart of the case

The claimants were retail workers. Their comparators were warehouse workers. Warehouse staff were paid more — not just in basic pay, but in some additional benefits too.

The tribunal accepted that the retail workers had shown particular disadvantage, based on statistical differences between the two groups and other factual findings. That’s significant. Equal pay claims often fall at the first hurdle because tribunals decide the disadvantage isn’t proven. Here, the tribunal said it was.

But when it came to the employer’s defence — the “material factor” argument — the tribunal rejected Next’s justification. It said the employer hadn’t shown a legitimate aim for the pay difference.

That’s where the EAT disagreed.

The EAT’s intervention: legitimate aims and proportionality

Mr Justice Bourne upheld the tribunal’s finding on disadvantage, but overturned its conclusion on justification. He said the tribunal had misunderstood the employer’s aim.

Next’s aim, taken as a whole, was to pay higher rates to warehouse staff because those roles faced recruitment and retention pressures that retail roles did not. That, the EAT said, is a legitimate aim. And crucially, the employer did not need to justify why it didn’t raise retail pay to match warehouse pay. The only question was whether the higher warehouse pay was justified.

Because the tribunal had approached the question the wrong way round, its alternative finding — that the employer’s justification wasn’t proportionate — also collapsed. The tribunal had focused too much on why retail pay was lower, and not enough on why warehouse pay was higher. That’s a legal misstep, and the EAT corrected it.

On other pay benefits, the tribunal’s reasoning was sound. No error there.

The cross‑appeal: direct discrimination

The workers also argued direct discrimination. The tribunal rejected that claim, and the EAT agreed.

Two points stand out:

  • Market forces don’t automatically amount to discrimination. Employers don’t have to prove that market pressures affect men and women equally every time they rely on them.
  • You don’t need a Board member to give evidence for the employer’s reasoning to stand. The tribunal had enough evidence to understand why Next made its decisions, even without senior executives giving live testimony.

That’s a tough outcome for claimants. It shows how high the bar remains for proving direct discrimination in pay cases.

What this means for workers and unions

Market‑forces arguments are here to stay

Employers will continue to rely on recruitment and retention pressures to justify pay gaps. This judgment strengthens that defence. It doesn’t make equal pay claims impossible, but it does make them harder when employers can point to external labour‑market conditions.

Tribunals must ask the right question

The tribunal focused on the retail workers’ lower pay. The EAT says the real question is: Was the higher warehouse pay justified? That framing matters. It shifts the burden and can change the outcome.

Statistical disadvantage still matters

The EAT upheld the tribunal’s finding that the claimants had shown disadvantage. That’s important. Workers can still use statistical evidence to demonstrate inequality — and tribunals must take it seriously.

Direct discrimination remains a steep climb

Unless there’s clear evidence of sex‑based decision‑making, tribunals will usually accept business‑related explanations.

The wider lesson

This case shows the limits of equal‑pay law when employers can point to market conditions. It also shows how easily tribunals can misapply the legal tests — and how important it is for workers to have strong representation capable of challenging those errors.

For unions, the message is clear: You need robust evidence, clear statistical analysis and a strong alternative narrative if you want to challenge market‑forces defences.

For workers, it’s another reminder that fairness and legality are not always the same thing. A pay gap can feel unjust, and still be legally justified.

The fight for equal pay continues — but cases like Thandi show exactly where the pressure points are, and why collective action remains essential.

By Pat Harrington

This article is intended as a general explanation of the decision in Next v. Thandi. It is not legal advice and should not be relied upon as such. The summary is based on publicly available information, including the judgment and reporting from reputable news sources, and is provided for information and comment only. Individual cases turn on their own facts, and anyone affected by issues raised here should seek advice from a qualified legal professional. Solidarity Trade Union accepts no liability for any loss arising from reliance on this material.

Duffy v House of Gods: Key Insights on Interim Relief for Workers

In late 2025, a hotel worker at Edinburgh’s boutique “House of Gods” found himself out of a job after a chaotic evening shift that ended with the police being called. That much is common ground. What came next is the sort of dispute that goes right to the heart of workplace safety, whistleblowing protection, and the power imbalance workers face when employers move fast and loose.

According to Mr Duffy, the worker at the centre of the case, he had raised a serious safety concern that night: fire escape doors left open, creating a risk to guests, staff, and the building’s security . He said this disclosure – a classic health and safety warning – was the real reason he was dismissed.

The employer told a very different story. They claimed no disclosure was ever made, and that the decision to dismiss had already been taken three days earlier, supposedly for performance reasons while he was still in probation .

When the case first reached the Employment Tribunal, Duffy applied for interim relief – a powerful but rarely granted remedy that can keep a worker on payroll until the full whistleblowing case is heard. The tribunal refused his application . So he appealed.

And that’s where things get interesting.

What the Employment Appeal Tribunal decided

Recorder Fraser Butlin KC allowed the appeal. His reasoning was simple but important: the tribunal had not carried out the required summary assessment of the evidence to decide whether Duffy had a “pretty good chance” of succeeding in his whistleblowing claim .

That phrase – pretty good chance – is the legal test for interim relief. It doesn’t require a full trial. It doesn’t require witnesses to be cross‑examined. It’s a quick, urgent look at the evidence to see whether the worker’s case is strong enough to justify temporary protection.

The tribunal hadn’t done that. It had simply refused the application without engaging properly with the evidence.

Butlin KC stopped short of substituting his own decision. Doing so, he said, would amount to an improper judicial fact‑finding exercise at appeal level. Instead, he sent the case back to the same tribunal to reconsider the interim relief application afresh .

Why this case matters for workers and trade unionists

1. Interim relief is one of the strongest protections workers have – but tribunals often shy away from it

Interim relief is a lifeline. If granted, it forces the employer to keep paying the worker until the final hearing. For someone suddenly dismissed, often without warning, that can be the difference between stability and crisis.

But tribunals rarely grant it. Some judges treat it as an exceptional remedy. Others apply the test too strictly. This case is a reminder that tribunals must actually do the job: look at the evidence, weigh it quickly but properly, and decide whether the worker has a “pretty good chance” of winning.

If they don’t, workers lose one of the few tools that can stop employers from sacking whistleblowers and then dragging out litigation for months or years.

2. Whistleblowing isn’t just about dramatic scandals – it’s often about everyday safety

Fire doors left open. Security risks. Guest and staff safety. These aren’t abstract concerns. They’re the sort of issues workers raise every day, often informally, often under pressure, and often without any protection when employers react badly.

This case shows how quickly a safety disclosure can become entangled with disciplinary action, probation reviews, and employer narratives about “performance”. It’s a familiar pattern to anyone in a union.

3. Employers frequently claim the dismissal decision was made earlier – tribunals must scrutinise that

The employer’s argument that the dismissal was already decided three days before the alleged disclosure is a classic defence. Sometimes it’s true. Sometimes it’s convenient. Interim relief hearings are precisely where tribunals should interrogate that claim.

The EAT’s message is clear: don’t just accept the employer’s timeline – test it.

4. Workers need unions because whistleblowing law is technical, fast‑moving, and stacked against individuals

Interim relief applications must be made within seven days of dismissal. Evidence must be marshalled quickly. The legal test is demanding. And employers often have HR teams and solicitors ready to respond.

Without union support, most workers never even attempt interim relief. Cases like Duffy’s show why unions must be ready to act fast when members raise safety concerns or face sudden dismissal.

The bigger picture

This appeal doesn’t decide whether Duffy was right or wrong. It doesn’t say whether he made a protected disclosure. It doesn’t say whether the employer acted lawfully. What it does say is that workers deserve a fair shot at interim relief when they claim they were sacked for raising safety concerns.

The EAT’s intervention is a quiet but important reminder that whistleblowing protections only work if tribunals apply them properly. For Solidarity members, it’s another example of why collective strength matters. When workers speak up about safety, they should not be punished – and when they are, the law should give them real tools to fight back.

This case reinforces that message. And it sends the tribunal back to do what it should have done the first time: look at the evidence, weigh it fairly, and decide whether a worker raising fire‑safety concerns deserves protection while the truth is sorted out.

By Patrick Harrington

Read the full Judgment in Duffy v BXTR 3 LTD t/a House of Gods: [2026] EAT 119.

This article is intended as a general explanation of the EAT decision in Duffy v. House of Gods. It is not legal advice and should not be relied upon as such. The summary is based on publicly available information, including the judgment and reporting from reputable news sources, and is provided for information and comment only. Individual cases turn on their own facts, and anyone affected by issues raised here should seek advice from a qualified legal professional. Solidarity Trade Union accepts no liability for any loss arising from reliance on this material.

ABC v Huntercombe: when a failing hospital changes hands and the law looks the other way

Sometimes a case doesn’t just expose a bad institution—it exposes a hole in the law. ABC v Huntercombe (No.12) Ltd & Ors [2026]EWCACiv1161 is exactly that. It’s about a young woman, a failing psychiatric hospital in Maidenhead, a change of ownership, and a legal system that ultimately tells her: you may have been wronged, but you may never be compensated.

This is the Court of Appeal’s decision, in plain English, with the BBC’s reporting and the judgment woven together.

The hospital, the patient, and the transfer

Huntercombe Hospital in Maidenhead was a privately run psychiatric facility for young people. At the time relevant to this case, it was owned and operated by Huntercombe (No.12) Ltd, part of the Huntercombe Group.

The claimant—known only as ABC for legal reasons—was placed there for about four months in 2018–2019. She alleges that during that placement she was:

  • mentally and verbally abused by staff
  • restrained on more than 200 occasions

Every single one of those events happened before the hospital changed hands.

In around March 2021, the hospital undertaking was transferred under the TUPE 2006 Regulations to Active Young People Limited (AYPL). Two clinicians involved in her care—her consultant psychiatrist and responsible clinician—moved across with the transfer and continued working under AYPL.

By 2023, the hospital had closed. The BBC describes it bluntly as a “failing hospital for young people” that shut after years of problems.

Why she couldn’t just sue Huntercombe

ABC initially sued Huntercombe alone. That’s the obvious defendant: it owned and ran the hospital at the time of the alleged abuse.

But Huntercombe went into liquidation. The Court of Appeal explains the practical problem: Huntercombe’s insurance arrangements included a £250,000 per‑claim excess. If claims succeeded, that excess would have to be met by the insolvent company itself. The judges accepted that this could “wipe out most or all” of ABC’s damages.

So ABC did what any rational claimant would do: she looked for someone else who might be legally responsible.

She turned to AYPL, the company that took over the hospital in 2021.

The legal question: does vicarious liability travel with the staff?

The case turns on a narrow but high‑stakes question under Regulation 4(2)(a) of TUPE 2006:

When a business is transferred under TUPE, does the old employer’s vicarious liability to an injured third party (here, a patient) transfer to the new employer?

Regulation 4(2)(a) says that, on a relevant transfer, “all the transferor’s rights, powers, duties and liabilities under or in connection with” any employment contract move to the transferee.

It was already established in Bernadone v Pall Mall Services Group [2001] ICR 197 that tort liabilities owed to employees can transfer under TUPE, because they arise “in connection with” the employment contract.

ABC’s argument was to push that logic one step further. If an employer’s tort liability to an employee can transfer, why not its vicarious liability to a third party, where that liability arises from acts closely connected with the employee’s work?

Her case was simple in concept:

  • Huntercombe’s staff allegedly abused and restrained her before 2021.
  • Huntercombe is now insolvent and may not be able to meet the insurance excess.
  • AYPL took over the hospital and the staff under TUPE.
  • Therefore, AYPL should have inherited Huntercombe’s vicarious liability for those pre‑transfer acts.

His Honour Judge Bird, sitting in the High Court, rejected that argument at a preliminary trial in 2025. ABC appealed.

The Court of Appeal: TUPE doesn’t carry third‑party vicarious liability

The appeal was heard by Bean LJ, Coulson LJ (who gave the leading judgment), and Sir Launcelot Henderson on 22 July 2026, with judgment handed down on 8 September 2026.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. Their reasoning can be boiled down into a few key points.

1. TUPE is about employees’ rights, not third‑party claimants

The court started from the Acquired Rights Directive, the EU instrument from which TUPE is derived. Its purpose is to safeguard employees’ rights when their employer changes—not to create new rights for customers, patients, or other third parties.

So when Regulation 4(2)(a) talks about liabilities “under or in connection with” employment contracts, that phrase has to be read in that context: it’s about liabilities that matter to employees.

2. Vicarious liability doesn’t give employees any rights

Counsel for ABC accepted that an employee has no relevant right against the employer in respect of its vicarious liability to a third party. The court agreed.

Vicarious liability is described as “secondary” and “parasitic” on the employee’s own liability to the third party. It’s a legal construct that helps injured third parties sue employers, but it doesn’t protect employees. In fact, under cases like Lister v Romford Ice and Lifestyle Equities CV v Ahmed, an employer can seek a full indemnity from the negligent employee for damages paid out.

So, from the employee’s perspective, the employer’s vicarious liability is not a benefit; it’s potentially a risk.

3. “In connection with” is wide, but not limitless

The court accepted that “in connection with” is language of very wide import. But it’s also a “protean” phrase whose meaning depends on the surrounding words and the legislative purpose.

Here, the purpose is to protect employees’ rights. Because vicarious liability to third parties does not give employees any rights under their contracts, it does not arise “in connection with” those contracts for TUPE purposes.

4. TUPE’s disclosure regime is about employee claims, not third‑party claims

Regulations 11 and 12 of TUPE require the transferor to give the transferee information about employees and their rights, including existing claims. That allows the transferee to understand what liabilities it is taking on.

There is nothing in TUPE that requires disclosure of third‑party tort claims. The Court of Appeal treated that silence as deliberate. If Parliament had intended transferees to inherit vicarious liability to third parties, it would have required disclosure of those claims too.

5. You don’t make a new owner liable for historic events without clear words

The court emphasised that allowing a third party to sue a transferee with no involvement in the events would be “at odds with ordinary legal principle” unless there were clear statutory wording to permit it. There isn’t.

So the court concluded:

Regulation 4(2)(a) does not transfer the transferor’s vicarious liability to third parties for pre‑transfer acts.

That applies both to common‑law tort claims and to the human‑rights allegations ABC had also raised.

The wider context: a failing hospital and dozens of claims

The BBC report adds the human context the judgment only hints at.

  • Around 50 similar claims by former Huntercombe patients are waiting to be managed by the court.
  • In February 2022, a 14‑year‑old girl, Ruth Szymankiewicz, was unlawfully killed at the hospital after being left unaccompanied by a staff member on his first shift. An inquest jury reached that conclusion in August 2025.

The Court of Appeal was clearly aware that this wasn’t an isolated complaint. Huntercombe was a troubled institution, and AYPL inherited a hospital with serious issues it “could not have known” about at the time of transfer.

What the judges said about the claimant herself

One of the most striking passages in the judgment is the court’s treatment of ABC personally. They went out of their way to say she was not being criticised for bringing the claim.

They accepted that she:

  • “has suffered loss and damage”
  • may not be able to recover damages
  • and that this is “through no fault of her own”

That’s as close as appellate judges get to saying: we think you may have been badly treated, but the law doesn’t give you a route to compensation from this defendant.

The result

The Court of Appeal upheld HHJ Bird’s decision. The key holding is stark:

  • TUPE Regulation 4(2)(a) does not transfer an employer’s vicarious liability to third parties for pre‑transfer acts.
  • That liability remains with the transferor—here, Huntercombe.

For ABC, that means AYPL is not liable for what allegedly happened to her in 2018–2019. Her only route is against Huntercombe, a company in liquidation with an insurance structure that may make meaningful recovery impossible.

For the law, it means a clear line has now been drawn: when a business changes hands under TUPE, employees’ rights travel; third‑party vicarious liability does not.

For the dozens of other former patients, it’s a warning. The courts may accept that they were harmed. They may even say so in judgment. But unless Parliament changes the rules, the legal system may still leave them with nothing.

By Pat Harrington

The judgment can be found here: 

https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2026/1161.html

Disclaimer

This article is intended as a general explanation of the Court of Appeal’s decision in ABC v Huntercombe (No.12) Ltd & Ors [2026] EWCA Civ 1161. It is not legal advice and should not be relied upon as such. The summary is based on publicly available information, including the judgment and reporting from reputable news sources, and is provided for information and comment only. Individual cases turn on their own facts, and anyone affected by issues raised here should seek advice from a qualified legal professional. Solidarity Trade Union accepts no liability for any loss arising from reliance on this material.

Five Days to Appeal: How a Flawed HR Convention Became a Barrier to Workplace Justice — And Why ACAS Must Act

There are many small injustices in the modern workplace — the quiet, procedural ones that rarely make headlines but shape the daily reality of workers facing disciplinary action. Among the most persistent is the widespread employer practice of giving workers just five working days to appeal a disciplinary outcome. It appears in policy after policy, as if it were a fixed rule of employment law. It is not. It has no statutory basis and no foundation in case law. Yet it is treated as gospel.

This arbitrary deadline has become so normalised that many workers assume it must be legally mandated. In truth, it is nothing more than a managerial convenience that has hardened into convention — a convention that routinely undermines fairness, equality, and access to justice.

At our most recent AGM, Solidarity members recognised this problem and passed a motion committing the union to campaign against the five‑day norm. It is a commitment rooted in both principle and lived experience, and it deserves to be taken seriously.

A Deadline Without a Law

The first and most important fact is this: no UK law requires a five‑day appeal window.
The Employment Rights Act is silent on appeal deadlines.
The Equality Act is silent on appeal deadlines.
ACAS — whose Code of Practice tribunals take into account — does not mandate five days.

ACAS guidance simply states that employees should appeal “as soon as possible or within the time period set out in the employer’s procedure.” That is all. The oft‑quoted “five working days” appears only in non‑binding examples, not in the Code itself. It is not a standard. It is not a requirement. It is not even a recommendation.

ACAS also says nothing about disciplinary minutes — nothing about when they must be provided, nothing about whether the appeal clock should start only after they are received. This omission is striking, because in practice many workers receive the outcome letter before they receive the minutes. They are expected to appeal a decision without access to the record of what was said. No fair‑minded person could consider that reasonable.

Where Five Days Really Came From

If the five‑day rule is not law, where did it come from?
The answer is depressingly simple: HR templates.

For decades, large HR consultancies have produced standardised disciplinary procedures for employers. These templates — designed primarily for managerial convenience — often included a five‑day appeal window. Over time, this figure became embedded in employer‑side “best practice” documents and was repeated so often that it acquired an aura of legitimacy.

But repetition is not justification.
A convention is not a principle.
And managerial convenience is not fairness.

Why Five Days Is Not Enough

A disciplinary outcome can be life‑changing. It may affect a worker’s job, income, reputation, mental health, and future employability. Yet employers routinely expect workers to:

  • absorb the decision
  • request and review the minutes
  • gather evidence
  • seek union representation
  • obtain medical or occupational health information
  • prepare written grounds of appeal

…all within five working days.

This is unrealistic for anyone — and impossible for many.

Workers who are stressed, anxious, or traumatised by the process are disadvantaged.
Workers with caring responsibilities are disadvantaged.
Workers without immediate access to a rep are disadvantaged.
And disabled and neurodivergent workers — who may need more time to process information, gather medical evidence, or communicate effectively — are systematically disadvantaged.

Under the Equality Act 2010, a rigid five‑day deadline is a Provision, Criterion or Practice (PCP). If it places disabled workers at a substantial disadvantage, employers must make reasonable adjustments. Yet most disciplinary policies say nothing about adjustments and instead sometimes rely on vague “management discretion.” , if they mention anything at all. Discretion is not compliance. Adjustments are not optional.

A deadline that cannot flex is a deadline that discriminates. This should be stated clearly in any employer disciplinary policy.

Appeals Are a Safeguard, Not a Sprint

The right to appeal is not an administrative nicety. It is a fundamental safeguard against flawed investigations, procedural errors, bias, and disproportionate sanctions. A right that cannot be exercised meaningfully is not a right at all.

Many unionised workplaces already use 14 days as standard — and nothing collapses. Employers continue to function. Processes continue. Justice is better served. The only thing that changes is that workers get a fair chance to defend themselves.

What ACAS Should Do: Time for the Guidance to Catch Up With Reality

If the five‑day appeal window has become entrenched across UK workplaces, it is partly because ACAS — unintentionally — has allowed ambiguity to flourish. While ACAS does not mandate five days, and does not prohibit longer deadlines, its guidance contains two structural weaknesses that employers routinely exploit:

  1. It offers “five working days” without proper context or caveat.
  2. It says nothing about disciplinary minutes and how that affects when the appeal clock should start.

This silence has consequences. Employers treat the example as a ceiling, not a floor. They treat the absence of rules about minutes as permission to delay them. And they seldom reference Equality Act compliance or its affect on time limits.

Solidarity believes ACAS should now take responsibility for closing these gaps.

1. ACAS should require that the appeal period begins only once the worker has received both the minutes and outcome.

Natural justice demands that workers see the record of what was said. ACAS should state that:

  • minutes must be provided promptly
  • the appeal window begins only after the worker receives them and the outcome
  • delays in providing minutes automatically extend the deadline

3. ACAS should incorporate Equality Act duties directly into its disciplinary guidance.

ACAS should state that:

  • fixed deadlines are a PCP
  • employers must consider reasonable adjustments
  • adjustments are a legal duty, not a matter of discretion
  • policies must explicitly reference this duty

4. ACAS should recommend a default appeal window of at least 14 calendar days.

This is already standard in many unionised workplaces and poses no operational difficulty.

5. ACAS should update its guidelines to reflect modern, evidence‑based practice.

The five‑day figure comes from outdated HR templates, not fairness. It should be replaced with a timeframe grounded in accessibility, equality, and justice.

ACAS guidance shapes employer behaviour. When the guidance is vague, outdated, or silent on key issues, workers suffer. Solidarity’s position is simple:

ACAS should not merely reflect common practice — it should lead it.
And it should lead it in the direction of fairness, accessibility, and equality.

Solidarity’s Mandate for Change

At our AGM, members passed a motion recognising:

  • that the five‑day deadline has no legal basis
  • that it originates from employer‑centric templates
  • that it disproportionately harms disabled, unwell, and unsupported workers
  • that meaningful access to justice requires adequate time

The AGM resolved that Solidarity will:

  • adopt 14 calendar days as our bargaining position
  • produce guidance for reps on challenging short deadlines
  • campaign publicly and privately for employers to abandon the five‑day norm
  • support members who miss deadlines by arguing for extensions on equality and fairness grounds
  • review disciplinary policies across recognised workplaces and target those with unreasonable appeal windows

This is not symbolic. It is a practical commitment to improving procedural fairness for every worker we represent.

A Call to Employers: Fairness Is Not an Administrative Burden

Employers often defend the five‑day rule by claiming they need “certainty” or “efficiency.” But fairness is not the enemy of efficiency. Rushed appeals create more disputes, more grievances, and more legal risk. If an employer can take weeks or months to schedule a disciplinary hearing, they can wait 14 days for an appeal.

A fair process protects everyone — including the employer.

A Call to Workers: You Deserve Time, Dignity, and Justice

If you are facing a disciplinary outcome, you deserve:

  • time to understand the decision
  • time to seek advice
  • time to gather evidence
  • time to prepare a proper appeal

You deserve a process that recognises you as a human being, not a box to be ticked.

Solidarity will continue to fight for that — in negotiations, in campaigns, and in every workplace where our members are subjected to unreasonable deadlines.

Five days is not enough.
It never was.
And together, we can change it.

By Pat Harrington

Dancing on the Edge of “Information”: Capeling v TFX Group Ltd [2026] EAT 57

Some cases arrive at the Employment Appeal Tribunal like thunderclaps, reshaping doctrine or unsettling long‑held assumptions. Others arrive quietly, almost modestly, but leave behind a sharper understanding of the law’s boundaries. Capeling v TFX Group Ltd is firmly in the second category: a small case with a precise point, a reminder that whistleblowing protection is not a catch‑all shield but a carefully defined statutory mechanism with limits that matter.

At its heart, this appeal was about a single question: when does a workplace concern cross the line from a vague complaint into a protected disclosure? The answer, as the EAT makes clear, is not when the claimant believes it should — but when the law says it does.

The Story Behind the Appeal

Mrs Capeling had been employed as a National Sales Manager from March to September 2022. Her dismissal was abrupt — immediate, with only a week’s wages in lieu of notice — and justified by the employer as a response to poor performance. She, however, saw a different narrative: one in which she had raised concerns about health and safety, only to be punished for speaking up.

This disclosure, according to the claimant, was a warning that the company lacked written contracts with certain Dispensing Appliance Contractors (DACs), and that this absence was putting patient safety at risk — a risk she suggested might even be deliberately concealed.

She brought claims of automatic unfair dismissal and detriment for making protected disclosures. Three alleged disclosures were put forward, but by the time the case reached the EAT, only one remained in dispute: the so‑called third disclosure.

It sounds dramatic. It sounds like the kind of thing whistleblowing law was designed to protect. But the Tribunal — and later the EAT — were not persuaded.

The Legal Fault Line: “Information” vs. “Allegation”

The Tribunal’s reasoning, upheld on appeal, turned on two deceptively simple points.

1. The claimant did not disclose “information”

The EAT agreed that what the claimant provided was essentially:

  • a factual statement: some DAC contracts are missing, and
  • a broad, unparticularised assertion: this is putting health and safety at risk.

The Tribunal was entitled to conclude that this second part — the health and safety claim — was too general, too unsubstantiated, to amount to “information” under the statutory test

Whistleblowing law draws a line between:

  • information (which can qualify), and
  • allegations (which often do not).

A protected disclosure must convey facts, not just fears. It must tell the employer something concrete, not simply gesture toward a risk.

2. Any belief in a health‑and‑safety link was not reasonable

Even if the claimant genuinely believed that missing contracts endangered patients, the Tribunal found — and the EAT accepted — that this belief was not reasonable for someone in her position, with her knowledge of the business.

This is a crucial point. Whistleblowing protection does not require the worker to be right, but it does require them to be reasonably wrong. A belief that is speculative, unresearched, or disconnected from the worker’s actual role will not suffice.

Why This Case Matters

On the surface, Capeling is a narrow decision. But beneath it lies a broader message about the architecture of whistleblowing law.

1. The law protects disclosures, not anxieties

The claimant’s concern may have been sincere. But sincerity is not the test. The law demands specificity: facts, details, something that can be investigated. A generalised “this could be dangerous” will rarely be enough.

2. Reasonableness is contextual

The Tribunal looked at the claimant’s role, her knowledge, and the nature of the contracts. It concluded that she lacked a reasonable basis for linking missing paperwork to patient harm. This is a reminder that whistleblowing protection is not a free‑floating right — it is tethered to what the worker actually knows and can reasonably infer.

3. The EAT will not rescue weak appeals

The judgment is crisp, almost brisk. The EAT saw no error of law, no misdirection, no misapplication of the statutory test. The appeal was dismissed without ceremony.

The Human Story Beneath the Legal One

What lingers after reading this case is not the legal test — though that is important — but the human texture beneath it.

A worker dismissed abruptly. A belief, perhaps honestly held, that she was raising something important. A sense of injustice that propelled her through the Tribunal and into the EAT. And then the cold clarity of the law: not every workplace concern is a protected disclosure, and not every dismissal following a complaint is whistleblowing retaliation.

There is a melancholy to cases like this. They remind us that employment law is not a moral tribunal; it is a statutory framework with defined thresholds. The claimant may have felt she was doing the right thing. The Tribunal may even have believed she acted in good faith. But good faith alone is not enough.

The law asks:
What did you say?
What did you know?
And was your belief reasonable?

In Capeling, the answers did not meet the statutory bar.

Conclusion: A Small Case with a Sharp Edge

Capeling v TFX Group Ltd will not make headlines. It will not reshape doctrine. But it will sit quietly in the background of future whistleblowing cases, reminding lawyers and claimants alike that:

  • vague assertions are not disclosures,
  • belief must be grounded in reason, and
  • the law protects information, not speculation.

It is a case about boundaries — the boundary between concern and disclosure, between belief and reasonable belief, between dismissal and protected dismissal. And like all boundary cases, it sharpens the edges of the law.

By Pat Harrington

When “Following the Process” Isn’t Enough: Lessons from Taylor v Sainsbury’s Supermarkets Ltd

There are tribunal cases that feel like technical disputes about procedure.
And then there are cases like Taylor v Sainsbury’s Supermarkets Ltd — cases that expose the gap between what an organisation thinks it is doing and what an employee is actually experiencing.

A disabled employee.
A supermarket chain.
An absence policy.

And a reminder that the law cares far less about tidy paperwork than it does about lived reality.

The Employee Behind the Case

Mr Taylor worked for Sainsbury’s and lived with ankylosing spondylitis, a long‑term inflammatory condition that can cause severe pain, stiffness and fatigue. It is a condition that fluctuates, and like many disabilities, it doesn’t map neatly onto rigid attendance expectations.

He raised concerns about:

  • how his absence management was handled
  • how working hours were allocated
  • how reasonable adjustments were considered, implemented, and reviewed

On paper, everything looked reassuringly compliant.

✔ Occupational health referrals
✔ Adjustments discussed
✔ Policies in place

But tribunals don’t judge organisations on the neatness of their documentation.
They judge them on what actually happened.

And that’s where this case becomes instructive.

Where Things Began to Fray

1. Absence Triggers Applied Without Flexibility

Sainsbury’s had a standard absence policy with trigger points.
Nothing unusual there.

But Mr Taylor’s condition meant he was more likely to hit those triggers — not because of misconduct, but because of disability‑related flare‑ups.

The tribunal examined not the existence of the policy, but the rigidity with which it was applied.
A trigger point that is neutral on its face can become discriminatory in practice if managers fail to adjust it for someone whose disability makes absence more likely.

This is where many employers stumble:
they treat “consistency” as fairness, when the law requires individualisation.

2. Adjustments Discussed… But Not Embedded

The organisation did discuss adjustments.
But discussion is not the same as implementation.
And implementation is not the same as ongoing review.

The tribunal looked closely at:

  • whether adjustments were actually put in place
  • whether they were maintained
  • whether managers understood them
  • whether they were revisited when circumstances changed

A reasonable adjustment is not a one‑off event.
It is a living commitment.

3. Working Hours Expectations That Didn’t Reflect Reality

Mr Taylor’s condition affected his stamina and mobility.
Yet expectations around shift patterns and duties did not always reflect the limitations identified by occupational health.

This is a common organisational blind spot:
the gap between what HR agrees, what OH recommends, and what frontline managers actually do on the shop floor.

The tribunal paid attention to that gap.

The Legal Test Employers Forget

One of the most common refrains in tribunal litigation is:

“We followed the process.”

But that is not the legal test.

The tribunal asks two questions:

  1. Did the employee face a disadvantage because of their disability?
  2. Did the employer take reasonable steps to remove or reduce that disadvantage?

Policies are written for the average employee.
Disability law requires employers to think beyond the average.

And that is where Sainsbury’s fell short.

Why This Case Matters

This case is not about bad faith.
It’s about rigidity — the quiet, procedural kind that creeps in when managers are under pressure, when policies are treated as scripts, and when “consistency” becomes a shield against Here’s a version that keeps the spine of the original but reframes it through that Patrick‑style, morally attentive lens — weighing the lessons for both sides of the employment relationship, and foregrounding judgement as a shared, legally consequential practice.

The biggest HR risks rarely come from having the wrong policy.
They come from applying the right policy as if people were identical units on a spreadsheet.

Absence triggers.
Bonus schemes.
Working‑hours expectations.
Return‑to‑work interviews.
Performance metrics.

On paper, these are neutral tools.
In practice, they can quietly — and sometimes catastrophically — disadvantage disabled employees when managers apply them without curiosity, flexibility or context.

From the employee’s side, the lesson is stark:
you can be doing everything “right” and still find yourself penalised by systems designed for an imaginary average worker.
Knowing your rights, flagging barriers early, and documenting the adjustments you need isn’t self‑advocacy as a favour to HR — it’s self‑protection in a landscape where the burden of explanation too often falls on the person already carrying the weight.

From the employer’s side, the message is even clearer:
the organisations that avoid tribunals aren’t the ones with the thickest policy binders.
They’re the ones with leaders who understand when the rules require:

judgement
nuance
humanity
and the courage to deviate from the script

Because good HR has never been about paperwork.
It’s about the quality of decision‑making in the moments where the policy doesn’t quite fit the person in front of you.

And cases like Taylor v Sainsbury’s underline something many leaders still treat as optional:
judgement is not a soft skill.
It is a legal requirement — one that protects employees from harm and employers from the consequences of their own rigidity.

In other words: the law expects humanity.
And so should we.

By Pat Harrington

Court Says Old Employer Still to Blame for Staff Mistakes Made Before Job Transfer

High Court ruling clarifies what happens under TUPE when employees move jobs but past harm is alleged

407 words, 2 minutes read time.

In the case ABC v Huntercombe (No. 12) Ltd and others, the High Court has ruled that employers cannot pass the blame for their workers’ past mistakes onto a new company just because the staff have been transferred. The decision has important implications for businesses, workers, and anyone affected by workplace negligence.

The Claimant in the case suffered harm while receiving care at a hospital operated by Huntercombe. She claimed that two hospital staff members were responsible. But by the time she took legal action, those two workers had moved to a different company—Active Young People Ltd—through a process known as TUPE.

What is TUPE?

TUPE, short for Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment), is a UK regulation that protects employees when the business or service they work for changes hands. It ensures that workers keep their jobs, pay, and employment terms even when a new employer takes over.

TUPE also means that many of the old employer’s responsibilities—like holiday pay, notice periods, or ongoing grievances—transfer over to the new employer.

But there are limits.

What did the court decide?

The key issue was whether vicarious liability—where an employer is legally responsible for their staff’s actions—also transfers. The Claimant said it should, and argued the new employer should be held responsible for harm caused by staff before the transfer.

The court disagreed. It ruled that TUPE is designed to protect employees, not to make new employers responsible for everything the staff may have done in the past. It said that only legal duties and obligations that exist between the employer and the employee are transferred. Responsibilities for injuries or damage to third parties, like patients or customers, are not.

The court also rejected a previous case, Doane v Wimbledon Football Club, that had suggested the opposite. That earlier case should no longer be followed, it said.

Why it matters

This ruling helps clarify that past liabilities stay with the old employer, even if staff move under TUPE. New employers taking over services or contracts won’t be unexpectedly hit with claims for things that happened before they were in charge.

It also tells Claimants where to aim their legal actions: even if the person responsible has changed employers, the company that employed them at the time of the incident is still the one legally accountable.

By Patrick Harrington

Picture credit: By sjiong – https://www.flickr.com/photos/sjiong/109817932/, CC BY-SA 2.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=6380215

UK Supreme Court’s 2025 Ruling: ‘Woman’ Defined by Biological Sex – Context, Implications, and Reactions

In April 2025, the UK Supreme Court delivered a historic judgment confirming that under the Equality Act 2010, the term “woman” refers to a biological female – in other words, one’s sex assigned at birth.[1] This unanimous ruling by five justices resolved a long-running legal dispute and clarified the law’s intent regarding sex-based rights.

Legal Background

The Equality Act 2010 is the UK’s comprehensive anti-discrimination law, establishing sex as a protected characteristic alongside others like race, religion, sexual orientation, and gender reassignment. Notably, the Act’s glossary defines “woman” as “a female of any age” and “man” as “a male of any age.”[2] The Gender Recognition Act 2004 (GRA), passed in response to a 2002 European Court of Human Rights ruling, allows transgender people to obtain a Gender Recognition Certificate (GRC) legally recognizing their acquired gender. A GRC holder is to be treated as their affirmed gender “for all purposes” of law (with a few exceptions).[3] For nearly two decades, the working understanding in the UK was that a trans woman with a GRC would generally be regarded as legally female (a “woman”) in most contexts.

The Supreme Court’s decision in 2025 upended this assumption by drawing a distinction between gender identity and the protected category of sex in the Equality Act. As Deputy Court President Lord Patrick Hodge put it, the EA “deals with biological sex at birth, and not with a person’s acquired gender, regardless of whether they held a gender recognition certificate.”[4]

The For Women Scotland Case

The case was brought by feminist advocacy group For Women Scotland (FWS). In 2018, the Scottish Parliament passed the Gender Representation on Public Boards (Scotland) Act, aiming for 50/50 representation of men and women on public sector boards. The Scottish government’s accompanying guidance stated that for these purposes, a “woman” included trans women with a GRC, treating them as legally female.[5] FWS – supported financially by author J.K. Rowling – challenged this guidance, arguing that the Scottish government had overstepped its devolved powers by effectively redefining “woman” beyond the meaning intended in the UK-wide Equality Act.

After losing in the Scottish courts in 2022, FWS was granted permission to appeal to the Supreme Court, which heard the case in November 2024.

Supreme Court’s Decision and Reasoning

On April 16, 2025, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously in FWS’s favor.[6] The central question was whether a transgender woman with a GRC counts as a woman under the Equality Act 2010. The court’s answer was a clear “no.”

In an 88-page judgment, the justices held that the ordinary, “plain and unambiguous” meaning of woman in the Equality Act “corresponds with… biological characteristics,” i.e. someone born female.[7] They emphasized that sex in the statute means biological sex, and this had always been Parliament’s intent. Any broader interpretation (e.g. including those who changed legal gender) would, in their view, render parts of the Act “incoherent and unworkable.”

Lord Hodge noted that interpreting sex as “certificated gender” would produce “heterogeneous groupings” and clash with specific provisions on pregnancy, maternity, and sex-specific protections that logically refer only to biological sex.

Workplace and Employment Implications

The Supreme Court’s ruling carries significant implications for workplaces, employers, and trade unions, especially regarding policies on sex and gender. By legally cementing that “women” means only biological females in the Equality Act, the judgment potentially affects everything from hiring practices and diversity policies to provision of single-sex facilities at work.[8]

Single-Sex Spaces and Facilities

Employers that provide sex-specific spaces – such as women’s toilets, changing rooms, or shower facilities – may feel more confident in restricting these to biologically female employees. Previously, many organizations adopted gender identity-inclusive approaches as a matter of good practice or legal caution. While the law already permitted exclusion of trans people from single-sex spaces if it was a “proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim”, the Supreme Court has “cleared up [that] legal ambiguity,” confirming that such spaces can be lawfully reserved for natal women.[9]

Practically, this may make it easier for employers to exclude trans women from, say, a women’s locker room or female dormitory at a work site, on the basis that they are not legally women. Employers should still tread carefully: any exclusion must be justifiable to avoid unlawful gender reassignment discrimination.[10]

Recruitment and Job Roles

Employers sometimes use genuine occupational requirements to hire only women for certain roles – for example, a counselor for female rape survivors. Under the clarified definition, only biological females count as women for such roles. A trans woman applicant, even with a GRC, could now be lawfully treated as ineligible for a “women-only” position, based solely on her sex at birth.[11]

Equal Opportunities and Diversity Policies

Many employers have adopted expansive equality policies that go beyond the letter of the law. While these commitments aren’t directly affected by the court ruling, the legal baseline has shifted. Employers must be mindful that affirmative action or quotas for women (e.g., in governance or board appointments) cannot automatically include trans women unless this is explicitly stated as a policy choice.[12]

Workplace Dress Codes and HR Practices

The ruling may also affect workplace inclusion. HR professionals have observed that ensuring a welcoming environment for trans employees might become more challenging. One employment law partner noted that “because of the ruling, ensuring workplaces are welcoming places for trans people will be an ‘uphill battle’.”[13] Trans employees could feel alienated if workplace policies start distinguishing “legal women” versus “trans women.”

Trade Unions and Worker Representation

Trade unions – with responsibilities to advocate for equality and represent all members – must navigate this ruling sensitively. A union like Solidarity, for instance, may find the decision validates long-held concerns of some members about preserving sex-based protections. However, they must still robustly support trans members, who are protected under the Equality Act’s gender reassignment provision. No union can lawfully deny representation based on a member’s transgender status.[14]

Unions may also play a crucial role in ensuring that employers implement the ruling fairly – avoiding blanket bans or policies that create hostile environments for trans workers. Updated guidance for shop stewards and equality reps may be necessary to handle sensitive disputes with clarity and fairness.

Consequences for the Trans and Cisgender Communities

The Supreme Court’s decision has profound implications for both transgender people and cisgender women, particularly in their access to services, spaces, and opportunities previously understood to be protected under the broader interpretation of the term “woman.”

Reactions from Trans Communities and Advocacy Groups

LGBTQ+ organizations including Stonewall and TransActual UK have expressed concern that this ruling may reinforce discriminatory behaviour and deepen social exclusion. They argue that although protections under the gender reassignment characteristic remain in place, the ruling effectively creates a legal distinction that reduces the scope of rights and recognitions trans people may have previously assumed.[15]

Jane Fae, director of TransActual, warned the ruling could have a symbolic impact that makes trans people feel “as if they have been told they do not exist.” While not creating new offences, the judgment may be misinterpreted by service providers or individuals, potentially increasing the risk of exclusion and misapplication of the law.[16]

Access to Single-Sex Spaces and Public Services

Trans women may now face greater exclusion from rape crisis centres, domestic violence refuges, hospital wards, and changing rooms, even when they hold a Gender Recognition Certificate (GRC). The ruling confirms that these services can legally define access by biological sex, provided the exclusion is proportionate and justified.[17]

NHS guidance from 2019, which stated that trans patients should be accommodated according to their gender presentation, is expected to be revised to align with the ruling. Baroness Falkner of the EHRC has indicated that the NHS and similar service providers will need to “start to implement the new legal reasoning and produce their exceptions forthwith.”[18]

Public Boards and Civic Participation

Trans women will no longer qualify as women for the purposes of measures aimed at achieving gender balance on public sector boards, such as those legislated for by the Scottish Government. This has immediate implications for civic representation and may set a precedent for similar assessments across the UK.

Responses from Cisgender Women

Some gender-critical feminists and advocacy groups such as For Women Scotland and the LGB Alliance celebrated the ruling, calling it a “victory for women’s rights” and a confirmation that women-only spaces and services should be protected as such.[19] They argue this offers legal support to cisgender women who have raised concerns about privacy, safety, and dignity in shared spaces.

However, many cisgender women and feminists who support transgender inclusion have responded with dismay, noting that trans women have used these spaces safely for years. Critics worry the ruling may embolden harassment and vigilance by the public in gender-policing spaces like toilets and changing areas.

Legal Ambiguity for Trans Men and Non-Binary People

Interestingly, the ruling also means that trans men – individuals assigned female at birth – are still considered women under the Equality Act, unless future legislation states otherwise. This has potential implications for inclusion in women-only spaces and in measures designed to promote female representation or opportunity. For non-binary individuals, who do not identify strictly as male or female, the ruling provides no clear guidance, leaving them in a legal grey area.

Social and Psychological Impacts

Though the court emphasized that trans individuals are still protected under the Equality Act, the symbolic message of the ruling is profound. Many in the trans community feel relegated or erased, while some cisgender women feel that their rights are being newly upheld. The challenge for service providers, employers, and advocacy groups is to ensure that in asserting sex-based rights, society does not inadvertently foster exclusion, hostility, or harm.

Comparative International Legal Context

The UK Supreme Court’s ruling has placed the country at one end of a spectrum of international approaches to legal definitions of sex and gender. While some democracies are codifying sex as based on biology, others are expanding legal frameworks to affirm gender identity regardless of sex assigned at birth.

United States

In the United States, the legal approach is more fragmented. The landmark Supreme Court case Bostock v. Clayton County (2020) ruled that firing someone for being transgender constitutes discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which prohibits sex-based discrimination.[20] However, definitions vary by state. Several U.S. states have passed legislation explicitly defining sex as immutable and based on birth anatomy, similar to the UK’s new interpretation. Conversely, the federal government under the Biden administration has broadly interpreted sex-based protections to include gender identity.

Canada

Canada has enshrined gender identity and expression as protected categories under the Canadian Human Rights Act and provincial human rights codes. Since 2017, federal law explicitly prohibits discrimination based on gender identity, and most provinces allow for gender marker changes on identification documents without surgical requirements.[21] Legal sex is defined by self-identification in most contexts, and transgender individuals are fully recognized in the gender they live in.

European Union

Across the EU, many countries have moved toward gender self-identification. For instance, Ireland, Denmark, and Spain allow individuals to change legal gender based on self-declaration without medical certification. Spain’s 2023 “Ley Trans” legislation allows individuals over 16 to change their legal sex based on self-identification, aligning with progressive EU standards.[22]

However, not all European countries are aligned. Poland and Hungary have taken restrictive stances, with Hungary banning legal gender changes altogether in 2020. In general, though, EU human rights case law, including decisions by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), has supported trans rights, particularly through privacy and non-discrimination provisions.

Australia and New Zealand

In Australia, federal and state laws vary, but generally include gender identity as a protected attribute. Court rulings have recognized trans individuals in their affirmed gender, and several states allow self-identification for legal gender change. New Zealand introduced self-ID for gender on birth certificates in 2023, marking a significant shift toward gender autonomy.[23]

Sports and Global Bodies

Internationally, governing bodies like World Athletics and World Rugby have introduced policies restricting trans women’s participation in female competitions, citing fairness and safety. The UK ruling may reinforce similar domestic policies, although interpretations continue to evolve.

Summary

Compared to its peers, the UK now occupies a more restrictive position on the legal definition of sex. While many liberal democracies are moving toward gender-inclusive frameworks, the UK has clarified a biological interpretation of sex for equality law purposes. This divergence may have implications for future international human rights reviews or legal conflicts involving cross-border rights recognition.

  1. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-68812789
  2. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/section/212
  3. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2004/7/contents
  4. https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/uksc-2022-0098.html
  5. https://www.forwomen.scot/01/04/2025/supreme-court-judgment-gender-representation-scotland
  6. https://www.supremecourt.uk/press-summary/uksc-2022-0098.html
  7. https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/supreme-court-ruling-definition-woman-biological-legal-2025
  8. https://www.cipd.org/uk/knowledge/factsheets/equality-act-factsheet
  9. https://www.gov.uk/guidance/equality-act-2010-guidance
  10. https://www.acas.org.uk/gender-reassignment-discrimination
  11. https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/advice-and-guidance/recruitment-and-employment
  12. https://www.tuc.org.uk/research-analysis/reports/trans-inclusion-workplace
  13. https://www.personneltoday.com/hr/supreme-court-ruling-gender-equality-act-commentary
  14. https://www.solidaritytradeunion.org/rightsoftheworker/gender-reassignment-and-union-representation
  15. https://www.stonewall.org.uk/about-us/news/stonewalls-response-uk-supreme-court-ruling
  16. https://uk.news.yahoo.com/what-supreme-courts-gender-ruling-means-trans-rights-091217341.html
  17. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/supreme-court-ruling-on-equality-act-definition-of-woman
  18. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-68812249
  19. https://www.lgballiance.org.uk/news/supreme-court-judgment-on-definition-of-woman
  20. https://www.canada.ca/en/services/immigration-citizenship/helpcentre/glossary.html#gender_identity
  21. httpenglish.elpais.com/spain/2023-02-16/spains-parliament-approves-landmark-trans-law.html
  22. https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/479868/new-law-passed-to-make-changing-gender-on-nz-birth-certificates-easier

The Case of Bailey v Stonewall Equality Limited and Others: A Landmark Decision on Belief Discrimination

846 words, 4 minutes read time.

In the landmark case of Bailey v Stonewall Equality Limited and others, the Employment Appeal Tribunal delivered a significant judgment that has implications for employment law and the protection of beliefs within the workplace. The case revolved around Ms. Allison Bailey’s claim that she faced discrimination due to her gender-critical beliefs, which she argued were protected under the Equality Act 2010.

Bailey’s beliefs included the view that Stonewall’s advocacy for gender self-identity was harmful to women’s rights and lesbian same-sex orientation. The Employment Tribunal applied the Grainger test and ruled that her beliefs were indeed protected.

In the most recent development, the Employment Appeal Tribunal upheld the first decision, reinforcing the protection of gender-critical beliefs under the Equality Act.

The tribunal’s judgment addressed complex issues surrounding the interpretation of the Equality Act, particularly about philosophical beliefs. It highlighted the need for employers to carefully consider the rights of employees to hold and express beliefs, even when those beliefs are controversial or at odds with the views of others within the organization.

The implications of the Bailey v Stonewall Equality Limited case are quite significant for future disputes involving philosophical beliefs and workplace discrimination:

Protection of Philosophical Beliefs: The case reinforces that “gender-critical” beliefs are protected under the Equality Act. This means that individuals holding such beliefs are entitled to protection from discrimination and victimization in the workplace.
Employer Policies and Training: Employers need to review their policies and training programs to make sure they do not inadvertently discriminate against employees with protected beliefs. This includes balancing the rights of individuals with different beliefs and making sure an inclusive environment is created for all.
Legal Precedent: The case sets a legal precedent that influences future tribunal decisions. It highlights the importance of the Grainger test in determining whether a belief qualifies for protection under the Equality Act.
Impact on Advocacy Groups: Advocacy groups like Stonewall need to consider how their policies and actions are perceived and make sure they do not conflict with the rights of individuals holding protected beliefs.
Workplace Dynamics: The case will lead to increased awareness and sensitivity around issues of belief and identity in the workplace, encouraging more open dialogue and understanding among employees.

The implications of the Bailey v Stonewall Equality Limited case and her employer are quite significant for future disputes involving philosophical beliefs and workplace discrimination:

Protection of Philosophical Beliefs: The case reinforces that “gender-critical” beliefs are protected under the Equality Act. This means that individuals holding such beliefs are entitled to protection from discrimination and victimization in the workplace.
Employer Policies and Training: Employers need to review their policies and training programs to make sure they do not inadvertently discriminate against employees with protected beliefs. This includes balancing the rights of individuals with different beliefs and making sure an inclusive environment is created for all.
Legal Precedent: The case sets a legal precedent that will influence future tribunal decisions. It highlights the importance of the Grainger test in determining whether a belief qualifies for protection under the Equality Act.
Impact on Advocacy Groups: Advocacy groups like Stonewall need to consider how their policies and actions are perceived and make sure they do not conflict with the rights of individuals holding protected beliefs.
Workplace Dynamics: The case will lead to increased awareness and sensitivity around issues of belief and identity in the workplace, encouraging more open dialogue and understanding among employees.

In this case, Bailey, a tenant of GCC, had tweeted views critical of Stonewall’s stance on trans rights. Stonewall and others complained to GCC, prompting an investigation. The tribunal found that GCC’s actions were discriminatory against Bailey’s gender critical beliefs. But Bailey’s appeal against Stonewall was dismissed because:

1. Causation Requirement: The EAT found that GCC made the final decision to discriminate, independent of Stonewall’s complaint.
2. Fairness and Reasonableness: It would not be fair or reasonable to hold Stonewall liable for GCC’s discriminatory actions, even though Stonewall’s complaint initiated the process.

So, the EAT determined that the responsibility for the discriminatory outcome rested solely with GCC.

Bailey was awarded £22,000 in the discrimination case.

For those interested in delving deeper into the details of the case and its implications, the full judgment is available for public review. It provides a comprehensive analysis of the arguments presented and the legal reasoning behind the tribunal’s decision. This case is a must-read for legal professionals, employers, and employees alike, as it offers valuable insights into the complexities of belief discrimination and the application of the Equality Act in real-world scenarios.

The Bailey v Stonewall Equality Limited case is a testament to the dynamic nature of employment law and its responsiveness to the changing societal landscape. It is a clear sign that the courts are willing to engage with difficult questions about belief, identity, and the rights of individuals within the workplace. As society continues to grapple with these issues, the legal system will play a crucial role in defining the boundaries of acceptable belief and expression in professional settings.

You can read the full EAT decision here

By Pat Harrington