By Maria Camara
Most employees facing disciplinary proceedings assume that the manager sitting opposite them will decide their fate. That seems reasonable enough. The manager hears the evidence, listens to the employee’s explanation and decides whether disciplinary action is justified.
But anyone with experience of workplace representation knows that matters are not always so straightforward. Human Resources departments often play a significant role behind the scenes. They advise managers, prepare documents, interpret policies and sometimes express strong views about what should happen. There is nothing necessarily wrong with that. Problems arise when advice becomes pressure, or when the person supposedly making the decision is doing little more than putting their name to somebody else’s conclusions.
The Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) has examined this question in Shing v University of the Arts London [2026] EAT 154. Its judgment, delivered on 12 October 2026, clarifies how far HR can legitimately become involved in disciplinary decisions.
The answer may disappoint those hoping for strict limits on HR influence. The EAT has confirmed that HR advisers can discuss the seriousness of misconduct and the appropriate approach to sanctions. They are not restricted to giving advice about law and procedure.
That is a significant clarification, though it does not mean HR can simply dictate the outcome of disciplinary proceedings.
A lecturer loses his job
Mr WYC Shing was a senior lecturer at the University of the Arts London. He had worked there since September 2006, giving him more than 14 years of service when he was dismissed in December 2020.
His dismissal followed a brief romantic relationship with a mature female student. Although he was not responsible for marking her work, the university considered that he had crossed important professional boundaries. During their association, he had offered her a ticket to New York. The student subsequently complained about his behaviour.
The disciplinary investigation did not establish sexual harassment. Nevertheless, the university concluded that Mr Shing had behaved inappropriately and dismissed him without notice.
Mr Shing disputed the decision. He argued that the relationship had involved two adults, that he had not deliberately acted improperly and that dismissal was excessive. He also complained that HR had improperly influenced the manager responsible for the decision.
There was a further allegation of race discrimination. Mr Shing, who is Chinese, pointed to two colleagues who had received lesser sanctions following complaints about their behaviour towards students.
The Employment Tribunal rejected his claims. He appealed, but the EAT upheld the original decision.
It is worth considering the underlying circumstances before turning to the legal arguments.
Universities have every reason to insist upon professional boundaries between lecturers and students. Even where both parties are adults, differences in status and authority may create difficulties. Students should be able to study without worrying that personal relationships might affect their treatment or academic opportunities.
Yet we should also be cautious about assuming that every breach of a professional boundary deserves dismissal. Employment law ought to leave room for proportionate responses, particularly where an employee has given many years of service and there is no finding of harassment.
Mr Shing’s length of service was substantial. The investigation had not established the most serious allegation. Those were matters worth weighing carefully.
The tribunal accepted that dismissal was within the range of reasonable responses open to the employer. Interestingly, it acknowledged that its own members would not necessarily all have chosen dismissal.
That illustrates something important about unfair dismissal law. A tribunal is not deciding whether it agrees with an employer’s decision. It is deciding whether that decision fell within the range of responses available to a reasonable employer.
There is a difference, and it is not always one that favours the employee.
The manager, HR and the dismissal decision
The most interesting part of the appeal concerned the part played by HR.
Mr Shing relied on an earlier judgment, Ramphal v Department for Transport [2015], which had raised serious concerns about HR interference in disciplinary investigations.
In that case, an investigating manager initially concluded that an employee’s misconduct warranted a final written warning rather than dismissal. Following substantial involvement by HR, the manager’s report changed. Findings favourable to the employee were altered or removed, and the recommended sanction became dismissal for gross misconduct.
The EAT was concerned that HR had gone beyond advising on procedure and had influenced the manager’s assessment of the evidence and the employee’s blameworthiness. It sent the case back to the Employment Tribunal to reconsider fairness.
For union representatives, the concern is obvious. If a manager is appointed to investigate allegations, the employee should be entitled to expect that the manager’s conclusions are genuinely their own.
There is something deeply unsatisfactory about a disciplinary process in which the hearing officer appears to exercise independent judgement while the real decisions are being shaped elsewhere.
Mr Shing argued that something similar had happened in his case.
The university’s HR adviser, Mr Culver, had corresponded with Professor Crow, the manager responsible for deciding the disciplinary outcome. HR had supplied template letters, prepared documentation and assisted with the dismissal process.
The EAT was not persuaded that this amounted to improper interference.
The evidence showed that HR had provided draft letters covering different possible sanctions, including warnings and dismissal. Professor Crow subsequently indicated that he was likely to dismiss Mr Shing. The relevant memorandum was then prepared for the Vice-Chancellor’s endorsement.
There was no evidence that HR had instructed Professor Crow to dismiss, rewritten his findings to make the misconduct appear more serious or pressured him to abandon a lesser sanction.
That was the essential difference from Ramphal.
The EAT went further, however. It questioned the suggestion that HR advice must always be confined to law and procedure.
An organisation employing hundreds or thousands of people has a legitimate interest in maintaining consistent disciplinary standards. A manager dealing with a serious allegation for the first time may benefit from HR’s knowledge of previous cases. Advice about whether particular conduct amounts to misconduct or gross misconduct can be part of that process.
There is force in this reasoning. Employees should not face radically different penalties simply because one manager is more severe than another.
But consistency can also become a convenient justification for centralised control.
HR advisers are employed by the organisation, and their professional responsibilities may include protecting it from legal and reputational risks. Their advice is not necessarily neutral. Nor should we assume that a manager will feel entirely free to disregard the views of experienced HR professionals or senior executives.
That does not make HR advice improper. It does mean that independence should be judged by what actually happened, not simply by whose signature appears on the dismissal letter.
The EAT recognised this distinction. Undue pressure from HR, or anyone else outside the proper decision-making process, can still affect the fairness of a dismissal. Whether it does so depends on the facts.
The judgment therefore narrows an overly restrictive reading of Ramphal without removing the protection against improper influence.
A further complication in Mr Shing’s case was that Professor Crow had died before the original tribunal hearing. He could not be questioned about his reasoning. The tribunal had to reconstruct events from emails and other documents.
This made the written record especially important. The tribunal concluded that it demonstrated an independent decision, and the EAT found no legal error in that assessment.
Different employees, different punishments
Mr Shing’s race discrimination claim raised another question familiar to trade union representatives. Why do some employees lose their jobs while others, accused of apparently similar behaviour, receive warnings?
He identified two colleagues, referred to as G and H, who had faced disciplinary proceedings concerning their conduct towards students.
G had been investigated over several allegations, including inappropriate behaviour and misuse of authority. However, only two allegations were upheld. These concerned socialising with students shortly before assessing their work and discussing an investigation despite restrictions imposed during suspension.
G received a first written warning.
H had been investigated over inappropriate and unwanted messages to a student. The tribunal accepted that his conduct amounted to harassment, yet he received a final written warning rather than dismissal.
On the surface, that disparity might raise questions. Mr Shing had been dismissed even though sexual harassment had not been established in his case, while another lecturer whose behaviour was found to constitute harassment had retained his employment.
The university argued that the circumstances were materially different.
In G’s case, the allegations actually proved were considered less serious than Mr Shing’s misconduct.
H had acknowledged that his behaviour was wrong, apologised, sought counselling and demonstrated an understanding of professional boundaries. He had also stopped the unwanted messages when the student objected.
Mr Shing, by contrast, was considered insufficiently aware of why his behaviour was unacceptable. He had expressed regret, but the university was not convinced that he fully understood the professional issues involved.
The tribunal accepted these distinctions. It found that the different sanctions did not establish race discrimination, and the EAT agreed.
There is a reasonable legal argument here. Two cases may look similar at first glance but be very different once the evidence is examined. An employee’s disciplinary record, the seriousness of proven misconduct and relevant mitigation can all influence the sanction.
Nevertheless, I would sound a note of caution about placing too much weight on expressions of remorse.
Some people are naturally articulate and persuasive. Others struggle to explain themselves, particularly when under considerable stress. Cultural differences, language difficulties and personal communication styles may influence how an apology is expressed and received.
There is also a danger that employees who contest allegations will be treated more harshly because they refuse to admit wrongdoing.
An employee is entitled to defend themselves. Maintaining innocence should not automatically be interpreted as a lack of insight.
Where misconduct has genuinely been established, willingness to undertake training or accept guidance may be more useful evidence of future conduct than an eloquent apology delivered at a disciplinary hearing.
The tribunal was entitled to assess the particular evidence in Mr Shing’s case. The wider point remains important.
Disciplinary consistency is not achieved merely by comparing the labels attached to allegations. Nor should employers be allowed to explain away obvious disparities with vague claims that every case is different.
Differences in treatment require credible explanations.
Mr Shing had also brought an indirect race discrimination claim concerning the university’s policies on personal relationships and professional boundaries. He argued that language and cultural differences placed Chinese employees at a disadvantage. The original tribunal rejected that claim, finding insufficient evidence of the alleged group disadvantage or that difficulties understanding the policy had caused his conduct. This was not a substantive issue determined in the appeal.
What union representatives should take from the judgment
The practical significance of Shing is not that HR now has a free hand. It is that allegations of improper influence need to be supported by evidence.
When I look at disciplinary cases from a representative’s perspective, one of the questions that matters most is whether the process has genuinely been open-minded. Was the employer investigating what happened, or assembling a justification for a decision already taken?
That distinction can be difficult to establish. An employer may follow every formal step while still approaching the case with a predetermined outcome.
A disciplinary invitation is issued. The hearing takes place. The employee is allowed to speak. A dismissal letter follows. On paper, the procedure looks respectable.
Yet the real issue may lie in the emails exchanged before the hearing or in changes made to an investigation report.
Where improper influence is suspected, representatives should examine drafts, correspondence, internal recommendations and any unexplained changes in findings or sanctions. The timing of communications can be revealing.
Did the investigator originally recommend a warning? Who suggested changing it? Was new evidence discovered, or did somebody simply take a different view of the desired outcome?
Were mitigating circumstances removed from the final report? Did senior management express expectations about the result? Was the employee given an opportunity to answer any new or more serious allegation?
Such questions are more productive than simply objecting to HR’s presence.
Relevant documents may sometimes be obtained through a subject access request, although exemptions and restrictions can apply. Where tribunal proceedings are underway, disclosure may provide a more effective means of obtaining material relevant to the issues in dispute.
Representatives should also study the employer’s disciplinary procedure. If it forms part of the employment contract, additional legal obligations may arise.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Chhabra v West London Mental Health NHS Trust [2013], considered in Shing, concerned interference with a process governed by particular contractual safeguards. The EAT made clear that those circumstances cannot automatically be applied to every workplace.
Even where the disciplinary procedure is not contractual, however, the employer must still comply with the statutory requirement of fairness.
That obligation is not satisfied merely by producing the right paperwork.
For an employee facing dismissal, the consequences are considerable. Losing a job can mean losing financial security, professional standing and confidence. Years of service may be swept aside by one decision.
Employers should therefore be expected to demonstrate that dismissal was genuinely considered necessary, rather than simply the easiest way of bringing an uncomfortable situation to an end.
Fairness is more important than appearances
Shing v University of the Arts London is a significant decision, although its implications should not be exaggerated.
It confirms that HR can properly advise managers about the seriousness of disciplinary allegations and the treatment of comparable cases. Such advice may help employers achieve consistency.
It does not authorise HR to manipulate evidence, impose predetermined outcomes or exert undue pressure on those responsible for disciplinary decisions.
Mr Shing ultimately failed because the tribunal accepted that the university had reached a reasonable decision through a fair process. His discrimination claim also failed because the circumstances of the colleagues he identified were materially different.
Whether dismissal was the best response to his conduct is another question. The original tribunal itself acknowledged that its members might not all have made the same decision.
That is perhaps the most troubling feature of the case from a worker’s point of view. Employment law allows employers considerable discretion, even where dismissal seems harsh.
Trade unions cannot remove that discretion, but we can insist that it is exercised fairly. We can challenge weak evidence, expose inconsistency, demand disclosure and ensure that employees have a genuine opportunity to defend themselves.
There is nothing objectionable about HR offering professional advice. The difficulty begins when advice becomes direction and the supposed decision-maker ceases to exercise independent judgement.
The test of a fair disciplinary procedure is not how many letters were sent, how many meetings were held or whether every box on a checklist was ticked.
It is whether the employee was genuinely heard, the evidence was fairly assessed and the outcome was reached without improper influence.
That is the standard every employer should be expected to meet.
Legal references: Shing v University of the Arts London [2026] EAT 154; Ramphal v Department for Transport [2015] UKEAT/0352/14; Chhabra v West London Mental Health NHS Trust [2013] UKSC 80; Employment Rights Act 1996, section 98; Equality Act 2010, sections 13, 19 and 23.
