When HR Crosses the Line: Who Really Makes the Decision to Dismiss?

By Maria Camara

Most employees facing disciplinary proceedings assume that the manager sitting opposite them will decide their fate. That seems reasonable enough. The manager hears the evidence, listens to the employee’s explanation and decides whether disciplinary action is justified.

But anyone with experience of workplace representation knows that matters are not always so straightforward. Human Resources departments often play a significant role behind the scenes. They advise managers, prepare documents, interpret policies and sometimes express strong views about what should happen. There is nothing necessarily wrong with that. Problems arise when advice becomes pressure, or when the person supposedly making the decision is doing little more than putting their name to somebody else’s conclusions.

The Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) has examined this question in Shing v University of the Arts London [2026] EAT 154. Its judgment, delivered on 12 October 2026, clarifies how far HR can legitimately become involved in disciplinary decisions.

The answer may disappoint those hoping for strict limits on HR influence. The EAT has confirmed that HR advisers can discuss the seriousness of misconduct and the appropriate approach to sanctions. They are not restricted to giving advice about law and procedure.

That is a significant clarification, though it does not mean HR can simply dictate the outcome of disciplinary proceedings.

A lecturer loses his job

Mr WYC Shing was a senior lecturer at the University of the Arts London. He had worked there since September 2006, giving him more than 14 years of service when he was dismissed in December 2020.

His dismissal followed a brief romantic relationship with a mature female student. Although he was not responsible for marking her work, the university considered that he had crossed important professional boundaries. During their association, he had offered her a ticket to New York. The student subsequently complained about his behaviour.

The disciplinary investigation did not establish sexual harassment. Nevertheless, the university concluded that Mr Shing had behaved inappropriately and dismissed him without notice.

Mr Shing disputed the decision. He argued that the relationship had involved two adults, that he had not deliberately acted improperly and that dismissal was excessive. He also complained that HR had improperly influenced the manager responsible for the decision.

There was a further allegation of race discrimination. Mr Shing, who is Chinese, pointed to two colleagues who had received lesser sanctions following complaints about their behaviour towards students.

The Employment Tribunal rejected his claims. He appealed, but the EAT upheld the original decision.

It is worth considering the underlying circumstances before turning to the legal arguments.

Universities have every reason to insist upon professional boundaries between lecturers and students. Even where both parties are adults, differences in status and authority may create difficulties. Students should be able to study without worrying that personal relationships might affect their treatment or academic opportunities.

Yet we should also be cautious about assuming that every breach of a professional boundary deserves dismissal. Employment law ought to leave room for proportionate responses, particularly where an employee has given many years of service and there is no finding of harassment.

Mr Shing’s length of service was substantial. The investigation had not established the most serious allegation. Those were matters worth weighing carefully.

The tribunal accepted that dismissal was within the range of reasonable responses open to the employer. Interestingly, it acknowledged that its own members would not necessarily all have chosen dismissal.

That illustrates something important about unfair dismissal law. A tribunal is not deciding whether it agrees with an employer’s decision. It is deciding whether that decision fell within the range of responses available to a reasonable employer.

There is a difference, and it is not always one that favours the employee.

The manager, HR and the dismissal decision

The most interesting part of the appeal concerned the part played by HR.

Mr Shing relied on an earlier judgment, Ramphal v Department for Transport [2015], which had raised serious concerns about HR interference in disciplinary investigations.

In that case, an investigating manager initially concluded that an employee’s misconduct warranted a final written warning rather than dismissal. Following substantial involvement by HR, the manager’s report changed. Findings favourable to the employee were altered or removed, and the recommended sanction became dismissal for gross misconduct.

The EAT was concerned that HR had gone beyond advising on procedure and had influenced the manager’s assessment of the evidence and the employee’s blameworthiness. It sent the case back to the Employment Tribunal to reconsider fairness.

For union representatives, the concern is obvious. If a manager is appointed to investigate allegations, the employee should be entitled to expect that the manager’s conclusions are genuinely their own.

There is something deeply unsatisfactory about a disciplinary process in which the hearing officer appears to exercise independent judgement while the real decisions are being shaped elsewhere.

Mr Shing argued that something similar had happened in his case.

The university’s HR adviser, Mr Culver, had corresponded with Professor Crow, the manager responsible for deciding the disciplinary outcome. HR had supplied template letters, prepared documentation and assisted with the dismissal process.

The EAT was not persuaded that this amounted to improper interference.

The evidence showed that HR had provided draft letters covering different possible sanctions, including warnings and dismissal. Professor Crow subsequently indicated that he was likely to dismiss Mr Shing. The relevant memorandum was then prepared for the Vice-Chancellor’s endorsement.

There was no evidence that HR had instructed Professor Crow to dismiss, rewritten his findings to make the misconduct appear more serious or pressured him to abandon a lesser sanction.

That was the essential difference from Ramphal.

The EAT went further, however. It questioned the suggestion that HR advice must always be confined to law and procedure.

An organisation employing hundreds or thousands of people has a legitimate interest in maintaining consistent disciplinary standards. A manager dealing with a serious allegation for the first time may benefit from HR’s knowledge of previous cases. Advice about whether particular conduct amounts to misconduct or gross misconduct can be part of that process.

There is force in this reasoning. Employees should not face radically different penalties simply because one manager is more severe than another.

But consistency can also become a convenient justification for centralised control.

HR advisers are employed by the organisation, and their professional responsibilities may include protecting it from legal and reputational risks. Their advice is not necessarily neutral. Nor should we assume that a manager will feel entirely free to disregard the views of experienced HR professionals or senior executives.

That does not make HR advice improper. It does mean that independence should be judged by what actually happened, not simply by whose signature appears on the dismissal letter.

The EAT recognised this distinction. Undue pressure from HR, or anyone else outside the proper decision-making process, can still affect the fairness of a dismissal. Whether it does so depends on the facts.

The judgment therefore narrows an overly restrictive reading of Ramphal without removing the protection against improper influence.

A further complication in Mr Shing’s case was that Professor Crow had died before the original tribunal hearing. He could not be questioned about his reasoning. The tribunal had to reconstruct events from emails and other documents.

This made the written record especially important. The tribunal concluded that it demonstrated an independent decision, and the EAT found no legal error in that assessment.

Different employees, different punishments

Mr Shing’s race discrimination claim raised another question familiar to trade union representatives. Why do some employees lose their jobs while others, accused of apparently similar behaviour, receive warnings?

He identified two colleagues, referred to as G and H, who had faced disciplinary proceedings concerning their conduct towards students.

G had been investigated over several allegations, including inappropriate behaviour and misuse of authority. However, only two allegations were upheld. These concerned socialising with students shortly before assessing their work and discussing an investigation despite restrictions imposed during suspension.

G received a first written warning.

H had been investigated over inappropriate and unwanted messages to a student. The tribunal accepted that his conduct amounted to harassment, yet he received a final written warning rather than dismissal.

On the surface, that disparity might raise questions. Mr Shing had been dismissed even though sexual harassment had not been established in his case, while another lecturer whose behaviour was found to constitute harassment had retained his employment.

The university argued that the circumstances were materially different.

In G’s case, the allegations actually proved were considered less serious than Mr Shing’s misconduct.

H had acknowledged that his behaviour was wrong, apologised, sought counselling and demonstrated an understanding of professional boundaries. He had also stopped the unwanted messages when the student objected.

Mr Shing, by contrast, was considered insufficiently aware of why his behaviour was unacceptable. He had expressed regret, but the university was not convinced that he fully understood the professional issues involved.

The tribunal accepted these distinctions. It found that the different sanctions did not establish race discrimination, and the EAT agreed.

There is a reasonable legal argument here. Two cases may look similar at first glance but be very different once the evidence is examined. An employee’s disciplinary record, the seriousness of proven misconduct and relevant mitigation can all influence the sanction.

Nevertheless, I would sound a note of caution about placing too much weight on expressions of remorse.

Some people are naturally articulate and persuasive. Others struggle to explain themselves, particularly when under considerable stress. Cultural differences, language difficulties and personal communication styles may influence how an apology is expressed and received.

There is also a danger that employees who contest allegations will be treated more harshly because they refuse to admit wrongdoing.

An employee is entitled to defend themselves. Maintaining innocence should not automatically be interpreted as a lack of insight.

Where misconduct has genuinely been established, willingness to undertake training or accept guidance may be more useful evidence of future conduct than an eloquent apology delivered at a disciplinary hearing.

The tribunal was entitled to assess the particular evidence in Mr Shing’s case. The wider point remains important.

Disciplinary consistency is not achieved merely by comparing the labels attached to allegations. Nor should employers be allowed to explain away obvious disparities with vague claims that every case is different.

Differences in treatment require credible explanations.

Mr Shing had also brought an indirect race discrimination claim concerning the university’s policies on personal relationships and professional boundaries. He argued that language and cultural differences placed Chinese employees at a disadvantage. The original tribunal rejected that claim, finding insufficient evidence of the alleged group disadvantage or that difficulties understanding the policy had caused his conduct. This was not a substantive issue determined in the appeal.

What union representatives should take from the judgment

The practical significance of Shing is not that HR now has a free hand. It is that allegations of improper influence need to be supported by evidence.

When I look at disciplinary cases from a representative’s perspective, one of the questions that matters most is whether the process has genuinely been open-minded. Was the employer investigating what happened, or assembling a justification for a decision already taken?

That distinction can be difficult to establish. An employer may follow every formal step while still approaching the case with a predetermined outcome.

A disciplinary invitation is issued. The hearing takes place. The employee is allowed to speak. A dismissal letter follows. On paper, the procedure looks respectable.

Yet the real issue may lie in the emails exchanged before the hearing or in changes made to an investigation report.

Where improper influence is suspected, representatives should examine drafts, correspondence, internal recommendations and any unexplained changes in findings or sanctions. The timing of communications can be revealing.

Did the investigator originally recommend a warning? Who suggested changing it? Was new evidence discovered, or did somebody simply take a different view of the desired outcome?

Were mitigating circumstances removed from the final report? Did senior management express expectations about the result? Was the employee given an opportunity to answer any new or more serious allegation?

Such questions are more productive than simply objecting to HR’s presence.

Relevant documents may sometimes be obtained through a subject access request, although exemptions and restrictions can apply. Where tribunal proceedings are underway, disclosure may provide a more effective means of obtaining material relevant to the issues in dispute.

Representatives should also study the employer’s disciplinary procedure. If it forms part of the employment contract, additional legal obligations may arise.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Chhabra v West London Mental Health NHS Trust [2013], considered in Shing, concerned interference with a process governed by particular contractual safeguards. The EAT made clear that those circumstances cannot automatically be applied to every workplace.

Even where the disciplinary procedure is not contractual, however, the employer must still comply with the statutory requirement of fairness.

That obligation is not satisfied merely by producing the right paperwork.

For an employee facing dismissal, the consequences are considerable. Losing a job can mean losing financial security, professional standing and confidence. Years of service may be swept aside by one decision.

Employers should therefore be expected to demonstrate that dismissal was genuinely considered necessary, rather than simply the easiest way of bringing an uncomfortable situation to an end.

Fairness is more important than appearances

Shing v University of the Arts London is a significant decision, although its implications should not be exaggerated.

It confirms that HR can properly advise managers about the seriousness of disciplinary allegations and the treatment of comparable cases. Such advice may help employers achieve consistency.

It does not authorise HR to manipulate evidence, impose predetermined outcomes or exert undue pressure on those responsible for disciplinary decisions.

Mr Shing ultimately failed because the tribunal accepted that the university had reached a reasonable decision through a fair process. His discrimination claim also failed because the circumstances of the colleagues he identified were materially different.

Whether dismissal was the best response to his conduct is another question. The original tribunal itself acknowledged that its members might not all have made the same decision.

That is perhaps the most troubling feature of the case from a worker’s point of view. Employment law allows employers considerable discretion, even where dismissal seems harsh.

Trade unions cannot remove that discretion, but we can insist that it is exercised fairly. We can challenge weak evidence, expose inconsistency, demand disclosure and ensure that employees have a genuine opportunity to defend themselves.

There is nothing objectionable about HR offering professional advice. The difficulty begins when advice becomes direction and the supposed decision-maker ceases to exercise independent judgement.

The test of a fair disciplinary procedure is not how many letters were sent, how many meetings were held or whether every box on a checklist was ticked.

It is whether the employee was genuinely heard, the evidence was fairly assessed and the outcome was reached without improper influence.

That is the standard every employer should be expected to meet.

Legal references: Shing v University of the Arts London [2026] EAT 154; Ramphal v Department for Transport [2015] UKEAT/0352/14; Chhabra v West London Mental Health NHS Trust [2013] UKSC 80; Employment Rights Act 1996, section 98; Equality Act 2010, sections 13, 19 and 23.

Autistic Job Applicant’s Stress Misjudged: Tribunal Warned Against Making Assumptions About Disability

An employment tribunal was wrong to assume that an autistic job applicant was not stressed simply because he appeared confident during an interview. The Employment Appeal Tribunal has ordered part of his discrimination case to be heard again. The decision raises important questions about how employers assess disabled candidates and whether traditional recruitment methods give everyone a fair opportunity.

By Maria Camara

How can an interviewer tell whether someone is stressed?

They might look for nervousness, hesitation or visible discomfort. Someone who answers questions confidently and stands up for themselves might be assumed to be coping perfectly well.

But people do not all experience or display stress in the same way. What appears calm on the outside may conceal considerable anxiety.

This was central to the Employment Appeal Tribunal’s decision in Bryce v Coventry City Council [2026] EAT 153, delivered on 9 October 2026.

The appeal tribunal found that the original employment tribunal had wrongly relied upon assumptions about how people normally behave when deciding whether an autistic job applicant had experienced stress.

The case provides an important reminder that disability discrimination cannot always be assessed by applying conventional expectations about behaviour.

What happened?

Mr Bryce, who has Asperger’s syndrome and dyslexia, applied for a team manager position in Coventry City Council’s revenue services department.

Asperger’s syndrome is a term historically used to describe a form of autism and is now generally included within the wider autism spectrum.

Mr Bryce informed the council about his disabilities before his interview in February 2022.

The council agreed to several adjustments. His interview was scheduled at the end of the working day so that additional time could be allowed if necessary. He received the interview questions 24 minutes beforehand, and interviewers agreed to repeat or rephrase questions when required.

Eight candidates competed for two positions. Mr Bryce received the lowest score and was unsuccessful.

He brought claims under the Equality Act 2010, arguing that the interview arrangements had placed him at a disadvantage and that his disability had contributed to his rejection.

The original employment tribunal dismissed his claims in October 2023.

He appealed.

The problem with judging appearances

One of Mr Bryce’s arguments was that his disabilities caused him stress in unfamiliar situations, including job interviews.

The original tribunal accepted that he generally experienced such difficulties. However, it concluded that he had not been stressed during this particular interview.

Its reasoning relied heavily upon the observations of an experienced interviewer, Mr Stinton.

Mr Stinton considered that Mr Bryce appeared confident. He had explained the adjustments he needed and had refused a request to share his computer screen during his presentation.

The interviewer believed that someone experiencing stress might agree to something they did not want to do rather than refuse.

The Employment Appeal Tribunal identified a fundamental problem with that reasoning.

The interviewer was making assumptions based upon how neurotypical people might behave.

Neurotypical generally describes people whose neurological functioning follows patterns regarded as typical.

An autistic person may experience stress without displaying the signs another person expects to see.

The appeal judge, Her Honour Judge Joffe, found that the tribunal had accepted the interviewer’s assessment without considering whether someone with Mr Bryce’s disabilities might express stress differently.

It had also preferred the interviewer’s impressions, despite his lack of specialist expertise in Mr Bryce’s conditions, over Mr Bryce’s own evidence about how interviews affected him.

That conclusion could not stand.

The appeal judge also found that, if the original tribunal had instead concluded that Mr Bryce experienced stress but that it made no material difference to his performance, it had failed to explain that finding adequately.

What does discrimination arising from disability mean?

Mr Bryce’s successful appeal concerned section 15 of the Equality Act 2010.

This deals with discrimination arising from disability.

In plain English, it means treating someone unfavourably because of something resulting from their disability.

For example, a disabled employee might have difficulty concentrating or communicating in particular circumstances. If an employer penalises them for the resulting behaviour, that may amount to discrimination even where the employer is not deliberately targeting the disability itself.

An employer may have a defence if it can demonstrate that the treatment was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.

That means showing that the decision served a genuine and lawful purpose and was justified in the particular circumstances.

In Mr Bryce’s case, the central question is whether stress arising from his disabilities contributed to the council’s decision not to appoint him.

That question has not yet been finally determined.

Why did his reasonable-adjustments appeal fail?

Mr Bryce also argued that the council had failed to make reasonable adjustments to the interview process.

Employers have a legal duty to take reasonable steps to remove or reduce substantial disadvantages experienced by disabled applicants and employees.

A substantial disadvantage is one that is more than minor or trivial.

Mr Bryce had difficulty quickly recalling examples of his experience and explaining how he met the requirements of the role.

He argued that interviewers should have used closed questions, ultimately proposing questions requiring only yes-or-no answers.

The appeal judge accepted that the wording of questions could affect how quickly someone with his disabilities could respond. On that point, the original tribunal’s reasoning had been wrong.

However, the council had already followed guidance from the National Autistic Society by asking specific questions about relevant experience.

The judge agreed that asking only yes-or-no questions would have prevented the interviewers from properly assessing whether Mr Bryce possessed the skills required for the management position.

His reasonable-adjustments appeal therefore failed.

There was nevertheless another important legal clarification.

The original tribunal had suggested that the council could simply accept the adjustments requested by Mr Bryce without considering anything further.

The appeal judge explained that this was not necessarily correct.

An employer’s duty is not automatically limited to the adjustments a disabled applicant specifically requests.

Employers may need to consider other reasonable measures to address a disadvantage of which they are, or should be, aware.

What was the exact outcome of the appeal?

Mr Bryce succeeded in challenging the tribunal’s treatment of his disability-related stress, but he did not win his discrimination claim outright.

The Employment Appeal Tribunal ordered a fresh hearing before a different tribunal, which must reconsider whether stress arising from his disability contributed to his unsuccessful application and, if so, whether the council’s decision was legally justified.

His separate claim that the council failed to make reasonable adjustments was dismissed.

An additional ground of appeal, concerning whether difficulties demonstrating communication and other skills arose from his disability, was also rejected. That particular argument had not been properly advanced in the original proceedings.

The final outcome of the section 15 discrimination claim therefore remains undecided.

The EAT identified legal errors in the original tribunal’s reasoning. It did not find that Coventry City Council had committed unlawful discrimination.

No compensation was awarded by the appeal tribunal.

Are traditional interviews always fair?

There is a wider issue here.

Recruitment processes often reward candidates who think quickly, speak confidently and produce polished answers under pressure.

Yet performing well at an interview is not necessarily the same as performing well in a job.

A capable worker may struggle to recall examples of their experience in an artificial interview setting but demonstrate excellent judgement and ability in everyday employment.

The appeal judge recognised that alternative assessment methods might sometimes be more suitable for disabled applicants.

Practical exercises, written responses, additional preparation time or different questioning techniques may help employers obtain a more accurate picture of a candidate’s abilities.

That does not mean every candidate should receive identical adjustments. Autism affects individuals differently, and arrangements must reflect their particular circumstances.

The objective should be to assess whether someone can do the job, not simply whether they can perform well in a conventional interview.

The Solidarity view

For Solidarity, this decision has implications beyond recruitment.

Managers dealing with disciplinary matters, capability assessments and grievances should not assume that someone’s outward behaviour accurately reflects their internal experience.

An employee who appears calm may be distressed. Someone who communicates directly may be misunderstood as confrontational. A worker who struggles to answer questions under pressure may nevertheless understand their job extremely well.

Trade union representatives should challenge assessments based upon stereotypes rather than evidence.

Employers are entitled to assess whether people have the necessary skills for a particular role. Disabled applicants are not automatically entitled to appointment or every adjustment they request.

But fairness requires employers to understand the difficulties individuals face and consider reasonable ways of addressing them.

The lesson from Bryce is that people should be judged on their actual abilities and circumstances rather than assumptions about how they ought to behave.

That is an important principle for disabled workers and one which trade unions should defend.

Case reference: Bryce v Coventry City Council [2026] EAT 153, Employment Appeal Tribunal, Her Honour Judge Joffe, 9 October 2026.

Full judgment: Read the official Employment Appeal Tribunal decision

Fire and Rehire: New Laws Will Protect Pay and Shift Patterns from March 2027

New employment laws will make it harder for employers to dismiss workers who refuse changes to their pay, hours or working conditions. The Government has now confirmed which expenses, benefits and shift arrangements will receive protection. The reforms are welcome, but some significant gaps remain.

By Maria Camara

Fire and rehire has long been a source of conflict between employers and workers. The practice allows an employer to dismiss employees who refuse changes to their contracts, then offer to re-employ them on new terms, often involving reduced pay, less favourable hours or the loss of benefits.

The choice facing workers can be difficult. Accept the changes or risk losing your job. For someone with a mortgage, rent or family responsibilities, that is hardly a negotiation between equals.

The Employment Rights Act 2025 introduces stronger restrictions on this practice. The Government has now published its response to a consultation examining how the new rules should apply to expenses, benefits and shift patterns.

The Government intends to bring the new protections into force in March 2027.

What will change?

The new law introduces the term restricted variation. This simply means a change to an employment contract that receives special legal protection.

Restricted changes include reductions to contractual pay, certain pension changes, alterations to contractual working hours, reductions in time off and specified changes to shift patterns.

An employer who dismisses a worker for refusing one of these changes will normally be committing automatically unfair dismissal.

This is an important distinction. Under ordinary unfair dismissal law, an employer may be able to justify dismissal by demonstrating a fair reason and a reasonable process. With automatically unfair dismissal, the law treats the particular reason for dismissal as unacceptable, subject to limited statutory exceptions.

Workers will not need a minimum period of employment to benefit from these new protections.

The law does not prevent employers and employees agreeing changes. Its purpose is to restrict the use of dismissal to force through changes to core contractual rights.

Expenses and benefits: what is protected?

The Government has decided that most expenses and benefits in kind will fall outside the strongest fire and rehire protections.

There are three important exceptions:

Travel expenses, including mileage payments.
Accommodation expenses incurred through work.
Long-term accommodation provided as a contractual employment benefit.

Consider a care worker who uses their own car to travel between clients. If their contract guarantees a particular mileage payment, an employer who dismisses them for refusing a reduction in that rate will normally fall foul of the new rules.

This matters because travel costs can consume a substantial proportion of a low-paid worker’s earnings.

The protection is less comprehensive when it comes to benefits in kind. These are non-cash benefits provided by employers, such as private medical insurance or subsidised services.

Most will be excluded, as will employee share schemes.

For many workers, this distinction may have little practical significance. An employer might reduce the overall value of an employee’s remuneration without reducing their stated salary. For workers, the financial consequences can be much the same.

Why the wording of your contract matters

The new protections generally apply where the entitlement being changed is contractual.

A contractual term is a legally binding part of the employment agreement. If a contract guarantees a particular payment or benefit, changing it will normally require agreement or some other lawful basis.

However, some employers provide benefits through policies which are expressly non-contractual. Others include variation clauses allowing specified changes to be made without further agreement.

Where an employer can genuinely make a change under an existing contractual provision, the new restricted variation rules may not apply.

But employers cannot simply declare that every benefit is discretionary.

Contractual rights may arise from collective agreements, incorporated workplace policies or established practices followed consistently over time.

Trade union representatives should therefore examine the contract, relevant policies and the history of an entitlement before accepting an employer’s claim that it can be withdrawn.

Shift patterns: protection against major changes

The new rules will also protect workers against certain particularly disruptive changes to their working patterns.

A restricted variation will arise where an employee is newly required to work:

at night rather than during the day, or during the day rather than at night; or
at weekends rather than on weekdays, or on weekdays rather than at weekends.

For these purposes, night-time means work between 11pm and 6am.

Imagine someone who has worked Monday to Friday for years. Their employer announces that weekend working will now be compulsory. The employee refuses because of childcare responsibilities.

Under the new regime, dismissing that employee in order to impose the new contractual requirement would normally be automatically unfair.

The same principle applies to a daytime worker who is newly required to work nights.

These protections recognise that changes between daytime and night-time working, and between weekday and weekend working, can have profound consequences for family life, caring responsibilities, transport arrangements, health and wellbeing.

However, the protection is deliberately limited. Not every disruptive shift change will qualify as a restricted variation.

For example, moving a shift from 8am-4pm to 10am-6pm would not normally fall within the protected categories, provided the contractual number of hours remains unchanged. Yet for a worker collecting children from school or relying on public transport, such a change could still make continued employment extremely difficult.

The Government has also excluded changes to availability windows. These are periods during which a contract permits an employer to schedule work, even though an employee may only work some of those hours.

A worker whose contract already allows broad scheduling flexibility may therefore receive less protection than someone whose working pattern is tightly defined.

From a trade union perspective, this is one of the most significant limitations of the reforms. While the legislation protects workers from certain major changes between day and night work and between weekday and weekend work, many other rota changes capable of seriously disrupting family life will remain outside the scope of the new rules.

What should trade unions do?

The new legislation should provide unions with stronger grounds for resisting attempts to impose worse employment conditions.

When an employer proposes contractual changes, representatives should establish precisely what is being changed, whether the terms are contractual and why management claims the changes are necessary.

Employers should be expected to explain their business case and consider alternatives.

If financial difficulties are claimed, unions should seek supporting information. If shift changes are proposed, management should explain why existing arrangements cannot continue.

Consultation must be meaningful. It should not be a meeting held merely to confirm a decision already taken.

Workers should also be cautious about signing revised contracts without advice. Once new terms have been accepted, challenging them can become more difficult.

Collective agreements remain particularly important. Clear negotiated provisions covering pay, expenses, shift patterns and consultation procedures can provide protection beyond the statutory minimum.

The Solidarity view

Solidarity welcomes stronger restrictions on fire and rehire. Employers should not be able to threaten workers with dismissal simply because they refuse to surrender established rights.

The new legislation will make that harder, particularly where employers seek reductions in contractual pay or major changes to working patterns.

But the exclusions are disappointing.

Losing an important workplace benefit can be just as damaging as losing part of a salary. A shift change of only a few hours can create serious difficulties for workers with caring responsibilities. These concerns should not be dismissed because they fall outside a narrow legal definition.

There is also a danger that employers will respond by using broader flexibility clauses and making more benefits discretionary.

This is why collective bargaining remains essential.

Where genuine operational difficulties exist, employers may need to seek changes to working arrangements. Where genuine problems do exist, those changes should be discussed openly, with proper consideration of the consequences for employees.

Workers should not be expected to accept whatever management demands simply because the alternative is unemployment.

While these protections represent a significant improvement, many workers may still face substantial changes to their hours and working arrangements where those changes fall outside the narrow categories protected by the regulations. We should use those protections fully while continuing to argue for stronger safeguards.

An employment contract is an agreement between two parties, not a document which the employer should be free to rewrite at will.

Legal note: The new fire and rehire protections are expected to come into force in March 2027, subject to implementing regulations. They apply to Great Britain; Northern Ireland has separate employment legislation. Existing legal protections continue to apply until the new provisions commence.

Sources: Employment Rights Act 2025 | Government consultation and response | Acas guidance on fire and rehire

Pregnancy and Maternity Dismissal Protection: Employers Face Tougher Rules from October 2027

Pregnant employees and new parents are set to receive stronger protection against unfair dismissal under the Employment Rights Act 2025. From October 2027, employers will have to demonstrate that dismissal is objectively justified, rather than simply falling within the range of decisions a reasonable employer might make. The changes could make a considerable difference to workers facing dismissal during pregnancy, maternity leave or their return to employment. But how far do the protections really go, and where do weaknesses remain?

These reforms are unquestionably significant, but workers should be cautious about assuming they eliminate the risk of unfair dismissal. The legislation strengthens legal protections and increases the obligations placed on employers, yet the effectiveness of those rights will ultimately depend on enforcement through employment tribunals and the willingness of employers to adopt fair workplace practices.

By Maria Camara

A woman tells her employer that she is pregnant. Until then, her performance has attracted little criticism. Months later, perhaps after returning from maternity leave, problems begin to emerge. Her duties have changed. There are questions about her availability, her commitment or her ability to meet the demands of the job. Eventually, she finds herself facing dismissal.

Was the decision genuinely about her performance? Would the employer have acted in the same way had she not become a mother? And, perhaps more importantly, was dismissal really necessary?

These are questions which employment tribunals already encounter. They are also questions which will become more important under the Government’s proposed changes to the law.

On 22 October 2026, the Government published its response to a consultation on enhanced dismissal protections for pregnant women and new mothers. The response sets out how powers contained in the Employment Rights Act 2025 are intended to be used.

The central change is significant. Employers will no longer be able to defend an ordinary unfair dismissal claim involving an employee within the new protected period simply by demonstrating that their decision fell within the range of responses open to a reasonable employer. They will face a more demanding test.

They must demonstrate that dismissal was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.

The new provisions are intended to take effect in October 2027. Regulations are still needed to bring the detailed protections into operation.

That distinction matters. Employees already have important pregnancy and maternity rights, but the additional dismissal test described here is not yet in force.

Why the existing law has not been enough

Pregnancy and maternity discrimination are already unlawful. The Equality Act 2010 prohibits unfavourable treatment because of pregnancy, pregnancy-related illness during the statutory protected period, or maternity leave.

Under existing employment legislation, dismissal because of pregnancy or the exercise of maternity rights can also amount to automatically unfair dismissal. Employees do not need two years’ service to bring such a claim.

There are additional rules governing redundancy. Since April 2024, pregnant employees and those taking qualifying family leave have enjoyed extended protection where their jobs are at risk. If a suitable alternative vacancy exists, an employer must offer it to an eligible protected employee as a priority.

Yet problems remain.

The existing legislation does not prevent every dismissal that occurs during pregnancy or shortly after maternity leave. An employer may argue that the dismissal concerns capability, conduct, redundancy or another legitimate matter unrelated to pregnancy.

Such explanations may be entirely genuine. They may also conceal discrimination or reflect a failure to consider the employee’s circumstances properly.

It is not always straightforward to establish which is the case.

In its 2026 State of the Nation survey, the campaign organisation Pregnant Then Screwed reported that nearly three-quarters of participating mothers had experienced pregnancy or maternity discrimination at work. The survey drew on responses from more than 5,000 women. More than one in three who reported discrimination said they had left their jobs.

Those findings are disturbing. They also demonstrate why having rights written into legislation is not necessarily enough.

Workers must know those rights, be able to challenge employers who disregard them and have realistic access to justice.

A different test for dismissal

To understand the importance of the proposed changes, it is necessary to look at how ordinary unfair dismissal currently operates.

An employer seeking to justify dismissal normally has to establish one of five potentially fair reasons:

Capability or qualifications
Conduct
Redundancy
Statutory prohibition
Some other substantial reason

The tribunal then considers whether dismissal was reasonable in all the circumstances.

Traditionally, this involves what lawyers call the band of reasonable responses test. A tribunal does not simply ask whether it would have made the same decision. Instead, it considers whether dismissal fell within the range of decisions that a reasonable employer could have made.

This gives employers considerable discretion.

Two reasonable employers might respond differently to the same problem. One might issue a final written warning. Another might dismiss. Depending on the circumstances, both decisions could fall within the permitted range.

The Government intends to replace that approach with an objective justification test for dismissals falling within the new protected period.

This test is familiar from parts of discrimination law under the Equality Act 2010.

An employer must identify a legitimate business objective and demonstrate that dismissing the employee was a proportionate means of achieving it.

The employer will ordinarily need to show that reasonably viable, less severe alternatives were not available.

That changes the nature of the argument.

It will no longer be sufficient simply to say that dismissal was a decision another reasonable employer might have reached. There will have to be a convincing explanation of why that decision was justified in the particular circumstances.

Consider an employee returning from maternity leave who is struggling with aspects of a changed role.

Under the proposed test, relevant questions might include whether appropriate training was provided, whether temporary adjustments could have been made and whether suitable alternative duties were available.

An employer who moved directly to dismissal without seriously considering such options could find the decision more difficult to defend.

This does not mean that employers must create jobs which do not exist or continue employment regardless of the consequences. The proportionality test will take account of the employer’s circumstances, including the size and resources of the organisation.

Nevertheless, it should require a more searching examination of the dismissal decision.

There is an important legal distinction here. The proposed objective justification test concerns the fairness of dismissals for potentially legitimate reasons. It does not provide a defence to a dismissal which is itself unlawful pregnancy or maternity discrimination.

An employer cannot make direct pregnancy discrimination lawful merely by describing it as commercially convenient.

Employers will retain the right to dismiss

Some campaigners had wanted the Government to go further by removing certain potentially fair reasons for dismissal during pregnancy and maternity.

That has not happened.

All five existing reasons will remain available.

Conduct, capability, redundancy, statutory prohibition and some other substantial reason may still provide grounds for dismissal, provided the employer can satisfy the stricter legal requirements.

There are circumstances where dismissal will plainly remain a possibility.

Serious misconduct, a genuine inability to perform essential duties or an unavoidable statutory prohibition may provide legitimate grounds. The new framework is not intended to make employees immune from dismissal.

But the employer’s justification will face closer examination.

A capability dismissal, for example, ought to be approached differently where pregnancy-related circumstances, a prolonged absence or a return from maternity leave have affected the employee’s ability to demonstrate performance.

The employer will need to consider what can reasonably be done to maintain the employment relationship.

The same principle applies to redundancy. Although a business may have genuine economic difficulties, the employer will have to justify dismissal under the new test as well as comply with the separate statutory redundancy safeguards.

The distinction between an employee’s actual conduct or capability and difficulties arising from pregnancy or maternity leave will therefore become particularly important.

For trade union representatives, this should provide additional grounds on which to challenge questionable disciplinary and capability decisions.

Protection from the first day of employment

One welcome aspect of the proposals is that the enhanced dismissal protection will be a day-one employment right.

There will be no qualifying period of service.

This is separate from the Government’s wider reform of ordinary unfair dismissal rights. Under the Employment Rights Act 2025, the general qualifying period is due to fall from two years to six months on 1 January 2027.

Pregnancy and maternity protections already include rights which apply without a minimum period of employment. The new enhanced test will follow that principle.

There is, however, an important qualification about when the additional protection begins.

The Government has decided that it will start when an employee informs her employer that she is pregnant.

That notification may be given verbally or in writing.

An employee does not have to submit a formal letter to trigger the proposed protection, although keeping written confirmation would be sensible. It could become important evidence if there were later disagreement about when the employer knew.

The requirement to notify should not be confused with the separate Equality Act framework, under which pregnancy and maternity discrimination protection already exists.

How long will employees be protected?

For pregnant employees entitled to maternity leave, the enhanced protection will begin when the employer is informed of the pregnancy and continue throughout maternity leave.

It will then last for six months after maternity leave ends.

An employee taking the full 52 weeks of statutory maternity leave would therefore receive protection for approximately 18 months after the child’s birth.

But the Government has deliberately rejected a universal 18-month period for this new dismissal protection.

An employee returning after a shorter period of maternity leave would receive six months of additional protection after that leave ended, rather than automatically remaining covered by the new test until the child reached 18 months.

The distinction is not insignificant.

A mother returning after three months of maternity leave may still face considerable difficulties connected with childcare, feeding arrangements, disrupted sleep or adjustment to her previous working routine.

Those problems do not necessarily disappear six months after her leave ends.

Indeed, the consultation revealed considerable support for longer protection.

Of the 843 respondents who answered the relevant question, 77% favoured protection lasting 18 months from birth, compared with 19% supporting six months following the return to work.

The Government nevertheless selected the shorter post-leave period, arguing that it provided stronger protection during the period of greatest vulnerability without unduly restricting employers in dealing with later performance or conduct issues.

That is a political and practical judgement which deserves scrutiny.

It is also important not to confuse these proposals with existing redundancy protection.

The current enhanced redundancy protections, which generally extend for 18 months after birth or adoption placement for the relevant eligible employees, will remain in place.

The new six-month post-leave period concerns the additional protection against dismissal more generally. It does not remove the longer statutory redundancy safeguards.

Pregnancy loss and the two-week rule

One of the less satisfactory aspects of the proposals concerns pregnancy loss.

Where a pregnancy ends before 24 weeks and the employee is not entitled to statutory maternity leave, the enhanced dismissal protection will continue for only two weeks after the pregnancy ends.

The Government has chosen to align this period with the existing redundancy protection rules.

It acknowledges that consultation respondents raised concerns about the physical and psychological effects of pregnancy loss, including the possibility of continuing disadvantage at work.

Those concerns are well founded.

An employee who has experienced a miscarriage may require time away from work, medical treatment or adjustments when returning. Recovery is not governed by a convenient timetable.

Two weeks is a very short period in which to address what may be a profoundly difficult experience.

The expiry of this specific enhanced protection would not extinguish other employment rights. Depending on the facts, discrimination law, sickness absence protections and other statutory provisions may remain relevant.

Nevertheless, the Government could reasonably have adopted a more generous approach.

A trade union should not have to argue that an employee deserves compassion because her circumstances happen to fall within a particular statutory category. Fair treatment should be expected.

Adoption, shared parental and other family leave

The proposals are not limited to employees who have personally experienced pregnancy.

The Government intends to extend the enhanced dismissal protections to employees taking adoption leave, shared parental leave, neonatal care leave and bereaved partner’s paternity leave.

The arrangements will differ according to the type and duration of leave.

Employees taking adoption leave will be protected from the first day of that leave, with protection continuing for six months after it ends.

For shared parental leave, neonatal care leave and bereaved partner’s paternity leave, protection will also begin on the first day of the relevant leave.

However, the additional six-month protection after leave ends will apply only where the employee has taken at least six continuous weeks of the qualifying leave.

Someone taking a shorter period will receive the enhanced protection while on that leave but not the extra six-month period afterwards.

Ordinary paternity leave is not included in this particular enhanced dismissal scheme, although separate legal protections continue to apply.

This extension is welcome.

Family responsibilities do not fall exclusively upon mothers. Adoptive parents, those sharing parental leave and parents dealing with the serious illness of a newborn child may experience similar difficulties when returning to employment.

It is right that dismissal protections should recognise those circumstances.

Will the new rules make a difference in practice?

Much will depend upon the way the provisions operate once implemented.

The Government does not intend to prescribe every detail of the proportionality test in regulations. Instead, it plans to support implementation through guidance, including material produced by Acas.

Tribunal decisions will also be important in establishing how the test is applied.

There will inevitably be arguments about what constitutes a legitimate business aim, which alternatives an employer should have considered and when dismissal becomes a proportionate response.

The circumstances of the employer will matter.

A large organisation with numerous departments, extensive human resources support and a range of possible alternative posts may be expected to examine options unavailable to a small employer with only a handful of staff.

But proportionality must not become an excuse for accepting vague assertions about business difficulties.

Employers should be expected to produce evidence.

What was the problem? When was it identified? What support was offered? Were alternatives seriously examined? Was the employee consulted? Was dismissal genuinely necessary?

These questions should be central to any fair dismissal process.

There is also a danger that employers seeking to avoid the new protections may alter the way they approach recruitment, fixed-term employment or performance management.

Such concerns were raised during the consultation itself.

The possibility of discrimination being pushed into less obvious forms makes effective enforcement especially important.

What trade union representatives should look for

For unions, the proposed changes should strengthen the practical arguments available when representing members facing disciplinary action, capability proceedings or redundancy.

A representative should already be examining the employer’s reasons, the evidence supporting allegations and whether the correct procedures have been followed.

The new framework will make the examination of alternatives particularly important.

Where an employee is pregnant or has recently returned from qualifying family leave, a union representative should consider whether the employer has properly explored adjusted duties, additional training, temporary support, alternative employment or other realistic measures.

The timing of decisions may also be revealing.

Were concerns raised before the pregnancy was disclosed? Did the employee receive favourable appraisals before maternity leave? Were performance targets altered? Did another employee take over duties during the absence? Was the returning employee given a proper opportunity to resume the role?

None of these matters automatically establishes unlawful discrimination or unfair dismissal.

Taken together, however, they may provide an important picture of how the employer reached its decision.

Contemporaneous records will matter. Emails, performance reviews, meeting notes, correspondence about duties and records of requests for support may all become relevant evidence.

Members should keep such material where they are lawfully entitled to do so, and seek advice before removing confidential workplace documents.

The changes may also provide an opportunity to improve workplace policies before disputes arise.

Employers should review their disciplinary, capability, redundancy and family leave procedures to ensure that the requirements of the new framework are properly reflected.

Trade unions should press for consultation over those changes and seek stronger contractual safeguards wherever possible.

A statutory minimum should never be treated as the limit of what can be negotiated.

Better rights must mean better access to justice

There is another difficulty which should not be overlooked.

Employment rights depend upon effective enforcement.

An employee who has just lost her job may also be coping with the financial demands of a new child, disrupted childcare arrangements or the effects of pregnancy-related illness.

Bringing an employment tribunal claim requires knowledge, evidence, time and persistence.

Many workers will understandably be reluctant to pursue a case against an employer with greater financial and organisational resources.

The Government has already extended the main employment tribunal time limits from three to six months, with effect from 1 October 2026. Transitional rules mean that the shorter period may still apply to earlier disputes.

Employees should therefore obtain advice promptly rather than assume that they have six months in every case. Acas early conciliation requirements must also be considered.

These procedural matters may appear remote from the central issue of pregnancy discrimination. In practice, they can determine whether an employee ever receives a hearing.

The length of tribunal proceedings, the availability of advice and the financial pressures facing claimants can be just as important as the wording of legislation.

That is one reason why trade union representation remains essential.

A welcome reform, but not the end of the argument

The Government’s proposals represent a worthwhile improvement in employment protection.

The move towards objective justification should make it harder for employers to rely upon general assertions about performance, conduct or business requirements when dismissing employees during a particularly vulnerable period.

The extension to other forms of family leave is also sensible.

There are limitations.

The six-month period following maternity leave is shorter than many consultation respondents wanted. The two-week protection following early pregnancy loss appears particularly inadequate. And retaining all five potentially fair dismissal reasons means employers will continue to have considerable scope to argue that dismissal was legitimate.

The effectiveness of the reform will depend upon the final regulations, the guidance accompanying them and the willingness of tribunals to examine employers’ explanations critically.

Most importantly, it will depend upon employees knowing their rights and being able to enforce them.

Pregnancy, childbirth and family responsibilities are ordinary parts of working life. They should not place employees in a position where they must continually prove their value or justify their continued employment.

An employer facing genuine difficulties must be able to manage its business. But that does not mean dismissal should be the first solution considered, particularly where practical alternatives exist.

The law should require employers to demonstrate that they have acted fairly and that losing an employee’s livelihood was genuinely necessary.

The extension of dismissal protections for pregnant workers and new mothers addresses a long-standing concern within the labour movement. While legal safeguards already existed, many workers continued to report feeling vulnerable during pregnancy, maternity leave and their return to work. The new framework should make it more difficult for employers to rely on broad or poorly evidenced justifications when taking decisions that affect this group of workers.

For Solidarity, the task is to ensure that members benefit from these protections when they come into force, while continuing to argue for stronger safeguards through collective bargaining, workplace representation and improvements to the law.

The reforms represent one of the most substantial changes to dismissal law in recent decades and should improve security for many workers. However, no legislation can entirely remove the imbalance of power that often exists between employers and employees. Strong legal rights are most effective when workers understand them, are prepared to enforce them and have access to collective representation. Trade unions will therefore continue to play a vital role in ensuring that the protections promised by Parliament are realised in practice within the workplace.

Legal position: This article reflects the Government’s consultation response published on 22 October 2026. The enhanced dismissal protections are intended to take effect in October 2027, subject to implementing regulations. They apply to the employment law framework in England, Scotland and Wales. Northern Ireland has separate employment legislation.

Further reading: Government consultation response, 22 October 2026 | Acas: Redundancy protection for pregnancy and new parents | Acas: Employment Rights Act 2025

Union News | 24 October 2026 – Barclays Job Cuts, NHS Pay Anger, Rail Strikes & 60 Years Since Aberfan

Welcome to Union News, your weekly round-up of the stories that matter to working people and the trade union movement. It’s Saturday, the 24th of October 2026.

This week, Barclays announces thousands of job cuts as artificial intelligence becomes the latest excuse for reducing its workforce. Outsourced railway workers fight to retain the Real Living Wage. NHS staff face another disappointing pay proposal, university workers continue their battles against redundancies, and we look at important changes to employment rights.

We also remember the 144 people who died in the Aberfan disaster, sixty years ago this week.

We begin with Barclays, where around five thousand jobs are being cut by the end of this year.

The bank says artificial intelligence will help it achieve greater efficiency. The reductions represent roughly five per cent of its global workforce, with many affecting operational and administrative roles.

Unite has condemned the announcement. Its general secretary, Sharon Graham, argues that Barclays is using artificial intelligence as an excuse to dispense with loyal employees rather than investing in their skills.

There is a much wider issue here.

Technological change is nothing new. Throughout industrial history, employers have introduced machinery and new working methods that have transformed employment. Sometimes these changes have brought genuine improvements in productivity and working conditions. At other times, workers have paid the price while shareholders have collected the benefits.

Artificial intelligence presents exactly the same challenge.

If new technology allows businesses to produce more with less effort, why should the benefits flow overwhelmingly to the owners?

Why shouldn’t workers enjoy shorter hours, improved conditions and greater job security?

There is nothing inevitable about technological progress leading to unemployment. That is a consequence of decisions made by employers and governments.

Trade unions need to be involved in those decisions from the beginning, rather than being consulted when redundancies have already been decided.

And where jobs are genuinely disappearing, workers deserve proper retraining, redeployment and compensation.

From banking to the railways, where members of the RMT union employed by gatesolutions have been taking industrial action over pay.

These workers provide catering supplies for London North Eastern Railway services, operating across the route between London and Edinburgh.

Although LNER is publicly owned, important parts of its operation remain in the hands of private contractors.

The dispute follows gatesolutions’ decision to stop maintaining pay at the Real Living Wage level, leaving workers facing rates barely above the statutory minimum.

RMT members took strike action on the 16th and 17th of October, with picketing and campaigning highlighting the treatment of outsourced staff.

The distinction between directly employed and outsourced workers is particularly important.

Two people can contribute to the same railway service, sometimes working alongside one another, yet have very different pay rates, pensions and employment conditions.

Outsourcing has allowed employers to distance themselves from responsibility for those inequalities.

The union argues that these services should be brought back into public ownership and that publicly owned LNER should ensure its contractors pay workers properly.

There has also been parliamentary support for the campaign, with MPs calling for action to resolve the dispute.

The question is straightforward. If a railway is publicly owned, why should workers providing essential services on that railway be denied decent employment standards?

The principle of public ownership ought to extend beyond the name above the door.

We turn now to the National Health Service.

The government has indicated that it considers a pay increase of just 2.4 per cent affordable for NHS staff in 2027 and 2028.

UNISON has described the proposal as derisory, arguing that it fails to recognise the pressures facing healthcare workers.

The union points out that more than two hundred thousand NHS employees are paid below the Real Living Wage.

That is an extraordinary situation for a service that depends on the dedication and professionalism of its workforce.

We regularly hear politicians praising NHS staff. But expressions of gratitude do not pay the mortgage, cover rising food bills or compensate for exhausting shifts.

Low pay also creates recruitment and retention problems. Experienced employees leave, vacancies remain unfilled, and those who stay face additional pressure.

There is a direct connection between the conditions experienced by NHS workers and the quality of care available to patients.

Meanwhile, in Northern Ireland, the Royal College of Nursing has opened a ballot for industrial action because nursing staff are still waiting for their pay award for the current financial year.

The ballot closes on the 20th of November.

Once again, healthcare workers are being forced to consider industrial action simply to secure fair treatment.

The government needs to recognise that rebuilding the NHS requires investment in the people who keep it running.

The crisis in higher education is another major concern.

Across Britain, university staff are fighting proposed job losses, departmental closures and changes to their contracts.

At the University of Edinburgh, members of the University and College Union have been taking prolonged strike action against cuts and compulsory redundancies.

At Nottingham, staff are also involved in sustained industrial action over proposed redundancies and course closures.

And at Goldsmiths in London, union members have been engaged in a particularly lengthy dispute over restructuring and job losses.

There have also been strikes at Glasgow Caledonian University, where unions have challenged management’s plans and demanded guarantees against compulsory redundancies.

The consequences extend well beyond university employees.

When experienced lecturers disappear, courses close and teaching provision is reduced, students suffer too.

Universities are supposed to be centres of learning, research and critical thought. Increasingly, however, many are being managed according to financial priorities that place these functions under threat.

Trade unions are right to challenge whether cuts are genuinely unavoidable and to demand transparency over university finances.

The principle is the same as in every other workplace. Employees should not simply be expected to accept management decisions without scrutiny.

There are also significant developments in employment law.

The Employment Rights Act 2025 is being introduced in stages, with further changes due to take effect on the 30th of October.

These include stronger rights for trade unions to gain access to workplaces, improvements to the statutory recognition process and additional protections for workers participating in lawful industrial action.

Trade union representatives will also benefit from strengthened rights relating to facilities and time off for union duties.

Earlier this month, the normal time limit for bringing many employment tribunal claims increased from three months to six months.

That is a welcome change, although workers should remember that the extension does not automatically revive claims whose deadlines had already expired.

There are also stronger obligations on employers to prevent sexual harassment and address harassment involving third parties.

These reforms matter. Too often, workers encounter unfair treatment without having the resources or confidence to challenge it.

But legislation alone cannot transform workplace relationships.

Rights must be understood, enforced and defended. Employers must be held accountable when they disregard them.

That is why workplace organisation and effective trade union representation remain essential.

Finally, we turn to an anniversary that deserves particular attention.

On the 21st of October 1966, a mountain of coal waste collapsed above the Welsh mining village of Aberfan.

The avalanche engulfed homes and Pantglas Junior School.

One hundred and forty-four people were killed, including 116 children.

Most of the children were attending school on the last day before the half-term holiday.

It remains one of the most appalling disasters in modern British history.

But Aberfan was not simply an unfortunate accident.

Warnings about the danger posed by the colliery spoil tips had been made before the disaster. The National Coal Board failed to respond adequately to those concerns.

The official inquiry subsequently placed responsibility for the disaster on the Coal Board.

For the families, the suffering did not end with the loss of their loved ones. They also faced a long struggle for justice, accountability and recognition.

Sixty years later, the lessons remain painfully relevant.

When organisations dismiss safety concerns, when commercial or institutional interests take priority over human lives, and when those in authority refuse to listen to warnings, the consequences can be catastrophic.

Workplace safety is not a bureaucratic formality. It is a fundamental responsibility.

And the right of workers and communities to raise concerns without fear must be protected.

This week, as Aberfan remembers those who died, we should remember too the extraordinary solidarity shown by miners, emergency workers and volunteers who rushed to help.

Their courage stands in sharp contrast to the failures of those responsible for preventing the disaster.

The best way to honour the dead is to ensure that the lessons are never forgotten.

That brings us to the end of this week’s Union News.

From the threat posed by artificial intelligence to jobs in banking, to the fight against low pay and outsourcing on the railways, the disputes affecting NHS and university workers, and the struggle for stronger employment rights, one message runs through all these stories.

Working people deserve respect, security, fair treatment and a genuine voice in the decisions that affect their lives.

None of those things can be taken for granted.

History shows that improvements in working conditions have rarely been handed down voluntarily. They have been won through organisation, negotiation and, when necessary, collective action.

Trade unions remain essential to defending those achievements and securing further progress.

If you’ve found this edition useful, please share it with colleagues, friends and fellow trade unionists.

You can find out more about Solidarity Trade Union at www.solidaritytradeunion.org.

Thank you for watching Union News. Until next time, stay informed, stay organised and stand together.

Script by Maria Camara

Unfairly Dismissed – Then Blamed for Not Finding Another Job

The Employment Appeal Tribunal’s decision in Kirkland v Caroline Mason trading as Hawthorn Education Services [2026] EAT 108 raises important questions about compensation, the obligation to find alternative work and the treatment of employees who have already suffered an unlawful dismissal.

There is something rather perverse about the way compensation can work in unfair dismissal cases. An employer dismisses someone without following a proper procedure. The employee takes the matter to an Employment Tribunal and establishes that the dismissal was unlawful. You might think the next question would be how much the employer should pay for the financial losses it has caused.

It isn’t always that simple.

Instead, attention can shift towards the dismissed worker. Did they apply for enough jobs? Could they have accepted different working hours? Were they too selective about the positions they considered? Did they spend too much time pursuing other interests when they should have been looking for employment?

These are legitimate questions in some circumstances. Employment law requires people who have suffered financial losses to take reasonable steps to reduce them. But there is a considerable difference between expecting someone to act reasonably and demanding that they reorganise their life to protect their former employer from the financial consequences of an unlawful dismissal.

The Employment Appeal Tribunal’s decision in Kirkland v Caroline Mason trading as Hawthorn Education Services [2026] EAT 108 examines that distinction. It also considers how tribunals should compensate workers for time spent preparing proceedings when the other side has behaved unreasonably.

Both issues have practical implications for trade union representatives.

A Dismissal Without a Proper Procedure

Patricia Kirkland worked as a part-time administration manager for Hawthorn Education Services, a business providing specialist education to children outside mainstream schooling. She had worked there since February 2019, completing 13.75 hours a week and earning an average of £652.91 gross per month.

In August 2022, she was summarily dismissed following allegations of misconduct. There had been no investigation, no proper disciplinary process and no warning that the meeting she attended might result in her dismissal. She received no written dismissal decision and was not offered a right of appeal.

The employer even disputed whether she was an employee, arguing that she was self-employed. That argument failed.

The Employment Tribunal found that Kirkland was an employee and that her dismissal was unfair. It also declined to reduce her compensation on grounds of contributory fault or on the basis that she might have been dismissed anyway had a fair procedure been followed.

The employer had failed to follow basic employment procedures and had dismissed someone unfairly. Kirkland was entitled to compensation.

She claimed £12,405.29 in lost earnings, covering approximately 19 months between her dismissal and March 2024.

However, her employer argued that she had failed to make sufficient efforts to find alternative employment.

Kirkland had made six job applications over approximately twelve months. She was 64 at the time of the tribunal proceedings and referred to her age, health difficulties and the absence of an employment reference as obstacles to finding suitable work.

She was also developing a short-term property rental business, which she had been establishing alongside her part-time employment. Following her dismissal, she spent more time building that business and concentrated on finding employment that would fit around it.

The employer challenged this approach. It argued that she should have applied for more positions and produced advertisements for 14 jobs that it suggested were potentially suitable.

One opportunity involved working for a solicitors’ firm. Kirkland had initially pursued the position because she understood it offered flexible part-time employment. However, when she discovered that attendance would be required on all five working days, she explained that the arrangement would not suit her circumstances. She was not subsequently interviewed.

The original tribunal was critical of her approach. It regarded her as capable, professional and highly employable. It concluded that she had concentrated on expanding her property business rather than making sufficient efforts to find replacement employment.

Instead of awarding the 19 months of lost earnings claimed, it allowed just six months, amounting to £3,917.46.

That was a substantial reduction. More importantly, the Employment Appeal Tribunal found that the original tribunal had applied the wrong legal test.

Who Has to Prove a Failure to Mitigate?

The central issue was the burden of proof.

The original tribunal had stated:

I am not satisfied that the Claimant has mitigated her loss.

Those words were important because they suggested that the tribunal expected Kirkland to prove she had taken reasonable steps to reduce her losses.

But that is not how the law works.

Where an employer argues that compensation should be reduced because a dismissed worker failed to mitigate their loss, the burden is on the employer to prove that the worker acted unreasonably.

This principle has been established for many years. The Court of Appeal addressed it in Wilding v British Telecommunications plc [2002] EWCA Civ 349, and it was examined again in Cooper Contracting Ltd v Lindsey UKEAT/0184/15.

In Cooper Contracting, the Employment Appeal Tribunal drew an important distinction between acting reasonably and not acting unreasonably.

It may have been reasonable for someone to apply for more jobs, accept different employment or pursue opportunities they ultimately rejected. That does not necessarily mean their actual decisions were unreasonable.

People do not always make the choices that a tribunal, looking back months or years later, considers most sensible. They may have good reasons for acting differently. The law allows for that.

Judge Mathew Gullick KC found that the original tribunal had failed to make a positive finding that Kirkland had acted unreasonably. It had considered her circumstances and expressed dissatisfaction with her attempts to find work, but it had not properly addressed whether the employer had proved an unreasonable failure to mitigate.

Nor had it correctly applied the burden of proof.

This is far more than a technical point.

Imagine a worker who has spent years in a part-time job and organised other commitments around those hours. After being unfairly dismissed, they are told that they should have applied for employment involving considerably less flexibility, longer journeys or attendance on more days.

It might have been sensible to consider those jobs. Depending on the circumstances, refusing them might even have been unreasonable. But the worker is not automatically required to abandon every existing commitment because their employer has unlawfully dismissed them.

In Kirkland’s case, the property rental business complicated matters. There was evidence that she had deliberately concentrated on finding work that would fit around its development. The employer was entitled to argue that this limited her efforts to replace her lost wages.

What it could not do was simply assume that those choices justified reducing compensation. It had to prove that her conduct was unreasonable.

The test is objective, but the worker’s circumstances, wishes and reasons for acting as they did are relevant.

An employer may believe that a dismissed worker could have done more. That is not enough.

One of the most useful principles in Cooper Contracting, discussed in the Kirkland judgment, is the warning against imposing too demanding a standard on someone who has already suffered a legal wrong.

After all, the worker would not have been in that position had the employer acted lawfully in the first place.

That does not excuse unreasonable conduct by a claimant. It does mean that the tribunal must ask the right question and place the burden of proof where the law says it belongs.

Job Advertisements Do Not Prove a Worker Could Have Found Employment

There is a familiar tactic in disputes over compensation. The employer produces a collection of job advertisements and suggests that, because vacancies existed, the claimant could have found alternative employment.

It sounds convincing until you examine the evidence.

A job advertisement is not a job offer.

Was the position actually suitable? Did it require qualifications or experience the claimant did not possess? Were the hours compatible with their circumstances? Was the location practical? How many other people might have applied?

And, most importantly, was the claimant unreasonable in failing to pursue it?

Kirkland’s employer had identified 14 advertised positions, but had produced no witness evidence at the remedy hearing. The advertisements were material the tribunal could consider. They did not, by themselves, prove that Kirkland had unreasonably failed to mitigate her losses.

For representatives, this is an area where careful preparation can make a difference.

If an employer produces a list of vacancies, examine them individually. Ask whether the jobs were genuinely suitable and whether the claimant had a realistic prospect of securing them. Do not allow the existence of advertisements to be treated as proof that employment was readily available.

Workers should also keep proper records of their efforts to find alternative employment. Applications, interviews, recruitment agency contacts and explanations for rejecting unsuitable vacancies can all help establish what actually happened.

Although the employer bears the legal burden, it makes sense for claimants to have evidence supporting their account.

Where members have health problems, caring responsibilities or other commitments affecting the work they can undertake, these should be explained and, where appropriate, supported by evidence.

Nobody needs to demonstrate that every decision was perfect. But being able to explain those decisions is important.

There is also a danger in allowing assumptions about employability to replace evidence. The original tribunal considered Kirkland capable, professional and an attractive prospect for administrative work. Those assessments may have been entirely fair. But being a capable worker is not the same as being guaranteed another job.

Nor does finding someone personally impressive establish that they behaved unreasonably by not securing employment sooner.

The Other Battle: Compensation for Preparation Time

Kirkland’s appeal raised a second issue that deserves more attention.

Employment litigation can be extraordinarily demanding. There are claims to prepare, documents to examine, correspondence to answer, witnesses to organise and deadlines to meet. A supposedly straightforward unfair dismissal case can become a prolonged exercise.

This is particularly true when an employer or its representatives conduct proceedings unreasonably.

Kirkland had represented herself before the original tribunal. She complained about the way the employer had defended the claim and submitted a detailed chronology explaining the additional work she believed that conduct had caused.

She sought a preparation time order covering 155 hours.

The tribunal accepted that the employer had acted vexatiously and unreasonably in defending the proceedings. It was particularly critical of aspects of the handling of the case and the apparent failure to engage in negotiations following an earlier hearing.

However, the tribunal also criticised Kirkland’s own approach. It considered that she had spent unnecessary time dealing with minor details and preparing excessively large bundles of documents.

That criticism was something the tribunal was entitled to take into account. Anyone who has represented members knows how easily a case can become buried beneath correspondence, duplicated material and arguments that have little bearing on the actual dispute.

One of the most valuable things an experienced representative can do is identify what really matters and concentrate on it.

But the tribunal then awarded Kirkland £1,000 without explaining how it had calculated that amount.

Her claim involved 155 hours at the applicable rate of £43 an hour, representing more than £6,500 if allowed in full. The tribunal had therefore reduced her claim substantially.

It was entitled to reject preparation time that it considered unreasonable or disproportionate. What it could not do was simply choose a figure without following the calculation required by the rules.

At the time of the proceedings, Rule 79 of the Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure 2013 required the tribunal to assess the number of reasonable and proportionate preparation hours and multiply that number by the prescribed hourly rate.

Judge Gullick found that the original tribunal had failed to do this.

It had effectively selected a round sum rather than identifying how many hours should properly be allowed.

The EAT recognised that a tribunal does not have to examine every minute of preparation individually. Some estimation is permissible. But there must still be an assessment of the hours allowed, supported by adequate reasoning.

The employer suggested that the £1,000 figure could be interpreted as representing approximately 23.26 hours at £43 an hour.

That argument was rejected. There was nothing in the original decision to suggest that the tribunal had actually undertaken such a calculation.

The rules have since changed, but the principle remains. Under Rule 77 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024, the tribunal must assess the reasonable and proportionate preparation time and apply the prescribed hourly rate. For preparation undertaken in the year beginning 6 April 2026, that rate is £46 an hour.

Preparation time orders are not automatically available simply because a worker wins a case. The legal grounds for making such an order must be established. These include unreasonable conduct of proceedings or a claim or response having no reasonable prospect of success.

A preparation time order is concerned with qualifying preparation undertaken without legal representation. Under the current rules, assistance from a non-lawyer representative does not, of itself, prevent such an order, although a preparation time order and a costs order cannot both be made in favour of the same party in the same proceedings.

For union representatives, the practical point is to keep a proper record when an employer’s unreasonable conduct causes additional work.

Identify what happened, what preparation became necessary and how much time was reasonably spent dealing with it. An application supported by a chronology and records of preparation is considerably stronger than a general complaint that the employer made the case difficult.

And if a tribunal accepts that an order is appropriate, it must then calculate the amount according to the rules.

Winning the Case Should Mean Something

The Employment Appeal Tribunal allowed Kirkland’s appeal on both grounds.

The compensatory award was set aside because the tribunal had failed to apply the correct approach to mitigation. The preparation time award was also set aside because it had not been calculated in accordance with the rules.

Both matters were sent back to a different Employment Judge for reconsideration.

The existing £500 award for loss of statutory rights was preserved, as was the finding that making a preparation time order was appropriate. The 25 per cent uplift for failure to comply with the ACAS Code of Practice would also have to be recalculated if the compensatory award changed. The employer had not challenged the 25 per cent rate itself.

Kirkland had not automatically secured the full compensation she originally claimed. The new tribunal would still have to consider the evidence and determine the appropriate amounts.

Her success was in establishing that the original decisions had been reached through an incorrect application of the law.

It is also worth noting that Kirkland was assisted in her appeal by Patricia Leonard of the Free Representation Unit, who appeared without charge. Without that assistance, an unrepresented claimant might have found it considerably harder to identify and pursue the legal errors involved.

The case illustrates why representatives need to be familiar with the authorities governing compensation, rather than relying entirely on general arguments about fairness.

The original tribunal had not been directed to the relevant authorities on mitigation. The employer’s submissions had emphasised the need for a just and equitable award without properly addressing the established burden of proof.

Section 123(1) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 does require a tribunal to determine what compensation is just and equitable. But section 123(4) requires it to apply the common law rules on mitigation. The general principle of fairness cannot be used to avoid the particular legal test.

That is an argument worth making whenever an employer seeks to reduce compensation because a worker supposedly failed to find alternative employment.

There is a broader concern here, too.

For a dismissed worker, bringing a tribunal claim can involve considerable financial and emotional strain. Employment may have been lost suddenly. Savings may be depleted. The worker may be trying to rebuild their working life while dealing with proceedings that continue for months or years.

Yet after proving that the employer acted unlawfully, the claimant may find themselves answering questions about every decision they have made since losing their job.

Why did they not apply for more vacancies? Why did they not accept different hours? Why did they concentrate on another source of income? Why did they not find work sooner?

Some scrutiny is inevitable. Compensation should reflect actual losses, and workers cannot disregard reasonable opportunities to reduce them.

But we should not lose sight of who created the problem.

Kirkland had worked part-time for several years. She was dismissed without investigation or procedure, and the original tribunal found that she had done nothing to bring the dismissal upon herself. She then had to pursue legal proceedings to establish rights that her employer had denied.

When the question of compensation arose, it was the employer’s responsibility to prove that she had acted unreasonably in failing to reduce her losses.

The EAT did not decide that all her choices were reasonable. It decided that the tribunal had failed to ask the correct question. That distinction is important, and it leaves the substantive issue to be determined properly at the rehearing.

For trade union representatives, Kirkland provides a useful authority to cite when employers argue that a claimant should have applied for more jobs, accepted different working arrangements or made greater efforts to reduce their losses.

It also reinforces the need to challenge inadequately reasoned preparation time awards.

Nobody disputes that dismissed workers should make reasonable efforts to find alternative employment. But there is something fundamentally wrong when an employer can dispense with proper procedures, dismiss a worker unlawfully and then seek to escape much of the financial responsibility by arguing that the worker should have organised their life differently afterwards.

The law places the burden of proving an unreasonable failure to mitigate on the employer.

It is a protection worth knowing about and, when necessary, fighting to enforce.

Report from Pat Harrington

Case: Kirkland v Caroline Mason trading as Hawthorn Education Services [2026] EAT 108.

Decision: Employment Appeal Tribunal, Judge Mathew Gullick KC, 9 July 2026. Published 18 September 2026.

Full judgment: Read the judgment on GOV.UK

Relevant authorities: Wilding v British Telecommunications plc [2002] EWCA Civ 349; Cooper Contracting Ltd v Lindsey UKEAT/0184/15.

Legislation: Employment Rights Act 1996, section 123; Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024, Rules 73–77.

Union News | 17 October 2026: Job Cuts, NHS Strikes, Equal Pay Battles & Workers’ Rights

Welcome to Union News, your weekly round-up of the stories that matter to working people, from Solidarity Trade Union.

It’s Saturday, the 17th of October 2026.

This week, we’re looking at threatened job losses at Greggs, NHS workers fighting for fair pay in Leeds, a long-running equal pay dispute in Sunderland, and fresh industrial action in Britain’s universities.

We’ll also be examining disputes in local government and transport, changes to employment law, and concerns about cuts to fire cover in the West Midlands.

There’s plenty to get through. And, as usual, we’ll be looking beyond the headlines to ask what these developments actually mean for the people doing the work.

Let’s begin with a story that illustrates just how insecure employment can become, even in a business that’s a familiar fixture of Britain’s high streets.

GREGGS: HUNDREDS OF JOBS UNDER THREAT

Greggs is a name recognised across the country.

For many people, it’s somewhere to grab a sandwich, a coffee or a sausage roll on the way to work.

But behind the shop counters and the familiar branding is a workforce that depends on the company for its livelihood.

And that workforce is facing considerable uncertainty.

Reports indicate that up to 854 jobs are under threat as the bakery chain considers changes to its operations.

For the workers concerned, these aren’t simply figures on a corporate spreadsheet.

They’re mortgages, rents, household bills and family responsibilities.

They’re people who have built their working lives around an employer and now find themselves wondering whether they’ll still have a job.

Whenever redundancies are proposed, employers tend to reach for the same language.

Restructuring. Efficiency. Modernisation. Changing operational requirements.

Sometimes businesses genuinely do need to adapt. Nobody seriously disputes that.

But those words can also conceal the human consequences of decisions made far away from the workplace.

The real questions are whether redundancies are genuinely necessary, whether alternatives have been properly examined, and whether employees are being given a meaningful opportunity to influence the outcome.

Consultation should never be a box-ticking exercise.

It must involve examining the business case, exploring alternatives, considering redeployment and challenging assumptions about the need for job losses.

Workers should not simply be informed that a decision has been taken and then invited to discuss how it will be implemented.

And where jobs are threatened, trade union representation becomes particularly important.

A union can examine the employer’s proposals, demand relevant information, challenge selection criteria and ensure that individual workers understand their rights.

The Greggs situation is another reminder that a familiar and successful brand does not automatically guarantee security for the people whose labour sustains it.

LEEDS NHS WORKERS FIGHT FOR FAIR PAY

Our next story takes us to Leeds, where NHS workers have been taking industrial action over their pay grading.

This is a dispute about something that should be straightforward.

If you’re doing a job that carries greater responsibility, or routinely carrying out duties associated with a higher grade, you should be paid accordingly.

Yet across the NHS, workers can find themselves taking on responsibilities that aren’t properly reflected in their pay bands.

Sometimes these arrangements develop gradually.

A department becomes short-staffed. Duties are redistributed. Employees are asked to take on additional tasks.

What begins as a temporary arrangement becomes part of the normal working day.

But the pay doesn’t necessarily follow.

And that’s where resentment understandably grows.

The workers involved in the Leeds dispute are challenging the way their roles and responsibilities have been assessed.

It’s important to recognise that this isn’t simply a question of wanting more money.

It’s about fairness, consistency and properly recognising the contribution employees make.

The NHS depends on enormous numbers of staff whose work rarely attracts the attention given to doctors and nurses.

Administrative workers, support staff, technical employees and others perform essential functions without which the health service simply couldn’t operate.

Their contribution deserves recognition.

And that recognition must be reflected in terms and conditions, not just warm words from management.

There is also a wider issue here.

Public services increasingly depend on workers being flexible, taking on extra responsibilities and filling gaps created by staff shortages.

But flexibility cannot be a one-way arrangement.

If employers want employees to take on additional responsibilities, they must be prepared to recognise those responsibilities properly.

Industrial action is never undertaken lightly, particularly in healthcare.

Workers lose pay, face pressure and know that their actions will attract public attention.

But when negotiations fail to resolve long-standing concerns, collective action may become the only effective means of securing change.

SUNDERLAND AND THE LONG FIGHT FOR EQUAL PAY

Now to Sunderland, where the continuing struggle over equal pay provides another reminder of how difficult it can be to turn a legal right into a practical reality.

Equal pay legislation has existed in Britain for decades.

Yet disputes continue to arise over whether jobs traditionally performed by women are valued as highly as comparable work more commonly undertaken by men.

This has been a particularly significant issue in local government.

Workers in jobs such as cleaning, catering and care have historically challenged pay arrangements that they believe undervalued their contribution.

And these aren’t easy cases.

They can involve complex comparisons between jobs, disagreements about grading structures, historical bonus arrangements and lengthy legal proceedings.

For the workers concerned, the process can stretch over years.

That’s a considerable burden.

It’s worth remembering what equal pay is actually about.

It’s not about demanding special treatment.

It’s about ensuring that work of equal value receives equal treatment.

Employers sometimes argue that different jobs cannot easily be compared.

Of course, different roles involve different skills, responsibilities and working conditions.

But that is precisely why proper job evaluation and transparent pay systems are so important.

The principle is that jobs should be assessed fairly, rather than according to historical assumptions about the value of men’s and women’s work.

The Sunderland dispute also raises questions about how public bodies respond when workers challenge established practices.

Councils have financial pressures. That’s undeniable.

But financial difficulty cannot, by itself, justify unlawful discrimination.

Nor should workers be expected to abandon legitimate claims simply because resolving them would prove expensive.

Equal pay is not merely a historical achievement to be celebrated.

It’s a principle that still has to be defended.

GOLDSMITHS: UNIVERSITY WORKERS RESIST CUTS

There are also continuing concerns in higher education, where staff at Goldsmiths, University of London, have been resisting cuts and restructuring.

Universities have been under considerable financial pressure.

We’ve seen institutions across the country announce redundancies, course closures and reductions in academic and support services.

Management frequently presents these measures as unavoidable responses to financial circumstances.

But staff and students are entitled to question the choices being made.

What alternatives have been explored?

How have spending priorities been determined?

And what happens to the quality of education when experienced lecturers, researchers and support workers disappear?

Goldsmiths has a distinctive reputation, particularly in the arts, humanities and social sciences.

Those subjects matter.

Universities shouldn’t be judged solely by their ability to produce an immediate financial return.

They’re also places where people develop critical thinking, explore ideas, challenge established assumptions and contribute to cultural life.

When courses are cut and departments dismantled, something can be lost that isn’t easily restored.

Staff facing redundancy are understandably concerned about their livelihoods.

But there is also a wider argument about the future of higher education.

Increasingly, universities are encouraged to operate according to commercial priorities.

Students become customers. Courses become products. Departments are assessed according to financial performance.

That approach risks losing sight of education as a public good.

Trade union opposition to university cuts therefore represents more than a defence of individual jobs.

It raises important questions about what universities are for and who should determine their priorities.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT: PRESSURE ON FRONTLINE SERVICES

The pressure on public services is also being felt in local government.

Disputes involving council workers in places including Great Yarmouth and Lewisham demonstrate the difficulties facing employees as authorities try to manage financial constraints.

Across Britain, councils are expected to deliver essential services while dealing with continuing pressure on their budgets.

And when the figures don’t add up, it’s often workers who are asked to absorb the consequences.

That might mean reduced staffing, changes to working arrangements, disputed pay settlements or increased workloads.

But council services aren’t abstract financial commitments.

They’re things people depend upon every day.

Waste collection, environmental services, housing support, social care, maintenance and a host of other functions keep communities running.

The workers delivering those services are often taken for granted.

Until, of course, the service stops.

It’s then that people suddenly recognise how much they rely on those doing the work.

There is a broader political question here.

If local government is expected to provide essential services, it needs the resources to do so properly.

Passing financial pressures down to employees is not a sustainable solution.

Nor is expecting ever-smaller workforces to maintain the same standards indefinitely.

Trade unions have an important role in challenging those assumptions and making sure that the workforce has a voice when decisions are taken.

NOTTINGHAM TRAM WORKERS AND THE TRANSPORT DISPUTE

Turning to transport, industrial relations involving Nottingham tram workers have also been in the news.

Public transport workers occupy an interesting position.

Their work is essential to the everyday functioning of towns and cities.

They get people to jobs, schools, hospitals and appointments.

Yet disputes over pay, conditions and working arrangements can quickly become contentious because industrial action has an immediate impact on passengers.

It’s entirely understandable that disruption causes frustration.

Nobody enjoys being stranded or having their journey interrupted.

But it’s worth considering why workers decide to strike in the first place.

Industrial action involves sacrifice.

Employees may lose wages, face criticism and find themselves under significant pressure.

It is not generally the easy option.

The underlying issues are often about maintaining a reasonable standard of living, securing predictable working patterns or resisting changes that workers believe would make their jobs less sustainable.

And the wider public has an interest in those conditions too.

A transport system that relies on exhausted, poorly rewarded or demoralised employees is hardly a recipe for a reliable service.

Good public transport requires investment in both infrastructure and the people operating it.

Passengers and workers don’t necessarily have opposing interests.

Quite often, they have a shared interest in services that are properly funded, adequately staffed and run responsibly.

EMPLOYMENT LAW: MORE TIME TO BRING CLAIMS

Now let’s turn to employment law, and developments that could have a significant impact on workers seeking justice.

One of the most important changes under discussion is the extension of time limits for bringing employment tribunal claims.

For many employment claims, the traditional deadline has been just three months, subject to the relevant rules and Acas early conciliation provisions.

That’s an extraordinarily short period.

Imagine being dismissed from your job.

You’re suddenly dealing with the loss of income, uncertainty about your future, perhaps an appeal against the decision, and the practical need to find alternative employment.

At the same time, you’re expected to understand employment law, obtain advice and begin legal proceedings within a very limited period.

It’s hardly surprising that some people miss the deadline.

And the consequences can be severe.

A potentially strong claim may never be heard because it was submitted too late.

Extending the standard tribunal time limit to six months would therefore represent an important improvement in access to justice.

It would give workers more opportunity to obtain advice, gather evidence and consider their options.

But longer deadlines won’t solve every problem.

Employment tribunals must also be adequately resourced.

There’s little point making it easier for someone to submit a claim if they then face an excessively long wait for a hearing.

Justice delayed can impose its own costs.

Witnesses move on. Memories fade. Financial difficulties increase.

And employers with greater resources may be in a stronger position to withstand prolonged litigation.

For trade union representatives, the practical lesson remains important.

Never assume that a proposed reform has already taken effect.

The correct deadline depends on the type of claim and the legislation in force at the relevant time.

Workers should continue seeking advice promptly, even where longer time limits are expected.

TRADE UNION RIGHTS AND THE CHANGING LEGAL FRAMEWORK

There are also wider changes taking shape in employment and trade union law.

The Government has presented its employment reforms as an attempt to improve security, strengthen rights and address unfair treatment in the workplace.

Some of the proposals are undoubtedly welcome.

But, as always, the detail matters.

A right written into legislation is only as effective as the ability of workers to enforce it.

We have to ask whether employees will genuinely be able to challenge unfair practices without risking retaliation.

Whether trade unions will have meaningful opportunities to organise and represent their members.

And whether enforcement arrangements will be strong enough to discourage employers from ignoring their obligations.

There’s also an important distinction between individual rights and collective bargaining.

Individual legal protections matter enormously.

They establish minimum standards and provide remedies when those standards are breached.

But workers are often better placed to improve their circumstances when they can negotiate collectively.

A union can address problems before they become tribunal cases.

It can challenge unsafe working practices, negotiate better conditions and ensure that management decisions are properly scrutinised.

Legislation can establish a floor beneath which employment standards should not fall.

Collective organisation can help workers build something better on top of it.

That’s why employment law reform should never be considered in isolation from trade union rights.

The two are closely connected.

WEST MIDLANDS: CONCERNS OVER FIRE COVER

Our final major story concerns the West Midlands, where proposals affecting fire cover have raised concerns about the future of emergency services.

Firefighters perform one of the most demanding and dangerous jobs in public service.

When most people are trying to escape a burning building, firefighters are the people heading towards it.

Their work requires extensive training, professional judgement, physical courage and teamwork.

But effective emergency response depends on more than the skill and dedication of individual firefighters.

It requires sufficient staffing, properly maintained equipment and resources positioned where they can respond quickly.

When proposals are made to reduce or reorganise fire cover, the public deserves a clear explanation of the consequences.

What will happen to response times?

Will some areas face longer waits for assistance?

How will additional pressure on remaining crews be managed?

And have firefighters and their representatives been properly consulted?

These are not unreasonable questions.

They go to the heart of public safety.

Of course, emergency services must regularly review how they operate.

Communities change. Patterns of risk change. Technology and working methods develop.

Nobody is arguing that services should remain unchanged simply for the sake of tradition.

But decisions must be based on a credible assessment of risk, not simply the need to make financial savings.

There is also the question of firefighter safety.

Smaller or overstretched crews may face greater difficulties responding effectively to dangerous incidents.

So when firefighters and their unions raise concerns about proposed changes, those concerns deserve serious consideration.

They’re based on the experience of people who understand what happens when an emergency call comes in.

The public has a direct interest in ensuring that their warnings are heard.

THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE

Looking back over this week’s stories, there is a common thread running through them.

At Greggs, workers face uncertainty about the future of their jobs.

In Leeds, NHS employees are demanding that their responsibilities be properly recognised.

In Sunderland, the struggle for equal pay continues.

At Goldsmiths, university staff are fighting to defend jobs and the educational services they provide.

Council workers and transport employees are challenging decisions affecting their livelihoods and working conditions.

And firefighters are raising questions about changes that could have serious implications for public safety.

These disputes take place in very different workplaces.

A bakery business. A hospital. A university. A council. A tram network. A fire service.

But they raise remarkably similar questions.

Who makes the decisions?

Who bears the consequences?

And how much influence do working people have over matters that directly affect their lives?

Employers and public authorities have responsibilities.

They must manage resources, plan for the future and make difficult decisions.

But workers are not simply another cost to be adjusted when circumstances become challenging.

They bring knowledge, experience and commitment to their workplaces.

They deserve to be treated with fairness and respect.

And they deserve a meaningful voice.

That’s where trade unions come in.

Collective organisation does not guarantee that every dispute will end in victory.

Anyone who has spent time representing workers knows that.

Sometimes negotiations produce compromises.

Sometimes campaigns take years.

And sometimes, despite everyone’s best efforts, the outcome falls short of what workers hoped to achieve.

But the alternative — leaving individuals to face powerful employers entirely on their own — is rarely a better one.

A union gives workers the opportunity to act together.

To share information.

To challenge unfairness.

To support colleagues facing difficult circumstances.

And, where necessary, to take collective action.

The strength of a trade union doesn’t come from its offices, its officials or its publicity.

It comes from its members.

From people willing to stand alongside one another and insist that fairness at work is worth defending.

That’s something we should never lose sight of.

And it’s why the stories we’ve covered this week matter.

They’re not simply industrial relations stories or employment law developments.

They’re stories about the balance of power in everyday working life.

Whether you’re working in healthcare, retail, education, transport, local government or the private sector, the underlying principles remain the same.

Fair pay.

Safe conditions.

Job security.

Respect.

And the right to be heard.

That brings us to the end of this week’s Union News.

Thank you for listening.

And remember, whatever challenges you face at work, there is strength in standing together.

Together we are strong.

Until next time, take care, and stay united.

Script by Maria Camara

When Words Hurt: Mental Health, Workplace Harassment and the Lessons of McManus v British Airways

The Employment Appeal Tribunal has confirmed that a worker’s mental health can influence whether unwanted conduct amounts to unlawful harassment. But its latest ruling also reveals the difficulties employees face when trying to establish that insensitive treatment has crossed the legal line.

There is a familiar problem in workplace disputes involving mental health. An employee complains that something said by a manager, supervisor or occupational health adviser caused considerable distress. The employer responds that no offence was intended, that the conversation was part of an ordinary management process, or that the employee simply reacted too strongly.

For workers already struggling with anxiety, depression or other mental health difficulties, such responses can make a distressing experience even worse. They may feel that the very condition which makes them vulnerable is being used to dismiss their concerns.

But where does the law draw the line between an insensitive remark and unlawful harassment? Should someone experiencing anxiety or depression be expected to react in the same way as a person without those conditions? And how much weight should a tribunal give to the particular vulnerabilities of the individual concerned?

These questions were considered by the Employment Appeal Tribunal in McManus v British Airways plc [2026] EAT 155, a judgment delivered on 9 October 2026.

The decision offers both encouragement and a warning to workers and their representatives. It confirms that mental ill health can be relevant when deciding whether unwanted conduct has a legally recognised harassing effect. At the same time, it demonstrates that even a genuinely upsetting, inappropriate and disability-related comment will not necessarily amount to unlawful harassment.

For trade union representatives, understanding that distinction is essential.

A difficult return to work

Mrs McManus was a British Airways cabin crew employee who had experienced depression, anxiety and social phobia during the Covid-19 pandemic. British Airways accepted that she was disabled for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010.

Following a lengthy period of sickness absence, she was preparing to return to work in 2022.

That prospect was already causing considerable anxiety. Changes within British Airways meant she would not be returning to precisely the same working arrangements she had previously known. She was also seeking adjustments that would help her manage her health conditions and resume her employment.

She had received support from a mental health support team and had developed a wellness and recovery action plan. She regarded the recommendations arising from that support as important to making a successful return.

British Airways referred her to its occupational health service for assessment.

The subsequent telephone consultation lasted approximately two hours and, according to the tribunal’s findings, did not go well.

Mrs McManus was nervous about the assessment. She found the occupational health practitioner’s approach upsetting, and there were disagreements over what adjustments were appropriate and whose recommendations should carry weight.

During the consultation, the occupational health practitioner made a remark about Access to Work, the government scheme that can provide practical and financial support to help disabled people obtain or remain in employment.

The practitioner told Mrs McManus:

“not for people like you, its for people in wheelchairs”

The tribunal accepted that the remark had been made and related to her disability.

It also accepted that the practitioner had a poor understanding of the scheme. Access to Work is not confined to people with physical disabilities or wheelchair users. Support may also be available to eligible workers experiencing mental health difficulties.

Mrs McManus regarded the comment as harassing and brought proceedings alleging disability discrimination, failures to make reasonable adjustments and disability-related harassment.

However, the original Employment Tribunal dismissed her claims.

Her appeal concentrated on the rejection of the harassment complaint arising from the Access to Work remark.

What does the Equality Act actually require?

Section 26 of the Equality Act 2010 defines harassment related to a protected characteristic.

In broad terms, a person harasses another where they engage in unwanted conduct related to a relevant protected characteristic, such as disability, and that conduct has the purpose or effect of violating the person’s dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment.

There is an important distinction between conduct intended to cause such harm and conduct which has that effect regardless of intention.

If an employer or manager deliberately humiliates a disabled employee because of their disability, the purpose of the conduct may provide the basis for a harassment claim.

But unlawful harassment can also arise where there was no intention to cause humiliation or offence.

That does not mean every unpleasant or thoughtless remark is unlawful.

Where a claimant relies on the effect of the conduct, section 26(4) requires the tribunal to consider three matters: the claimant’s perception, the other circumstances of the case, and whether it was reasonable for the conduct to have the alleged effect.

This creates an assessment that combines the individual’s actual experience with an objective consideration of whether the conduct could reasonably be regarded as sufficiently serious in the circumstances.

An employer cannot escape responsibility simply by claiming that no harm was intended.

Equally, an employee cannot establish unlawful harassment solely by demonstrating that they were upset.

Both sides of that equation matter.

Mental health is part of the circumstances

The central legal question in McManus concerned how the tribunal should approach the claimant’s mental health when assessing reasonableness.

British Airways argued that her mental ill health was relevant to establishing how she subjectively perceived the remark, but should not separately influence the objective assessment of whether the remark could reasonably be regarded as having a harassing effect.

The Employment Appeal Tribunal rejected that narrow approach.

His Honour Judge Auerbach confirmed that mental ill health could properly form part of the circumstances considered when deciding whether the conduct had the prohibited effect.

That is an important clarification.

An employee with a recognised anxiety disorder may experience particular language, behaviour or circumstances differently from someone without that condition.

A worker recovering from depression may be especially vulnerable during a return-to-work assessment. Someone with post-traumatic stress disorder may react particularly strongly to certain forms of confrontation or questioning.

These individual circumstances cannot simply be ignored when assessing what it was reasonable for the conduct to do.

The law does not require tribunals to imagine an entirely abstract employee, stripped of personal characteristics, and then judge every workplace interaction against that fictional individual’s reactions.

The person who experienced the conduct matters.

However, the EAT was equally clear that mental ill health does not automatically make every reaction objectively reasonable.

The tribunal must still consider the whole picture, including the nature of the conduct, the circumstances in which it occurred and its actual effect.

There is an important difference between saying that a condition must be taken into account and saying that the condition determines the outcome.

McManus establishes the former, not the latter.

Why did British Airways win?

At first sight, the result may seem surprising.

The occupational health practitioner had made an inaccurate and insensitive remark about a disability support scheme. Mrs McManus was genuinely distressed, and the comment related directly to her disability.

Yet the tribunal found that the legal threshold for harassment had not been met.

The EAT agreed that this conclusion was legally open to the tribunal.

A major consideration was the setting in which the remark had been made.

This was an occupational health assessment intended to establish what support Mrs McManus needed to return to work. Such consultations can involve difficult, personal and sometimes uncomfortable questions.

The original tribunal accepted that some of the practitioner’s approach could have been expressed differently. Nevertheless, it considered that the practitioner was carrying out a legitimate medical assessment, and that the Access to Work remark arose in a discussion about potential adjustments.

The tribunal also considered the fact that the offending remark formed a relatively small part of a two-hour consultation.

The practitioner appeared to have misunderstood the scope of Access to Work rather than deliberately sought to belittle the claimant.

Importantly, a lack of malicious intention would not, by itself, defeat a harassment claim based on the effect of conduct. But the nature and context of the remark were relevant to evaluating that effect.

The EAT concluded that the tribunal had considered Mrs McManus’s mental health and distress alongside these other circumstances.

It had not simply assumed that her anxiety was irrelevant.

Nor had it been required to reach a different conclusion because her distress was genuine.

Judge Auerbach emphasised that an appeal tribunal should not substitute its own assessment merely because it might have evaluated the facts differently. Intervention requires a legal error or a decision that meets the demanding threshold for perversity.

That threshold had not been reached.

The appeal was dismissed.

This is an important limitation on what the case decides. The EAT did not establish that remarks of this kind are generally acceptable, or that similar conduct could never constitute harassment. It decided that the original tribunal’s assessment was legally permissible on the particular facts.

Insensitive treatment is not automatically unlawful

There is an uncomfortable but necessary lesson in this judgment.

Employment law does not provide a remedy for every instance of insensitive, unfair or thoughtless workplace behaviour.

A manager may handle a conversation badly. An HR adviser may misunderstand an employee’s condition. An occupational health practitioner may use language that is unnecessarily blunt or dismissive.

Such conduct may justify a complaint, additional training, an apology or changes to workplace procedures without necessarily satisfying the legal definition of harassment.

That distinction can be frustrating for workers.

Someone who experiences genuine humiliation may understandably struggle to accept that a tribunal can recognise their distress yet conclude that no unlawful harassment occurred.

But the distinction is deliberate. The Equality Act requires the conduct to have a particular purpose or effect. It is not a general statutory code of workplace courtesy.

This should not encourage employers to tolerate poor treatment.

An employer interested only in whether conduct crosses the threshold for legal liability is setting its standards far too low.

Workplaces should be places where employees are treated with dignity because that is the right way to manage people, not merely because a tribunal might otherwise award compensation.

In occupational health consultations, that responsibility is especially important.

Employees may already feel vulnerable because of illness, prolonged absence or uncertainty about whether they will be permitted to return to their normal duties.

They should be able to expect accurate information, professional sensitivity and genuine consideration of their circumstances.

The importance of Access to Work

The comment at the centre of McManus also highlights a wider problem: misunderstanding the support available to disabled workers.

Access to Work is a government programme designed to help eligible disabled people obtain or remain in employment. Depending on individual circumstances and eligibility, it can provide assistance with practical workplace support, specialist equipment, travel or mental health-related support.

It is not exclusively intended for people who use wheelchairs.

For someone seeking to return after an extended absence caused by depression or anxiety, the possibility of Access to Work assistance may be significant.

An inaccurate statement suggesting that such support is unavailable could discourage someone from seeking help that might make continued employment possible.

Employers and occupational health professionals therefore have a responsibility to understand the scheme properly.

They should also distinguish between Access to Work assistance and an employer’s own obligations under the Equality Act.

An employer’s duty to make reasonable adjustments does not disappear simply because external assistance might be available.

Nor should an employee be expected to navigate complex support arrangements without appropriate guidance.

In McManus, the tribunal concluded that the practitioner’s misunderstanding did not amount to unlawful harassment. That should not obscure the practical importance of ensuring that employees receive accurate advice about the assistance available to them.

What this means for workers experiencing mental ill health

For employees with anxiety, depression or other mental health conditions, the judgment offers a significant point of principle.

Their health can be relevant not only to explaining why they experienced distress but also to the legal assessment of whether it was reasonable for the conduct to have that effect.

A tribunal considering a harassment complaint should not disregard a relevant mental health condition simply because the assessment contains an objective element.

This has practical implications.

Suppose an employee with a diagnosed anxiety disorder is subjected to repeated aggressive questioning by a manager who knows about the condition.

The employee becomes distressed and complains that the questioning created an intimidating environment.

It would be wrong to assess that complaint without considering the employee’s anxiety where it is a relevant circumstance.

The manager’s conduct might be regarded differently if the employer knew that particular approaches were likely to cause significant distress.

But this does not mean that the employee’s condition prevents the employer from asking difficult questions.

Employers remain entitled to investigate complaints, address performance concerns, manage sickness absence and make legitimate decisions about employment.

The question is how they exercise those responsibilities.

There is a difference between asking necessary questions respectfully and using an unnecessarily humiliating or aggressive approach.

The presence of a mental health condition may affect where that line is drawn, but it does not remove the line altogether.

Why the wider pattern of behaviour matters

One of the difficulties in harassment cases is that individual remarks may appear relatively minor when considered separately, even though their cumulative effect is much more serious.

A worker may experience a series of comments, dismissive responses or confrontational meetings that gradually create an intimidating or humiliating environment.

Each incident might appear insufficient on its own.

Taken together, they may present a different picture.

This was another issue raised in McManus.

Mrs McManus argued that the Access to Work remark should not be considered in isolation from other things said during the occupational health consultation.

The wider conversation had included sensitive questioning, disagreements about her proposed adjustments and an approach that she found distressing.

However, the EAT concluded that the tribunal had not ignored this wider context. It had considered the meeting as a whole and was entitled to distinguish the specific remark being challenged from other allegations that it had already assessed.

This is an important point for union representatives.

When representing a member who complains of harassment, it is necessary to identify both the individual incidents and the overall pattern.

Rather than relying upon a general assertion that management has been intimidating or bullying, representatives should establish what was said, when it was said, who was present and how the conduct affected the employee.

If several incidents are said to have produced a cumulative harassing effect, that should be explained explicitly.

The evidence may include emails, meeting notes, contemporaneous complaints, medical information and witness accounts.

It is also important to distinguish between conduct that is merely upsetting and conduct that can reasonably be regarded as violating dignity or creating one of the environments described in section 26.

A carefully documented history can help a tribunal understand the true context instead of viewing every incident as an isolated disagreement.

Evidence of vulnerability can be important

McManus demonstrates why representatives should give careful thought to evidence about a member’s mental health.

It may be established that an employee has depression or anxiety, but that does not necessarily explain how a particular incident affected them.

Where the link is relevant, medical evidence may assist.

An occupational health report, GP letter or specialist assessment might explain particular difficulties associated with the condition.

The employee’s own evidence will also be important.

A member may be able to describe why particular words or actions caused distress, whether similar incidents had occurred previously and what consequences followed.

Was the employee unable to continue working? Did the incident lead to an increase in symptoms? Was medical assistance sought? Did the employee complain at the time?

None of these matters is an automatic requirement for establishing harassment. Nor should a worker’s complaint be dismissed merely because they did not immediately report the incident or seek medical attention.

But relevant, reliable evidence can assist the tribunal in understanding the employee’s experience.

It is equally important to consider what the employer knew.

If an employer has been told about particular vulnerabilities, that may affect the context in which later conduct is assessed.

A manager who has received clear information about an employee’s mental health needs is in a different practical position from someone who has no knowledge of those difficulties.

That distinction does not automatically determine legal liability, but it may be significant when assessing the circumstances.

Harassment is not the only possible claim

Another important lesson is that workers should not assume harassment is the only legal route available when they experience insensitive or unfair treatment connected with mental health.

The Equality Act provides several distinct protections.

Where an employee is disabled within the meaning of the Act, the employer may have a duty to make reasonable adjustments.

A failure to take appropriate steps to remove substantial disadvantages may give rise to a claim even where there has been no unlawful harassment.

For example, an employer might refuse to consider changes to working hours, duties or procedures that could enable a disabled employee to remain in employment.

Depending on the circumstances, that could raise reasonable adjustment issues regardless of whether anyone made offensive comments.

Similarly, section 15 of the Equality Act addresses discrimination arising from disability.

This can occur where a disabled employee is treated unfavourably because of something arising in consequence of their disability, unless the employer can establish the relevant justification. The employer’s knowledge of disability and the statutory conditions must also be considered.

An employer that penalises an employee for disability-related absence or behaviour may therefore face questions quite separate from harassment.

Direct disability discrimination may also be relevant where an employee is treated less favourably because of disability.

These legal claims have different requirements and should not be confused.

In McManus, Mrs McManus had originally pursued several types of disability discrimination complaint, all of which were dismissed by the Employment Tribunal. The appeal concerned the particular harassment allegation arising from the Access to Work comment.

The decision should therefore not be interpreted as determining the outcome of every possible disability-related claim involving similar facts.

For union representatives, the practical lesson is to consider the full range of legal protections rather than placing every complaint under the heading of harassment.

A practical approach for trade union representatives

When a member reports harassment connected with mental health, the first task is to establish a clear account of events.

The representative should understand the precise conduct complained of and the circumstances in which it occurred.

It is then necessary to consider why that conduct is said to relate to disability and whether it had the purpose or effect required by section 26.

If the complaint concerns the effect rather than the purpose, McManus makes clear that the representative should address two questions.

Did the employee actually experience the conduct as violating their dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment?

If so, was it reasonable to regard the conduct as having that effect, taking account of the relevant circumstances?

The employee’s mental health may be important to both questions.

But representatives should resist the temptation to argue that the existence of anxiety or depression, by itself, establishes that the employee’s reaction was reasonable.

The stronger argument explains how the condition affected the employee, what the employer knew, the nature of the conduct and why its effect should reasonably be recognised as unlawful harassment.

It may also be useful to examine whether the employer followed its own procedures, whether concerns were raised before the incident and whether less confrontational approaches were available.

Where management claims that difficult questioning was necessary, the representative can legitimately ask whether the questions were relevant, proportionate and conducted professionally.

A legitimate management purpose is not a licence to humiliate employees.

At the same time, a representative must recognise that necessary and appropriately conducted management conversations do not become unlawful harassment simply because they concern matters that an employee finds distressing.

The objective is to distinguish genuine harassment from other forms of workplace disagreement or poor management, while ensuring that legitimate concerns are not dismissed because the employee has a mental health condition.

The danger of labelling workers oversensitive

There is a broader concern arising from cases of this kind.

Workers experiencing mental ill health can sometimes find their credibility questioned precisely because of their condition.

An employee who reports aggressive management behaviour may be described as oversensitive, emotional or unable to cope with ordinary workplace pressures.

Such descriptions can be deeply unfair.

They may also discourage employees from disclosing mental health difficulties or seeking support.

McManus makes clear that mental ill health cannot simply be excluded from the legal assessment of reasonableness.

That matters because there is no single universal standard of emotional resilience against which every employee must be measured without regard to personal circumstances.

The same workplace interaction may have very different effects upon different people.

Recognising that fact does not mean abandoning objective legal standards.

It means applying those standards with a proper understanding of the circumstances of the person concerned.

There must still be limits. Employers must be able to conduct investigations, discuss performance and manage their workforce.

But those responsibilities should be exercised with reasonable sensitivity, particularly where an employee’s disability is known.

Employers who confuse legitimate management with a right to behave aggressively or dismissively may find themselves exposed to legal claims that could have been avoided through better management.

What Solidarity believes

Solidarity believes that protecting the dignity of working people must be a basic principle of employment practice.

Workers should not have to tolerate humiliation, intimidation or discriminatory treatment.

Those experiencing mental ill health deserve the same respect and consideration as employees with physical health conditions.

Mental health difficulties should neither automatically validate every complaint nor provide employers with an excuse to disregard genuine concerns.

The law must balance the need for effective management with the obligation to protect employees from unlawful treatment.

McManus illustrates how difficult that balance can sometimes be.

The judgment confirms that mental health can form part of the assessment of harassment, even at the stage where a tribunal considers whether the alleged effect was reasonable.

But it also demonstrates that the threshold for unlawful harassment remains substantial.

For employers, there is a clear practical message. Do not assume that an employee’s distress can be dismissed as an unreasonable reaction without considering their circumstances. Ensure that managers and occupational health professionals understand disability-related responsibilities and communicate with appropriate care.

For workers, the message is equally important. If you believe you have experienced harassment, document what happened, explain its impact and seek advice about the legal protections available.

For trade union representatives, the case reinforces the importance of constructing arguments around evidence, context and the precise legal test.

A poorly handled meeting may justify a grievance without establishing harassment. But a legitimate management process can still become unlawful if the conduct, purpose or effect crosses the statutory threshold.

The distinction must be examined carefully rather than assumed.

A right to dignity at work

The most significant aspect of McManus is not simply that British Airways successfully defended the harassment allegation.

It is the recognition that a worker’s mental health may be relevant when deciding whether unwanted conduct could reasonably have the effect of violating dignity or creating a hostile or humiliating environment.

That principle acknowledges an important reality about working life.

Employees are individuals, not interchangeable units who all respond identically to pressure, criticism or confrontation.

Their experiences, health conditions and vulnerabilities may affect how workplace behaviour impacts them.

The law is right to recognise that.

However, legal protection must be established through the facts of each case. A tribunal must weigh the employee’s experience against the nature and context of the conduct and the statutory definition of harassment.

There is no automatic answer.

For Solidarity, the wider principle remains straightforward.

A decent workplace should not require employees to endure unnecessary distress before anyone takes their concerns seriously. Nor should respect and sensitivity be reserved only for situations where an employer faces a realistic prospect of losing an Employment Tribunal claim.

Good employment practice demands more than compliance with the minimum legal standard.

Workers experiencing mental health difficulties should be supported, listened to and treated as individuals whose circumstances matter.

That is not an unreasonable expectation.

It is a fundamental part of creating workplaces in which people can work with confidence, security and dignity.

By Maria Camara

Legal reference: McManus v British Airways plc [2026] EAT 155, judgment of His Honour Judge Auerbach, 9 October 2026. The article considers the judgment alongside section 26 of the Equality Act 2010.

Tax the Banks, Not the Workers: Why Britain Needs a Fairer Share of Banking Profits

There is something deeply wrong with an economy in which millions of people work hard, pay their taxes and still struggle to afford the basic necessities of life, while the banks report enormous profits and award record bonuses.

The contrast has become particularly stark as Britain approaches another difficult winter. Households are worrying about heating bills, mortgage repayments, rent increases and the weekly cost of shopping. Meanwhile, some of the country’s largest financial institutions are enjoying profits measured in billions.

The question is whether the Government should intervene to ensure that some of this extraordinary wealth is used to ease the pressure on ordinary working families.

Solidarity believes there is a powerful case for doing so. Banks provide essential services and should be able to operate profitably. They must also recognise that their prosperity depends upon the wider economy and the people who work within it. When exceptional profits arise partly from economic circumstances that have made life harder for those same people, a greater contribution to the public finances is reasonable.

A banking boom amid a household squeeze

The figures are extraordinary.

According to Trades Union Congress analysis published this year, Britain’s four biggest banks — Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds and NatWest — made around £29 billion in profits during the first half of 2026 alone.

Much of the improvement in bank profitability has been associated with higher interest rates. When borrowing becomes more expensive, banks can benefit from the difference between what they charge borrowers and what they pay savers.

Of course, the relationship is not entirely straightforward. Banks face higher funding costs, competition for deposits and the possibility that borrowers will default. Nevertheless, the interest-rate environment has provided substantial opportunities for increased earnings.

The same circumstances have been rather less welcome for many bank customers.

Families coming to the end of fixed-rate mortgage agreements have faced painful increases in monthly repayments. Small businesses have found borrowing more expensive. Tenants have experienced pressure from landlords seeking to recover higher financing costs.

For someone on a modest wage, an additional £100 or £200 a month in housing costs can mean the difference between managing comfortably and running up debt.

Yet the rewards at the top of the financial industry continue to grow.

In July, the TUC highlighted projections suggesting that bonuses across the finance and insurance sector could reach £25 billion during 2026. Its analysis also showed that average weekly bonuses in the sector had reached £431 during the first quarter.

There is nothing objectionable about rewarding productive work. Bank employees, like other workers, deserve fair pay for their contribution. But these figures concern an industry whose fortunes have been boosted by circumstances that have simultaneously squeezed millions of its customers.

It is reasonable to ask whether the distribution of those gains serves the wider national interest.

The workers who cannot make ends meet

The banking figures become even more troubling when placed alongside research published by Citizens Advice on 14 October.

The charity estimates that 5.6 million workers in Britain are trapped in insecure or precarious employment. These include people working on temporary contracts, zero-hours arrangements and other forms of poorly paid or unpredictable work.

Around a third of workers aged between 18 and 24 fall into this category. Disabled workers are also disproportionately affected.

The consequences are serious.

Citizens Advice found that, over the previous year, more than half of households containing insecure workers had resorted to measures such as borrowing money, selling possessions, using foodbanks or applying for emergency financial assistance.

Consider what that means.

These are not necessarily people who are unemployed or unwilling to work. Many are doing physically demanding, socially useful jobs. They clean offices, serve customers, transport passengers and help keep businesses functioning.

Their problem is that the rewards and security offered by employment are increasingly inadequate.

Tom MacInnes, director of policy at Citizens Advice, has warned that insecure workers cannot reliably predict how much they will receive each month. The charity has called for stronger employment protections and targeted financial assistance for the lowest earners.

Solidarity has consistently argued that work should provide dignity, security and a reasonable standard of living.

A person who fulfils their responsibilities at work should not have to rely upon a foodbank to feed their family.

Nor should employees who regularly work substantial hours be left wondering whether they will receive enough shifts next week to cover their bills.

The Government’s promised reforms of zero-hours contracts and insecure employment must therefore deliver meaningful change. But improvements in employment rights need to be accompanied by policies that tackle the wider cost of living.

That brings us back to the banks.

What would a windfall tax actually mean?

A windfall tax is an additional levy applied to profits considered unusually large because of exceptional circumstances rather than simply the normal growth of a business.

Britain has already applied this principle to the energy industry.

When oil and gas companies experienced extraordinary profits following dramatic movements in international energy prices, the Government introduced an additional tax on those gains.

The justification was straightforward. Companies benefiting unusually heavily from an economic crisis could reasonably be expected to make an additional contribution to addressing its consequences.

There is a strong argument for applying similar reasoning to banking.

Banks already pay corporation tax, and larger banking companies are subject to an additional surcharge on qualifying profits.

That surcharge currently stands at 3 per cent on profits above £100 million, having been reduced from 8 per cent in April 2023.

The reduction was introduced alongside an increase in the main rate of corporation tax, so it would be misleading to describe the change in isolation as a simple five-percentage-point reduction in banks’ total tax burden. Nevertheless, the TUC argues that the lower surcharge has substantially reduced the revenue that would otherwise have been collected during a period of exceptional bank profitability.

Its latest analysis estimates that restoring the surcharge to 8 per cent would raise approximately £9 billion over four years.

Increasing it to 16 per cent could raise around £24 billion over the same period, while a 35 per cent surcharge could generate an estimated £60 billion.

These are forecasts rather than guaranteed receipts. The amounts collected would depend upon future profits, investment decisions and the response of financial institutions to changes in taxation.

Even allowing for uncertainty, the sums involved are significant.

On 12 October, Labour MP Richard Burgon tabled a parliamentary motion calling for a windfall tax on bank profits. The motion cites analysis suggesting that such a tax could raise up to £15 billion annually, with the proceeds directed towards cost-of-living support and public services.

Bringing down household energy bills

One of the most practical proposals is to introduce a social energy tariff.

This would provide reduced energy costs for eligible households, particularly those on low and middle incomes who are struggling to cope with rising bills.

The TUC estimates that such a scheme could save qualifying households up to £559 annually, depending on its design and the level of support provided.

That would make a substantial difference to a family already struggling with mortgage payments, rent and food costs.

The need is particularly pressing as winter approaches.

Research published by Uswitch in October suggested that around 1.7 million households were planning not to turn on their heating this winter because of concerns about affordability.

Its survey also found that people using prepayment meters were especially worried about being cold.

For vulnerable households, inadequate heating is not simply an inconvenience. It can have consequences for health, wellbeing and the ability to maintain a decent home environment.

An appropriately targeted social tariff could provide direct and understandable relief.

There would need to be proper safeguards. Eligibility must be clear, support should reach those who need it, and the system should avoid penalising households just above an arbitrary income threshold.

But the basic idea deserves serious consideration.

Rather than expecting the lowest-paid workers to absorb every increase in essential household costs, the Government could use additional revenue from exceptional banking profits to provide some protection.

Would higher taxes damage Britain’s banking industry?

Opponents of increased bank taxation argue that Britain must remain internationally competitive.

This argument should not be dismissed.

Financial services are an important part of the British economy. They employ large numbers of people, support businesses, generate exports and contribute substantial tax revenues.

London remains a major international financial centre, while financial services employment also supports communities in Edinburgh, Birmingham, Leeds, Manchester and elsewhere.

Solidarity wants Britain to maintain and develop these strengths.

We have no interest in policies that would encourage financial institutions to relocate operations overseas, reduce investment or threaten the jobs of ordinary bank workers.

There is, however, a distinction between reasonable concern about competitiveness and the suggestion that substantial banking profits should be protected from any additional taxation.

The financial sector depends upon Britain having a functioning economy, a skilled workforce, reliable infrastructure and a stable legal and regulatory framework.

All these things require public investment.

There is also a legitimate question about how additional profits are used.

Money distributed in dividends and executive bonuses is not automatically money that would otherwise have funded new lending, improved services or investment in Britain.

Equally, taxation cannot be increased indefinitely without consequences. Poorly designed measures could affect investment, lending decisions and the attractiveness of operating in the United Kingdom.

The answer is careful policy design, not an automatic rejection of higher taxation.

A properly constructed windfall tax should concentrate on exceptional profits, protect ordinary employees and take account of the industry’s long-term contribution to the British economy.

The banks have obligations to their own workers

There is another aspect to this debate that deserves greater attention.

Banking is not an industry consisting entirely of highly paid traders and executives.

Many employees work in branches, call centres, administration, compliance, customer service and technical support. They are ordinary working people with the same concerns about bills, job security and family finances as workers in other sectors.

These employees have contributed to the success of the banks and deserve a fair share of the rewards.

At the same time that major institutions report substantial profits, the industry continues to change through branch closures, automation, restructuring and reductions in staffing.

Those changes can place considerable pressure upon employees who remain.

Bank workers should not be treated as expendable simply because technology has made some operations cheaper or more efficient.

Solidarity believes that profitable employers have particular responsibilities to maintain fair wages, provide decent working conditions, consult properly over restructuring and invest in their employees.

If banks can afford substantial distributions to shareholders and senior executives, they should also be able to demonstrate that their ordinary employees are being treated fairly.

Tax policy and employment policy are separate matters, but both concern the same underlying question: how the benefits of economic success are shared.

Where Solidarity stands

Solidarity is an independent trade union. We are not affiliated to any political party, and our assessment of economic policy is guided by what we believe will benefit working people.

We do not believe that profitability is something to be condemned. Successful British businesses create employment, generate wealth and contribute to national prosperity.

But a successful economy must work for the people who sustain it.

It cannot be considered healthy when millions of workers struggle with insecure employment, when households cannot afford adequate heating and when essential public services are under financial pressure.

Nor should the Government assume that ordinary workers must always bear the greatest burden when additional revenue is required.

Higher taxes on banking profits will not, by themselves, solve Britain’s economic difficulties.

We also need stronger employment rights, better vocational training, investment in productive industries, secure jobs and a serious effort to improve the country’s long-term economic performance.

Britain needs businesses that invest, innovate and create skilled employment. It needs an effective financial sector that supports those businesses rather than simply extracting the maximum short-term return.

A carefully designed windfall tax could form part of that wider approach.

It would recognise that extraordinary gains arising from unusual economic circumstances carry responsibilities.

It would also demonstrate that the burden of dealing with economic pressures need not fall disproportionately upon those least able to afford it.

A question of fairness

The debate over taxing bank profits is sometimes presented as a choice between supporting business and supporting workers.

That is a false choice.

Banks need a prosperous society in which people can afford to save, borrow, invest and buy homes. Businesses need customers with money to spend. Workers need secure employment and sufficient income to participate fully in the economy.

These interests are connected.

An economy in which wages are inadequate, household debt is rising and millions of people are financially insecure is not a sound foundation for sustained prosperity.

The coming Budget offers an opportunity to recognise that connection.

The Government should examine the case for an additional levy on exceptional banking profits, with the proceeds used to provide meaningful assistance with essential household costs and strengthen the services upon which working people depend.

It should do so while protecting Britain’s competitiveness and the jobs of employees throughout the financial sector.

The public deserves more than reassurances that economic growth will eventually improve living standards.

Working people need to see tangible benefits.

When the banks are making billions while some of their customers cannot afford to heat their homes, asking those banks to contribute more is not an attack upon enterprise.

It is a reasonable demand for a fairer distribution of the rewards of prosperity.

By Maria Camara

The Right to Be Accompanied: A Legal Protection With a Dangerous Loophole

SOLIDARITY TRADE UNION | EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS & CASE LAW

Wolfe v Taka Mayfair Ltd [2026] EAT 106

A worker is called into a meeting with his employers at the end of a shift. He has not been warned that his job is at risk. He has not been told that the meeting is disciplinary or that dismissal is a possible outcome. There is no trade union representative present, no colleague to offer support and no opportunity to prepare a defence. By the time he discovers what the meeting is really about, he has lost his job.

Most people would regard that as an obvious denial of basic procedural fairness. Yet, according to a recent Employment Appeal Tribunal judgment, the employer has not necessarily breached the statutory right to be accompanied.

The reason is remarkably simple. The worker never asked to be accompanied.

That is the uncomfortable lesson of Wolfe v Taka Mayfair Ltd [2026] EAT 106, decided by His Honour Judge Auerbach on 22 July 2026. The judgment exposes a significant weakness in legislation intended to protect workers during disciplinary and grievance proceedings. It also raises an important question about the relationship between rights that exist on paper and rights that can be exercised in practice.

For trade unions, the case deserves careful attention. It illustrates why workers need to understand their rights before they find themselves in difficulty, why employers should be challenged when they fail to follow fair procedures, and why the law itself may need strengthening.

What happened to Mr Wolfe?

Leonardo Wolfe was employed by Taka Mayfair Limited, a restaurant business, as a Head Sommelier and Manager. His employment began on 21 December 2022 and ended on 21 January 2023, a period of just one month.

According to the account he advanced before the Employment Tribunal, the circumstances of his dismissal were particularly troubling.

At the end of a working shift, he was drawn into a face-to-face meeting with the restaurant’s two owners. He had received no advance warning of the meeting’s purpose. Neither its disciplinary character nor the possibility of dismissal had been explained to him.

The employer disputed the characterisation of the meeting, describing it as a performance review rather than a disciplinary hearing. Wolfe maintained that the meeting was one at which the statutory right to be accompanied should have applied.

That disagreement was never finally resolved in the proceedings under consideration. Instead, the case turned on a narrower legal question.

Wolfe had not asked to bring a trade union representative or work colleague to the meeting. He argued that he had been unable to make an informed request because he had not known what was about to happen.

There is an obvious practical difficulty here. A worker cannot readily exercise a right attached to a particular type of meeting if the employer conceals, or simply fails to disclose, the meeting’s true nature.

Wolfe subsequently brought Employment Tribunal proceedings and sought permission to amend his claim to include a complaint that his statutory right to be accompanied had been breached.

The Tribunal refused the amendment. Even accepting his factual account for the purpose of considering the application, it concluded that the proposed claim could not succeed. Section 10 of the Employment Relations Act 1999 required him to have made a request to be accompanied. He had not done so.

Wolfe appealed that decision.

It is important to understand precisely what the appeal concerned. The Employment Appeal Tribunal was not deciding whether the original dismissal was fair, nor whether the employer had behaved properly in every respect. It was deciding whether the Employment Tribunal had been legally correct to refuse an amendment adding a particular statutory complaint.

That distinction matters because an employer may escape liability under one statutory provision while still having acted unfairly or unreasonably under another.

What does the law actually say?

The right to be accompanied is contained in section 10 of the Employment Relations Act 1999. It applies to workers, not merely those who satisfy the narrower legal definition of employee, and it does not depend on a minimum period of service.

The legislation establishes two conditions for the statutory right to become operative.

First, the worker must be required or invited to attend a qualifying disciplinary or grievance hearing. Secondly, the worker must reasonably request to be accompanied.

Where those conditions are satisfied, the employer must permit the worker to be accompanied by an eligible person, generally an appropriate trade union official or another worker employed by the same employer.

The companion is not there merely to observe proceedings. The legislation allows the companion to put the worker’s case, respond to points raised during the hearing, sum up the worker’s position and confer with the worker privately.

A companion cannot insist on answering every question on the worker’s behalf or preventing the employer from presenting its case. Nevertheless, the role provides significant practical protection.

A representative may identify procedural irregularities, challenge unsupported allegations, seek clarification, ensure relevant mitigating circumstances are considered and help prevent an employer from using its greater experience or authority to overwhelm an individual employee.

There is also a statutory postponement right. Where the chosen companion is unavailable, an eligible worker can propose a reasonable alternative date within the statutory five-working-day period, and the employer must postpone accordingly.

These protections are valuable, particularly when dismissal is a possible consequence.

However, the legislation contains a crucial qualification. The worker must request accompaniment before the employer becomes subject to the relevant duties.

That requirement proved decisive in Wolfe’s case.

The argument against the employer’s approach

Wolfe’s argument before the Employment Appeal Tribunal was both practical and persuasive from the standpoint of workplace fairness.

If an employer can avoid the statutory duty simply by failing to explain that a meeting is disciplinary, the protection becomes vulnerable to circumvention.

Consider the difference between two situations.

In the first, an employee receives a letter explaining that they are required to attend a disciplinary hearing, setting out the allegations and warning that dismissal is a possible outcome. The employee requests a trade union representative, and the employer refuses.

That is a straightforward potential breach of section 10.

In the second, an employee is simply told to attend a meeting with management. No allegations are disclosed. No warning is given. During the meeting, the employer raises concerns about performance or conduct and announces dismissal.

The employee may never have requested a representative because there was no reason to anticipate needing one.

Yet the practical outcome is substantially the same. In both cases, the worker faces a potentially career-ending decision without the support that Parliament intended the legislation to provide.

Wolfe argued that allowing the second situation to escape the statutory protection undermined the legislation’s purpose.

He also challenged the suggestion that employees should simply ask for representation whenever they are summoned to an unexplained meeting.

Workers are not always in a position to challenge management. Some may fear that asking for a union representative will be interpreted as confrontational. Others may be unfamiliar with employment law, inexperienced in disciplinary procedures or anxious about their position.

Those fears are especially acute among workers with limited service, insecure contracts or little practical bargaining power.

Judge Auerbach recognised the force of these concerns. Nevertheless, he concluded that the statutory wording was sufficiently clear to prevent the Tribunal from adopting Wolfe’s proposed interpretation.

The judge’s task was to apply the law Parliament had enacted, rather than to rewrite that law in accordance with what might be regarded as desirable policy.

The judgment makes clear that the express wording requires an actual request. Without one, the accompanying obligations in section 10 do not arise.

The judge concluded that any gap in protection was ultimately a matter for Parliament to address.

The difference between legal rights and workplace fairness

One of the most important aspects of the judgment is its treatment of the Acas Code of Practice on Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures.

The Code sets out standards of fairness that employers are expected to observe when dealing with disciplinary matters.

Under the Code, employees facing disciplinary proceedings should ordinarily receive written notification of the allegations, sufficient information to understand the case against them and reasonable time to prepare a response.

They should also be informed of their right to be accompanied.

Paragraph 10 of the Code expressly addresses notification of that right. Yet, as the Employment Appeal Tribunal explained, the Code does not have precisely the same legal status as an Act of Parliament.

An employer’s failure to comply with the Code does not automatically give rise to an independent claim for compensation.

Instead, tribunals must take relevant provisions into account when deciding applicable claims, such as ordinary unfair dismissal. In appropriate cases, an unreasonable failure to follow the Code may also affect compensation, with a potential adjustment of up to 25 per cent.

This creates an important distinction.

An employer who fails to explain the purpose of a disciplinary hearing may have disregarded recognised standards of fair treatment. If an eligible employee is dismissed, that failure may contribute to a finding of unfair dismissal.

Nevertheless, it does not automatically establish a breach of section 10 unless the worker made the required request to be accompanied.

The distinction might satisfy the technical requirements of the legislation, but it is difficult to defend as a coherent approach to workplace justice.

Why should an employer’s obligation to respect a particular statutory protection depend on whether an employee recognised a danger that the employer had failed to disclose?

Acas guidance clearly recognises the value of giving workers proper notice and an opportunity to prepare. The judgment demonstrates that following good practice and complying with the narrow requirements of a particular statute are not always the same thing.

A request made during the meeting could make a difference

Although Wolfe lost his appeal, the judgment contains an important observation that union representatives should not overlook.

Judge Auerbach considered the possibility of a worker discovering, during an unexpected meeting, that formal disciplinary action might be taken.

What if that worker immediately asks for a trade union representative?

The judgment discussed this possibility with reference to Yoshovska v Goldman Sachs International, an Employment Tribunal decision from January 2022.

The suggestion was that a worker who only becomes aware of the disciplinary nature of a meeting once it is underway may still be able to make a reasonable request for accompaniment at that point.

There is nothing in section 10 requiring every request to be made in writing, nor does the legislation prescribe a particular minimum period before the hearing by which the request must be submitted.

It follows that an oral request made during a meeting may be legally significant.

A worker who suddenly realises that a supposed informal discussion has become a disciplinary hearing should therefore make an immediate and explicit request for representation.

The employer may then need to adjourn proceedings to allow the statutory right to be exercised.

Importantly, however, the judge did not finally determine that particular question. He identified it as a potentially arguable route, but it could not assist Wolfe because Wolfe had made no request at all.

That qualification should not be lost. The judgment supports the practical importance of making a request during a meeting, but it should not be presented as definitively settling every question about a late request or adjournment.

The distinction is particularly important in workplace representation, where an overconfident reading of a judgment can be as damaging as misunderstanding the law altogether.

Could the dismissal still have been unfair?

A natural reaction to the case is to ask whether Wolfe could have pursued ordinary unfair dismissal rather than relying on the right to be accompanied.

His exceptionally short employment was a significant obstacle.

At the time of his dismissal in January 2023, employees ordinarily needed two years’ continuous service to qualify for protection against ordinary unfair dismissal.

Wolfe had approximately one month’s service.

There are exceptions where dismissal relates to particular automatically unfair reasons, and discrimination protections are not generally dependent on completing two years’ service. However, the facts described in the EAT judgment do not, by themselves, establish that such an exception applied.

This is one reason the right to be accompanied is so important.

Unlike ordinary unfair dismissal protection under the law applicable to Wolfe’s dismissal, section 10 does not require two years’ service.

A worker may be entitled to the protection from the very beginning of the working relationship.

Indeed, its application is wider in another respect. It extends to qualifying workers rather than being restricted exclusively to employees.

That makes it particularly valuable for people in insecure employment who may have limited access to other employment protections.

The difficulty exposed by Wolfe’s case is that the benefit of this wider protection may disappear at precisely the moment an inexperienced or vulnerable worker needs it most.

There is, nevertheless, another important legal distinction.

The EAT referred to Talon Engineering Ltd v Smith, an earlier decision demonstrating that the statutory right to accompaniment and the general law of unfair dismissal are separate.

A breach of section 10 does not inevitably render a dismissal unfair. Equally, an employer may comply with section 10 and still carry out an unfair dismissal.

Fairness depends on the wider circumstances, including the employer’s reasons, investigations, procedures, and treatment of the employee.

It would therefore be wrong to conclude from Wolfe that employers have unrestricted freedom to dismiss workers at meetings arranged without warning.

They do not.

The judgment decides a specific statutory issue, not the general acceptability of surprise dismissals.

A right without an effective remedy?

There is another aspect of section 10 worth examining: the compensation available when employers breach it.

Where an Employment Tribunal upholds a complaint under section 11, it may order compensation of up to two weeks’ pay, subject to the relevant statutory calculations.

That is a comparatively modest financial remedy.

For a worker who has lost a job, the practical consequences can be far greater than the amount recoverable under this particular provision.

The legislation also provides separate protections against victimisation for exercising, or seeking to exercise, the right to be accompanied.

Section 12 protects workers against detriment for invoking the statutory rights and includes protection against dismissal for that reason. Certain claims arising from dismissal for exercising these rights do not require the ordinary qualifying period of employment.

There is protection, too, for those who accompany or seek to accompany another worker under the statutory arrangements.

These provisions demonstrate that Parliament recognised the risk of employers retaliating against workers or representatives who assert their rights.

Yet the Wolfe judgment exposes a difficulty that arises before retaliation even becomes relevant.

What happens when the worker never gets a meaningful opportunity to assert the right in the first place?

That is the central problem.

The statutory framework protects workers who invoke accompaniment rights, but the particular duty to permit accompaniment can be avoided where no request is made, even if the absence of a request results from the employer’s failure to explain what is happening.

This is an unsatisfactory imbalance.

The employee must be sufficiently informed, sufficiently confident and sufficiently quick-thinking to recognise the situation and invoke the protection. The employer, meanwhile, is not subject to an equivalent express obligation under section 10 to ensure that the worker knows the nature of the meeting and the right that may arise.

That does not mean every employer will exploit the position. Many employers will follow established procedures and allow representation as a matter of course.

The concern is that the law leaves room for less scrupulous employers to take advantage of a worker’s uncertainty.

A statutory safeguard should not depend so heavily on the employee’s ability to anticipate management’s intentions.

Why the judge could not close the loophole

It would be easy to criticise the EAT for reaching a conclusion that appears harsh. That would miss an important feature of the judgment.

Judge Auerbach did not suggest that Wolfe’s concerns were trivial or irrational.

On the contrary, the judgment engaged carefully with the argument that an employer could undermine the protection by withholding information about a meeting.

The difficulty was the statutory wording.

Section 10 expressly requires a reasonable request. There was no dispute that Wolfe had failed to make one.

The judge considered whether the legislation could be interpreted more broadly by reference to its purpose, the history of its introduction or human rights principles.

He concluded that these approaches could not remove a requirement stated unambiguously by Parliament.

The purpose of statutory interpretation is not to give judges unlimited freedom to repair legislation whenever its operation produces an unattractive result.

That is an important constitutional principle, even when its practical consequences are frustrating.

The judgment therefore puts responsibility for any reform where it properly belongs: with Parliament.

The final conclusion was that if the absence of protection in these circumstances represents a legislative gap, Parliament must decide whether to close it.

For unions, that creates an opportunity to make the case for a straightforward and overdue reform.

What should change?

There is a strong argument for amending section 10 so that employers have an express statutory obligation to notify workers of their right to be accompanied whenever they are required to attend a qualifying disciplinary or grievance hearing.

That notification should explain the nature of the meeting, the possible consequences and the worker’s entitlement to representation.

The duty should not depend on the employee requesting information that the employer ought to have supplied in the first place.

It would also be sensible to provide expressly that where an apparently informal meeting develops into one at which formal disciplinary action may be taken, the employer must stop proceedings, explain the worker’s rights and provide a reasonable opportunity to secure representation.

Such requirements would hardly impose an unreasonable burden on responsible employers. Organisations already following the Acas Code should have little difficulty complying.

The change would principally affect employers who fail to observe the standards of transparency and procedural fairness that should already be normal practice.

A further question concerns remedies.

The existing maximum compensation of two weeks’ pay for a straightforward breach of accompaniment rights may provide an inadequate deterrent, particularly where employers deliberately exclude union representation.

There is an argument for stronger remedies where an employer knowingly disregards a worker’s statutory rights, alongside effective protection against retaliation.

The wider issue is that workers should not have to understand complicated distinctions between statutory obligations, codes of practice and qualifying periods merely to obtain fair treatment.

Employment law is already complex. That complexity should not become an advantage for employers who control the disciplinary process.

What Solidarity members should do

The immediate lesson from Wolfe is that workers must be proactive about representation.

Members should never assume that a meeting described as informal, a performance discussion, a review or a routine management conversation cannot have disciplinary consequences.

Where there is uncertainty about a meeting’s purpose, the sensible course is to ask for clarification before attending.

If there is any possibility of formal disciplinary action, members should expressly request accompaniment by a trade union representative.

Making that request in writing creates a useful record, although the statutory requirement does not insist upon written notification.

The following wording would be appropriate:

I would like clarification of the purpose of this meeting and whether any disciplinary action, including a warning or dismissal, is being considered. If this is a disciplinary hearing, I am exercising my statutory right under section 10 of the Employment Relations Act 1999 to be accompanied by a trade union representative. I request that the hearing be arranged to allow my representative to attend.

If the disciplinary nature of a meeting only becomes apparent once proceedings have started, the worker should make the request immediately and ask for an adjournment.

For example:

It now appears that this meeting may result in disciplinary action. I am requesting trade union representation under section 10 of the Employment Relations Act 1999. I ask that the meeting be adjourned so that I can arrange for my representative to attend.

There is no guarantee that every dispute over such a request will be resolved in the worker’s favour. Nevertheless, making the request removes the particular difficulty that defeated Wolfe’s claim: the complete absence of any attempt to invoke the statutory right.

Members should also record what happened, including who attended, what was said about the meeting’s purpose, when disciplinary consequences were first mentioned and how management responded to any request for representation.

These details may become crucial evidence in subsequent proceedings.

It is important to distinguish between a disciplinary investigation, an informal management discussion and a formal disciplinary hearing. The statutory right does not ordinarily apply to purely investigatory meetings or informal discussions that cannot themselves result in disciplinary action. However, workplace policies may provide wider rights, and disability-related reasonable adjustments may create additional obligations.

Members should therefore seek advice rather than assume that the statutory minimum represents the full extent of their protection.

Lessons for union representatives

For trade union representatives, the case has implications extending beyond advising individual members.

One is the importance of challenging employers who use ambiguous terminology to describe meetings.

A meeting does not necessarily cease to be disciplinary simply because management calls it a performance review, fact-finding conversation or informal discussion.

Its actual purpose and potential consequences matter.

If a meeting can result in a formal warning, dismissal or another qualifying disciplinary outcome, the statutory definition may be satisfied regardless of the label the employer attaches to it.

Representatives should examine the employer’s own disciplinary procedure and any contractual or collectively agreed provisions concerning representation.

These may provide protections exceeding the statutory minimum.

A collective agreement, for example, may require advance notice, disclosure of allegations and union representation in circumstances where the precise statutory duty under section 10 has not yet arisen.

It is also worth examining whether the employer has followed the Acas Code, whether the disciplinary investigation was adequate, whether the worker had a meaningful opportunity to respond and whether any dismissal was reasonable in the circumstances.

Wolfe should not encourage representatives to abandon potentially meritorious cases simply because no request for accompaniment was made.

It does, however, mean that an isolated claim for breach of section 10 is unlikely to succeed where the evidence establishes that the worker never made such a request.

Finally, representatives should remember that tribunal claims are subject to strict time limits, generally starting at three months less one day for the relevant employment event, subject to applicable rules and extensions. Acas early conciliation can affect the calculation. Members should seek advice promptly rather than wait for internal proceedings to conclude.

The importance of trade union membership

Perhaps the most significant lesson concerns the practical value of trade union membership.

Employment rights are not self-enforcing.

Workers may possess considerable protections under legislation yet be completely unaware of their existence until a dispute develops.

Even those who know their rights may lack the confidence to challenge management, particularly when they are new to an organisation or worried about losing their livelihood.

An experienced union representative can change that balance.

Representatives understand the relevant procedures, recognise when a supposedly informal conversation has become a disciplinary matter and know when to insist that proceedings are adjourned.

They can identify whether the employer has disclosed the allegations, provided adequate evidence and allowed the worker sufficient time to prepare.

They can also ensure that disciplinary decisions are challenged through the proper channels where there are grounds to do so.

None of this guarantees that every employee will avoid disciplinary action or dismissal. Nor should it.

Employers have legitimate reasons to address misconduct and poor performance. A fair disciplinary system must accommodate those responsibilities.

But it must also ensure that workers are treated with dignity, allowed to answer allegations and given a genuine opportunity to defend themselves.

These principles are not obstacles to effective management. They are essential conditions of fair management.

Solidarity’s approach is to ensure that members do not have to face workplace disputes alone. Where representation rights arise, we want members to exercise them confidently, with access to advice before decisions are taken rather than having to pursue remedies after the damage has been done.

A victory for the wording of the law, but not necessarily for justice

The decision in Wolfe v Taka Mayfair Ltd is legally understandable. The Employment Appeal Tribunal was asked to interpret a statute, and the relevant words leave little room for manoeuvre.

The judge did not invent the requirement that workers request accompaniment. Parliament put it there.

Yet that does not make the outcome satisfactory.

The case demonstrates how a legal protection can be weakened by the conditions attached to exercising it.

A worker who knows a disciplinary hearing is taking place can request representation. A worker who has no idea that a disciplinary hearing is taking place may fail to do so, even though the need for representation is just as great.

The law recognises the former situation but, as this judgment confirms, does not adequately address the latter through section 10.

There is something deeply unsatisfactory about a system in which an employer’s failure to provide information can leave a worker unable to exercise a statutory right, without that failure itself constituting a breach of the particular provision intended to protect them.

The answer is not to criticise judges for applying the law. It is to improve the law.

Parliament should make it an explicit statutory duty to notify workers of their accompaniment rights and provide a meaningful opportunity to exercise them before formal disciplinary action is taken.

Until that happens, workers and their unions must deal with the law as it stands.

For Solidarity members, the message is clear. When management calls you into a meeting and you suspect that your employment may be at risk, establish what the meeting is about and request your union representative. If the meeting unexpectedly turns disciplinary, make that request immediately.

The most important words in a disciplinary meeting may be spoken before the employer has even explained its allegations.

They are the words that ensure you do not face those allegations alone.

Together we are strong.

By Maria Camara

Legal reference: Wolfe v Taka Mayfair Ltd [2026] EAT 106, judgment of HHJ Auerbach, 22 July 2026. The article reflects the law and published guidance reviewed on 14 October 2026. The 2026 Acas consultation draft is not treated as an operative replacement for the existing Code.

Primary judgment: Employment Appeal Tribunal judgment. Relevant guidance: Acas Code of Practice.